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Multiregionalism and 
Multilateralism: Asian-European 
Relations in a Global Context 
Sebastian Bersick, Paul van der Velde and Wim Stokhof
ASEM’s tenth birthday celebrations will be in Finland which has the EU’s 
Presidency in the second half of 2006. Its capital Helsinki is gearing up to host 
the largest meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government in the history 
of the country. Approximately two thousand delegates and one thousand media 
representatives will gather for the sixth ASEM summit. There will also be a host 
of parallel meetings and conferences running in the beginning of September 
surrounding ASEM 6.
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was officially established in 1996 at the 
first summit in Bangkok. ASEM is an inter-regional process that consists of the 
ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, 
Japan, South Korea and the twenty five member states of the European Union 
(EU) plus the EU, represented by the European Commission and the Presidency 
of the European Council. The main components of the ASEM process, which has 
so far been loosely organized, include political dialogue, education and culture, 
security and economy. The process is generally considered by the parties involved 
to be a way of enhancing relations between Asia and Europe at all levels, which 
is deemed necessary to achieve a more balanced political and economic world 
order.
This book, Multiregionalism	and	Multilateralism:	Asian-European	Relations	in	
a	Global	Context is a sequel to the books which we edited before: ASEM	The	
Asia-Europe	Meeting.	A	Window	of	Opportunity	(London: Kegan Paul International 
1999); Asian-European	Perspectives:	Developing	the	ASEM	Process (London: Curzon 
2001) and the The	Eurasian	Space:	Far	More	than	Two	Continents (Singapore: 
ISEAS 2004). In the 1999 volume we looked at politicians’ views of ASEM and 
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possibilities to improve contact between Asia and Europe, addressing challenges 
and problem areas in an effort to map the probable future of ASEM. In the 2001 
volume, contributors answered questions of a more practical nature or reflected 
on the ideas the ASEM Vision Group had developed. How can the ASEM potential 
be realized? How can we create a useful ASEM vocabulary? How can we create 
a Eurasian Research Culture? Answers to these questions are of paramount 
importance to the continuation of the ASEM process. The 2004 volume examined 
levels of engagement between Asia and Europe, throwing light on how the ASEM 
process has been directly or indirectly useful in enhancing ties between various 
Asian and European countries, and in contributing to the general development 
of new approaches to international cooperation. 
The present volume focuses on the institutionalisation of intraregional and 
inter-regional cooperation in the international system. The contributors consist of 
academics who can rightly be called specialists in the young field of ASEM studies. 
Their contributions are a balanced mix of the multiregional and multilateral 
aspects of ASEM, the outcome of intensive (e)communication and a panel on the 
topic at the 2005 International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS 5) in Shanghai, 
which resulted in further fine-tuning of the present volume. In contrast to our 
previous volumes, the present one includes contributions by North and South 
American colleagues, which shows that ASEM is increasingly becoming a topic 
of interest to researchers worldwide. It also bears testimony to the fact that there 
is a growing awareness among politicians of the importance of the ASEM process 
in the emerging multilateral and multiregional world of the 21st century.
The Driving Force of Multiregionalism
Tânia Felício in her chapter ‘East Asia: The Missing Link in Multiregionalism’ 
focuses on how the crisis in multilateralism, especially at the security level, can 
be overcome through multiregionalism. She shows how multiregionalism is 
being encouraged by both regional-global and inter-regional processes pushing 
for region building in places previously dominated by state-to-state relations. 
Felício focuses on the inter-related phenomena of the developing regional-global 
security mechanism sponsored by the UN and the EU-Asia dialogue through 
ASEM. She analyses East Asia’s role in both multiregional fora and assesses the 
growing asymmetries in East Asia due to the lack of a regional approach. Felício 
furthermore contends that these asymmetries create a more positive attitude in 
East Asia towards closer cooperation while boosting their sense of regionhood. 
Michael Postert in his chapter ‘ASEM and EU-style Economic Integration in 
East Asia’ traces the positions of the actors in the financial architecture arena 
back to the Asian financial crisis. Support extended to the affected states was 
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not altruistic; nor were the preventive measures proposed thereafter. Asia’s 
financial architecture is a battleground between competing political agendas: 
integration into the IMF global regime or a more autonomous Asian regime 
loosely connected to the IMF. Asia under the de-facto guardianship of Japan has 
tried to reach a solution with US/IMF interests that sufficiently safeguards the 
needs of the region and its member states. In recent years, with the encouraging 
example of successful monetary integration in the EU, a more balanced and self-
assertive approach towards monetary and economic policy has emerged in East 
Asia. Postert shows how the process of inter-regional cooperation is leading to a 
more autonomous Asian policy approach in the field of economic and financial 
integration. Through interaction with the EU and other key actors, East Asia is 
shaping the contours of an emergent financial field in the multiregional world 
order. 
Christian Wagner deals with ‘India’s New Quest for Intra- and Inter-regional 
Politics’. Wagner takes a neo-realist view of interstate cooperation focusing on 
national interests and the relative gains of the state actors involved. Wagner reflects 
on India’s policies in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and concludes that 
India has followed a multi-faceted strategy through the 1990s, aiming for closer 
intraregional cooperation by strengthening existing organisations like SAARC 
and looking for new opportunities for regional cooperation by becoming more 
integrated in existing organisations like ASEAN and applying for membership 
in APEC and ASEM.
John Quigley in his chapter ‘Enhancing South-East Asia’s Security: The Aceh 
Monitoring Mission’ highlights a further important aspect of multiregionalism. 
Quigley focuses on the first-ever EU-ASEAN crisis management mission in Asia, 
which began in 2005. The implications for the security policies of both regional 
groupings may be significant. It is still early to tell, argues Quigley, but it may well 
have implications for EU external policy and ASEAN institutional structures.
The China Factor
Marc Lanteigne in his ‘ASEM and the Expanding China-European Union 
Relationship’ analyses the increasingly important role which ASEM is playing 
in the evolving relationship between China and the EU, as well as China’s 
engagement in the developing process of inter-regional relations between Europe 
and Asia. As China expands its post-Cold War foreign policy interests further 
beyond its periphery, the ASEM process has become an important forum for the 
country to address its expanding political, social and economic ties with Europe. 
China’s interest in the ASEM process has begun to move beyond the expansion of 
trade ties to include complex security issues between the two regions. Lanteigne 
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questions whether ASEM can be useful in mitigating conflict around issues 
separating Brussels and Beijing, e.g. differences over Chinese monetary trade 
policies. Furthermore, China’s participation in ASEM will be a crucial variable in 
determining whether ASEM will be able to distinguish itself from other regional 
and inter-regional institutions which have proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region 
over the past two decades.
Marisela Connelly in her ‘China and Latin America: The Economic Dimension’ 
gives a detailed overview of China’s increasing bilateral and multilateral 
involvement with Latin America over the past fifteen years, part of China’s search 
for raw materials to keep its economy on stream. The Chinese leadership is also 
aware that the region includes important countries like Mexico and Brazil which 
enjoy considerable prestige in international organisations. Yet many countries in 
Latin America still have diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Towards ASEM Awareness
Bart Gaens in his chapter ‘Beyond ASEM 6: Lessons for the Actors’ examines from 
a European point of view three key factors of ASEM cooperation: the informal 
approach; the achievement of tangible results and the non-institutionalised 
approach. ASEM’s open and informal character offers advantages for networking 
and for the free exchange of views, and allows for a comprehensive approach to 
global issues. It also underlines ASEM’s specific raison	d’etre within the array of 
available legal instruments and bilateral frameworks aiming to strengthen overall 
Asia-Europe relations. Rather than striving for grand projects or binding treaties, 
Gaens is of the opinion that the ASEM process needs to sharpen its focus with 
a view on attaining less spectacular but significant results, for example in the 
sphere of soft security through interfaith dialogue.
Yeo Lay Hwee in her contribution ‘Ten Years of ASEM – Changes and 
Challenges’ begins with a brief historical analysis of the genesis of ASEM. She 
then gives an overview of the key changes in the regional and global environment 
in which ASEM operates and examines how ASEM has and should respond to 
these changes. The chapter assesses the progress and achievements made so 
far and concludes with a look at the possible way forward for ASEM in the next 
decade.
Zhu Liqun’s ‘The Perception of ASEM in China’ is based on research by the 
ASEM research team done at four Chinese universities where questionnaires 
were handed out at random. This research sponsored by the Japan Centre for 
International Exchanges (JCIE) is timely because it gives us an idea to what 
degree ‘ASEM’ – following the ‘EU’ and ‘ASEAN’ – has become part of colloquial 
language over the past ten years. It comes as no surprise that awareness of ASEM 
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within the Chinese academic world barely exists. If comparable research was 
executed in other ASEM countries, the question remains whether the findings 
would differ. Research on awareness of ASEM in all member countries would 
thus be telling. Based on the outcome of such ASEM-wide research, a plan should 
be developed to devise ways to popularize ASEM. For in the final analysis, ASEM 
should be for, and of, the citizens. A policy of ASEMainstreaming should guide 
the post-Helsinki summit decade.
12
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East Asia: The Missing Link in 
Multiregionalism
Tânia Felício
The last years have witnessed a number of key changes and challenges in 
international relations, especially in the security area. Disagreements have 
continued over unilateral enforcement action without the authorization of the 
Security Council, and UN reforms have moved to the centre stage of debate. 
Some regional organisations have also gone through rapid periods of change and 
reflection and member states of the UN or other international organisations have 
started to wonder whether they should fund multilateral organizations or bilateral 
approaches. Critical questions of leadership, efficiency, duplication, transparency, 
democratic decision-making and accountability are heard more often than ever.
Today’s organising principle of global governance is multilateralism, defined 
by Higgott as ‘the management of transnational problems with three or more 
parties making policy on the basis of a series of acceptable, generalized principles 
of conduct’ – these being indivisibility, non-discrimination and diffuse reciprocity 
– creating collective trust amongst partners over time.1 The UN lies at the very 
core of the multilateral system, but as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
noted, ‘we can no longer take it for granted that our multilateral institutions are 
strong enough to cope with all the challenges facing them.’2 
The state-based system of cooperation and sovereignty has become increasingly 
problematic. Indeed, we seem to be in a period of crisis of confidence in the 
ability of multilateral institutions to meet the challenges of our times. The High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change outlined the unprecedented 
challenges the UN faces in the near future:3 more demands, higher expectations, 
greater public scrutiny, and often, diminishing resources. Furthermore, collective 
security has not worked in the manner envisaged by the UN Charter, and the 
developments of the past years have put severe strain on many of the traditional 
principles and tenets of multilateral security. 
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As Thakur and Van Langenhove have argued,4 the paradox of today seems to be 
that the policy authority for tackling global problems still belongs to states while 
the source of the problems and potential solutions is situated at the transnational, 
regional and global levels. This paradox is very visible especially in the security 
area; armed conflicts, terrorism, and nuclear weapons are some of the main 
‘problems without passports’. This may be the main reason for the very broadly 
publicized (namely by the UN Secretary-General) crisis in multilateralism. The 
conflicting doctrines of sovereignty, the use of force, and right to intervention limit 
the simple state-to-state approach to multilateralism and increase this paradox. 
In the past, the sovereign state had been the most obvious institution to cope 
with the challenges of modernization. However, under the impact of globalization, 
the state is losing these capacities. States tend to respond to the ‘complex 
interdependence’5 of a globalizing world by delegating authority to levels of 
governance above, below and laterally. This means that globalization is not only 
spurring state failure, institutional disintegration and other forms of fragmentation, 
as realists and critics of globalization argue, but is also contributing to institution-
building and the creation of new forms of cooperative international order.6
In order to assure that this crisis is overcome and the concept of multilateralism 
remains the basis of global governance, a stronger role must therefore be given 
to the regions by creating middle levels of governance that help overcome the 
problems of state-to-state approach at the global level. However, as far as region-
building and regional security cooperation issues are concerned, the different 
regions of the world have been moving at different paces. The case in point, 
East Asia and especially Northeast Asia, have had a weaker case for regional 
cooperation. The question is how to overcome the more bounded notions of 
sovereignty that limit decision-makers in the region. This chapter argues that 
the states of the region need to acknowledge the added value and comparative 
advantage of cooperation at the regional level in such a way that the disadvantages 
of a more limited sovereignty are overcome by the advantages of cooperation. Two 
processes are contributing to this change of perception in the East Asian region: 
1) the regional-global security mechanism and growing partnership between the 
UN and regional organisations for security; and 2) the inter-regional dialogue 
with Europe from within the ASEM process.
Both phenomena shall be analyzed, i.e. the developing regional-global security 
mechanism sponsored by the UN and the EU-Asia dialogue within the ASEM 
framework. Through the analysis of East Asia’s role in both multiregional fora the 
impact of the asymmetries that these relations have on East Asia’s intraregional 
and inter-regional cooperation shall be analyzed. Furthermore, there will also be 
discussed the linkage between these asymmetries and the creation of a political 
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will by the East Asian state actors to engage in cooperation, while their sense of 
regionhood is evolving.
Overcoming the Crisis in Multilateralism: Multiregionalism
As we face a crisis in multilateralism (the conflicting doctrines of sovereignty, 
the use of force and right to intervention limiting the simple state-to-state 
approach in international relations) the momentum is now on the renovation of 
the multilateral system through the adoption of far-reaching reform measures. 
These reforms are increasingly taking in the regional dimension, i.e. the 
role that multiregionalism can have in the development of a middle layer of 
governance between the state and the global level. This regional level approach 
to multilateralism is not only vertical (regional/global) but also horizontal (inter-
regional) through which regions and regional organisations support each other 
and the UN in its response to security threats in order to achieve an efficient 
security governance. 
The growing need to manage complex interdependence has paved the 
way for an accelerating vertical and horizontal differentiation of international 
institutions. Vertical differentiation denotes an emerging multilayered system of 
global governance which ranges from the local to the global level, characterized by 
a proliferation of new regional organisations. These organizations include novel 
intermediate levels of governance such as inter-regional dialogue fora and sub-
regional trans-border cooperation regimes. At the same time new inter-regional 
processes as well as the development of a parallel horizontal multiregionalism is 
taking place.
Regionalism is therefore becoming a major trend, perhaps a reflex of the feeling 
that the nation-state has become an unnatural, perhaps even dysfunctional unit for 
organizing human activity, especially where security is concerned. The inception 
of regionalism itself is somewhat related to security issues. The European Union 
– the fastest growing and most developed regional integration process of today 
– was created to keep the rivals of the Second World War out of conflict. Studies 
have concluded that regional organisations do help to create webs of functional 
links, which then improve relations between the member states. Functional 
interdependence promotes a sense of common identity or community among 
members; raises the threshold of tolerance because perceived benefits exceed 
perceived challenges; raises the cost of violent conflict; and provides mechanisms, 
experience and expectations of ‘integrative solutions’.7 The growing interest in 
cooperation with regional and other intergovernmental organisations in security 
can therefore be seen as a catalyst for the creation of a global-regional security 
mechanism. 
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The link between regionalism and security becomes even more evident 
with the development of the ‘new regionalism’. The metamorphosis in the 
nature of regionalism, from its almost exclusively economic and defence 
dimensions towards a more complex multi-sector comprehensive movement – 
involving political, social, economic, security and cultural issues in the broadest 
contemporary sense – is transforming regional organisations, making them 
more suitable to responding to security challenges and providing security as a 
regional public good. Regional response is faster, better informed, and more 
eager to deliver, because security and stability are essential for the well-being and 
development of the region. Regional organisations, if power is pooled at a higher 
degree, tend somewhat to be more autonomous and have better instruments to 
make their decisions binding and respected. 
An exclusive focus on the regional level would, however, also be misplaced. The 
interlinkages and the thin line between regional and global security challenges 
ask for cooperation and not competition – vertical and horizontal cooperation, as 
both have the potential to strengthen global governance. The interdependence is 
too strong to separate the different levels of governance. A multilevel relationship 
exists that needs to be addressed and well coordinated.
Vertical Multiregionalism: Regional-global Security Mechanism
Recent decades have seen a fast growth in regional and sub-regional organisations 
as well as a (slower) increasing recognition by the international community of the 
need for greater involvement of regional agencies in peace and security. At the 
same time enhanced cooperation between the regional and global levels is more 
visible.
The fundamental relationship between universalism and regionalism 
in security doctrine has been shaped by the UN Charter. Chapter VIII of the 
Charter addresses the issue of security regionalism; it allows for regional security 
arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security as a support to the 
primary role exercised by the Security Council, but without offering a formal, 
pre-fabricated mechanism of cooperation. In this first constitutional phase, when 
the UN Charter was conceived, the notion of regionalism was still in its infancy, 
this being very likely one of the reasons for a weak treatment of the regional 
level. But the 1950s followed with a burst of unparalleled creativity in regional 
institutional building in Europe, spreading to Africa and Asia in the 60s and the 
Caribbean and Pacific in the 70s, and supplemented by ‘late-comers’ in the 80s 
and 90s – when a global network of regional (and sub-regional) agencies was 
finally in place. 
In the 1990s the UN began to act on the recognition of the potential for greater 
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involvement of regional agencies in the pursuit of international security. Since 
the mid-1990s a series of meetings has been held aimed at developing a strategic 
partnership between the UN and regional agencies. This has taken two forms: 
a series of high-level meetings of the UN Secretary-General and UN specialised 
agencies with regional organisations, and three general meetings between the 
Security Council and regional organisations.8
These six High-level Meetings convened by the UN Secretary-General have 
resulted in a series of broad guidelines for operational measures in conflict 
prevention and peace-building. In recent years, the work surrounding the 5th HLM 
(July 2003) and 6th HLM (July 2005) has intensified. The latest meeting in July 
2005 introduced procedural innovations of potentially far-reaching significance, 
as the Secretary-General called for a ‘common vision of a global architecture 
of peace and security with interlocking capacities based on the comparative 
advantages of the global and regional institutions’.9 
Furthermore, the Security Council has undertaken initiatives in strengthening 
the partnership in the past few years. It has now held three meetings with regional 
and other organisations (April 2003; July 2004; October 2005), the most recent 
of which adopted a Council resolution on the UN-RO relationship for the first 
time. The Council expressed its determination to take appropriate steps to further 
the development of cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations 
in maintaining international peace and security consistent with Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter. It stressed the importance for the UN of developing the 
ability of regional and sub-regional organisations in pacific settlement and 
also their ability to deploy peacekeeping forces in support of UN operations or 
other Security Council-mandated operations. In addition the Council invited the 
Secretary-General to submit a report on the opportunities and challenges facing 
the cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations in 
maintaining international peace and security.10 
This new focus on a UN-RO partnership has been given some prominence by 
the high-level process leading up to the World Summit of September 2005. The 
2004 UN High-Level Panel noted the important role that regional organisations 
had to play in the area of international peace and security and called for more 
formalized agreements between them and the UN. In his report ‘In Larger 
Freedom’ of March 2005, the Secretary-General declared his intention to conclude 
a series of memoranda of understanding with partner organisations. These 
developments were noted and endorsed by the World Summit. 
However, as this partnership and the high-level meetings process advance, 
the inequalities and complexities of the relationship are becoming more and 
more visible. One of these is the over-representation of some regions next to the 
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lack of representation of others – namely Asia, and more specifically Northeast 
Asia. While European states are represented by four organizations on average, 
there is only one East Asian organization, i.e. ASEAN, involved which does not 
encompass the Northeast Asian states. The fact that China is represented by a 
different grouping of states – the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – raises 
further complexities. 
These complexities and asymmetry in representation from the East Asian 
region have been acknowledged by the UN Secretariat. In order to assure a more 
efficient and coherent regional-global cooperation process, the UN is trying to 
encourage region-building processes in Northeast Asia. The Secretariat’s unit 
on regional cooperation is therefore involved in the promotion of intraregional 
cooperation and integration in Northeast Asia. It is furthermore interested in a 
representation of East Asia in the high-level meetings’ process. Parallel to these 
global developments and its already achieved goals Northeast Asian state actors 
are progressively interested in this international dialogue forum, realizing that 
they will have to create their own regional structures in order to join the high-level 
meetings’ process at the UN.
Horizontal Multiregionalism: Inter-regionalism and ASEM
Inter-regionalism is a product of the so-called ‘new regionalism’, a second wave of 
regional institution-building following a first wave in the 1950s and 60s. The new 
regionalism reflects that, in view of the increasing number of policy issues with 
cross-border consequences, regional organisations have begun to pool and share 
sovereignty and resources, develop certain actorness qualities, and, as a logical 
consequence, to establish direct communicative links to each other.11 
Inter-regionalism has been encouraged and developed mainly by the EU, 
in full accordance with its regional approach, encompassing not only trade and 
investment but also political dialogue and cultural relations between the regions. 
This has become an increasingly important component of EU’s foreign policy 
relations. It is realized through a large number of inter-regional arrangements 
especially with more distant partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The EU’s 
ambition is also to formalize and institutionalize the relations between regional 
bodies and regions, but for pragmatic reasons the forms of inter-regional relations 
show some variety. 
The overall strategy towards Asia envisages extending the reach of the EU 
across issue areas in which previous engagement was limited – to issues such 
as security. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) represents a ‘new’ type of inter-
regionalism that is comprehensive and multisectoral, spanning trade and 
investments, politics, security and anti-terrorism, culture, technology and science, 
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drug trafficking, environmental protection and so on.12 Although the ASEM 
agenda is to include a huge variety of issues, this tends to be ad	hoc in nature, 
rather flexible and sometimes even unfocused. Differently from its strategy on 
Latin America and the ACP countries where the EU enjoys a status of stronger 
partner, in the ASEM dialogue the EU uses a pragmatic approach, with a more 
cautious stress on norms and good governance. 
Gilson’s study of ASEM and inter-regionalism has led her to conclude on five 
major functions that the theoretical literature on global governance and inter-
regionalism has attached to inter-regional fora: balancing, institution-building, 
rationalizing, agenda-setting and identity-building. Balancing is not a strategy based 
on military power but is designed to address political and economic disequilibria 
by readjusting institutional influence (in this regard APEC is a response to the 
emergence of a fortress Europe, as ASEM is a response to APEC). Inter-regionalism 
establishes a new layer of international interaction, spurs intraregional institution-
building through the formation of new coordination mechanisms and the creation 
of numerous subsidiary institutions addressing a broad range of agendas and 
policy issues. In addition inter-regional dialogues perform subsidiary clearing-
house and agenda-setting functions for global multilateral fora. Finally, the identity 
building refers to a reflexive process of interaction in which cognitive factors shape 
and sharpen regional identities, a process which has been aptly captured by the 
formula of ‘regionalism through inter-regionalism’.13
Gilson assesses how ASEM contributes to regional identification through 
functional institution building as well as through cognitive integration.14 The 
author considers that the real value of ASEM might just be that it opens up new 
ways for the participants to interact in the slow process of inter-regional definition. 
Looking at the performance of ASEM and the criticisms of its inability to be 
more than a mere ‘talking shop’, Rüland considers its disappointing performance 
to be a consequence of two major factors: structural weakness of inter-regional 
institutions and the crisis of multilateralism. Both are the reflection of state-to-
state based international actorness – as is visible in Asia. Rüland argues that in 
the case of asymmetric actorness capacities (such as in ASEM), inter-regional 
dialogues tend to adopt the institutional characteristics and cooperation norms 
of the weaker partner by using the lowest common denominator. It was made 
clear from the start that the process of dialogue would be conducted ‘the Asian 
way’ – through the understanding that ‘consensus is more important than 
breakthrough, camaraderie than formality and process than substance.’15 This 
asymmetry (in institutionalization and cultural approach to the inter-regional 
dialogue – bilateral for Asia while multilateral for Europe) would always impair 
the institutionalization and agenda setting of the meetings. The heterogeneity of 
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the membership and its diverse interests and mechanisms for cooperation still 
impair the degree of institutional coherence needed to develop ASEM into what 
Rüland calls a ‘multilateral utility’. As stated by the former EU External Relations 
Commissioner Patten ‘given the sprawling variety of Asia, it is absurd to think of 
a monolithic EU-Asia relationship’.16 
In his study of the ASEM process Sebastian Bersick argues that ASEM from 
its very beginning has been confronted with a conflict between two different 
perceptions of inter-regional cooperation, which materializes in the form of 
an institutional asymmetry. The Asian side thought of inter-regionalism as an 
intergovernmental modus that promotes and renders possible the cooperation 
between both regions on a state-to-state basis, whereas the European side 
intended ASEM to be a cooperation mechanism that enhances the development 
of two collective actors: one European and one Asian. Due to the impact of the 
Asian financial crises the perceptions of the Asian actors vis-à-vis regionalism 
have changed. The perceptional and institutional asymmetry is thus dynamic 
and in flux.17
According to Rüland, ASEM’s added value consists in its ability to serve as an 
Asian-European clearing house for global multilateral meetings. Inter-regional 
dialogues such as ASEM would thus contribute to a streamlining of the often 
gridlocked decision-making processes in global fora therefore enhancing the 
effectiveness of the global fora and contributing to strengthen EU and Asian 
voices. As a multilateral utility, ASEM would serve as an important mechanism 
exerting influence on world politics and at the same time fostering common Asian 
and European interests. For this aim to be achieved a more coherent approach 
from the Asian side is therefore needed.
Moreover, a review of ASEM documents suggests that ASEM participants 
have begun to direct increasing attention to non-traditional security threats (such 
as international terrorism, environmental degradation and energy security). This, 
however, still falls too short of a real dialogue on security matters.
In this context Bersick’s analysis of the effectiveness of ASEM demonstrates 
that ASEM performs the function of a security regime as it alleviates the danger 
of instability of the international system after the end of the Cold War.18 For ASEM 
to become more effective, it needs not only more institutionalization but also 
more binding and precise results. The challenge lies with the effectiveness of 
ASEM as a region-building catalyst. The advocacy for multilateralism adopted by 
ASEM is an important factor in this sense, a way to promote and strengthen the 
principle of multilateralism. In order to keep ASEM relevant in the long term, it 
must deepen its institutions to overcome the asymmetries and further balance 
the partnership.
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The Missing Region in the Multiregional Puzzle – Northeast Asia
Different world regions have been moving at different paces as far as 
regionalization is concerned, both in the institutionalization of their regions and 
regional organizations and in the development of a sense of regional identity or 
regionhood as argued by Van Langenhove.19 However, for one particular region 
of the world, the state-led approach and the focus on sovereignty and non-
intervention are still dominant trends. This is generally the case in Asia, but 
more clearly so in Northeast Asia, where no regional organization has yet been 
established to deal with global challenges, especially in the security field. Security 
remains a very sensitive issue for the Northeast Asian state actors to discuss at the 
regional level. Though today’s Asia faces serious security challenges (from border 
disputes to transnational crime and terrorism) it has not yet been able to join its 
efforts in a regional approach.
In most of East Asian countries, the tasks of nation-building and promoting 
domestic political stability or economic development are pre-requisites for 
greater integration. Moreover, the widely held view that a key aim of regional 
cooperation should be the strengthening and not the weakening of national 
autonomy has been an additional obstacle to further integration. National 
sovereignty has remained a concept deeply cherished by all East Asian states, 
and the unwillingness to give away certain parts of this sovereignty has posed a 
problem for the formation of a highly integrated and cohesive region similar to 
that of the EU.20 Furthermore, the historical animosities and political rivalries 
among the key players remain alive. The bilateral relationship between China 
and Japan is the most crucial. The lack of leadership in the region towards 
the creation of a regional identity is a further obstacle. Closely related to the 
previous issue are the deep structural inequalities that exist among the countries 
in the region, which result in patterns of hegemony and domination. Finally, 
the engagement of external powers, such as the US, in the region has been a 
further obstacle to the region’s cohesiveness and the development of a sense 
of regionhood.
As argued by Seng Tan, Asia’s long-term experience in regional security 
management can be understood in terms of a continued reliance on a bilateral 
alliance system and a forward military presence by the United States as well as 
in terms of an increasing flexibility vis-à-vis multilateral security dialogues.21 Yet, 
the stress is being put on the bilateral system of alliances. Because of this the 
Northeast region is in a disadvantaged position in relation to its actorness at inter-
regional and multilateral fora. At the vertical level in the UN-RO cooperation, and 
at the horizontal level in the inter-regional ASEM dialogue, it has become obvious 
that East Asia, and in particular Northeast Asia, have been under-represented, 
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because of the lack of institutionalized intraregional relations. Indeed, there is 
still no sense of regionhood in East Asia. 
The construction of East Asia as a political region has gathered some 
momentum during the last decade, specifically since the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis, which played a catalytic role in convincing the governments of East Asia 
of the extent of their countries economic interdependence. Although tangible 
evidence of political integration is still limited, there has been a significant increase 
in the level or volume of multilateral exchange between Asian governments and 
numerous ambitious collective projects have been adopted or are being negotiated. 
Some relate to ASEAN alone, other’s to ASEAN’s relations with Northeast Asia. 
However, the relations between Northeast Asian countries have remained under-
institutionalized.
In summary, although pragmatic regional cooperation has increased 
significantly in recent years, regional cohesion is still a distant goal. Despite the 
rapid growth of intraregional trade and investment, there has not been a strong 
movement towards institution-building. The political and economic heterogeneity 
of the region and the policy diversities and rivalries among key actors all constitute 
impediments to reaching a higher level of integration. 
In the same way that the European integration process helped to create a 
web of functional links that facilitated the improvement of relationships between 
its member states, a similar solution could be found for Northeast Asia. In this 
context one recent initiative which aims at creating a genuinely Northeast Asian 
regional community is the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative.
It is the ultimate goal of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative to 
materialize a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia by fostering the governance 
of cooperation and by building a regional community of mutual trust, reciprocity, 
and symbiosis. A proposal by the South Korean government expects to achieve 
this through three goals: 1) freeing the region from the threat of war (this 
requires the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as well as the building of a 
multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia in order to strengthen stability and 
the predictability of security dynamics); 2) encouraging regional cooperation and 
maximization of growth potential (this requires expanding regional cooperative 
enterprises and institutionalizing foundations for further cooperation); and 3) the 
comprehensive realization of regional peace, economic development and energy 
resource supply and environmental protection. The proposal particularly stresses 
efforts to accelerate regional cooperation in the energy and environment sectors 
in order to promote sustainable development.22
The initiative is guided by the principles of a functional approach to integration 
(using small scale energy-related projects in order to produce spill-over effects 
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in the economic, environmental and service sectors), simultaneous linkage (the 
need to exert concerted efforts in security, economic, and socio-cultural fields 
in an integrated manner), and multi-layered cooperation (with bilateral, sub-
regional, regional, and multilateral cooperation to be sought). 
The Multiregionalism Cycle: Pushing for Region-building 
The concept recently developed by Leonard, the Regional Domino Effect, argues 
that inter-regional and regional-global cooperation processes both lead to the 
development of new processes of region-building. This regionalism is not about 
autarchic blocs in competition it is about clubs that promote global development, 
regional security, and open markets for their members. And as each region 
develops their own arrangements, they will cumulatively have an impact on world 
order. 23
The EU can be seen as a catalyst for regionalization, namely through inter-
regionalism and specifically with the ASEM dialogue; it promotes regionalism 
in East Asia through further institutionalization of the cooperation and through 
coordination for agenda-setting. The development of the ASEAN+3 process and 
growing intraregional dynamics have indeed been reinforced by participation in 
the inter-regional dialogues with the EU (namely ASEM). 
Even if the results of the ASEM process can still be considered disappointing 
– namely in the security field – there is no question that its practices are already 
taking shape in the formation of an ‘Asian’ identity within the forum (the Asian 
states meeting as a forum prior to ASEM meetings, in order to coordinate their 
positions), leading some authors to argue that ASEM is this way serving as a kind 
of regional integrator. There is a growing desire in East Asia to establish a greater 
sense of regional cohesion in order that the given region plays a more significant 
role in the conduct of inter-state relations at the regional and international level. 
While the idea of using ASEM as a regional integrator may not be the common 
strategy or position of all Asian members, it is undeniable that ASEM provides 
another venue for dialogue and cooperation that encourages region-building 
through coordination of policies and consequent development of the sense of 
regionhood, seen as the gradual development of a sense of regional identity.24
As Bersick points out ASEM has developed overarching intersubjective 
structures. Its persistence can be explained by the development of a collective 
identity and collective interests. The ASEM regime has the function to develop 
an intersubjective structure that constitutes a context of interaction that allows 
for the formation of a collective identity on the inter-regional level. Therefore the 
ASEM regime is an example of a socializing process of state actors into an inter-
regional structure.25
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For the participating states of East Asia, the ASEM forum provides a first-
hand examination of the practices of regional integration. ASEM establishes 
a framework in which East Asia can present itself as a regional political and 
economic entity. Although ASEM is not a gathering of two pre-existing regions, 
the use of the concept of ‘equal partnership’ represents an attempt to create a 
region-to-region dialogue. Inter-regionalism is seen here as a ‘double-regional 
project’ in which existing regions trigger the formation of new ones. The 
functional requirements of the ASEM process mean that while the European 
Commission and the European Council represent the EU, the East Asian side 
also has to find intraregional agreements prior to the meetings. The East Asian 
region is thereby becoming a ‘spontaneous political actor’.
However, the process of region-building in East Asia or Northeast Asia does 
not have to be based on the European model. It would be a mistake to perceive the 
European approach or model as a blueprint for region-building in other regions. 
Region-building processes must adapt to the region itself. It is therefore unlikely 
that Asia will follow the European model of ‘sovereignty pooling’. Being more 
sensitive to the issue of national sovereignty, East Asia/Northeast Asia will likely 
adopt a less formalized cooperation process, developing selective, issue-specific 
strategies to enhance regional stability and competitiveness. Such a development 
should not be mistaken for unsuccessful region-building. The degree to which 
Asia can develop institutional capacity in the absence of sovereignty pooling is 
the challenge of the future.
At the regional-global level the same token can be acknowledged. Asia is the 
least represented region in the high-level meetings between the UN and the 
regional organisations. Yet, there is no organisation that represents Northeast 
Asia. This fact is being acknowledged by the region’s states, realising that indeed, 
security issues are more and more managed at the regional level. One of the 
objectives of the High-level Meetings’ process of the UN is to help strengthen 
regional organisations in regions of the world with a weak regional identity. The 
recent Korean initiative seems to be responding accordingly, with a proposal that 
goes over the modest economic and financial cooperation initiatives, linking 
economic development with energy and environment issues and with security.
During the seventh ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting (May 2005) ministers 
confirmed their commitment to multilateralism, and to a fair, just and rule-based 
international order, with the UN at its heart playing the central role to effectively 
address new global challenges and threats.26 However, even if issues of terrorism, 
disarmament and non-proliferation and transnational organized crime are already 
part of the agenda, there is still little focus on regional security issues of higher 
sensitivity such as border disputes. 
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It seems, indeed, too early for the East Asian countries to sit round a table 
and discuss their regional security with another region. However, intraregional 
cooperation may be the first step to creating a region of peace which is a 
precondition for a strong role at the global level. East Asia can only expect to be a 
stronger actor at the global level when it overcomes its differences and becomes 
a unified actor.
Conclusion
Traditional theories of International Relations, such as realism, emphasise the 
primacy of the state as an actor in the international system. Institutions have 
only a marginal role. Indeed, the main problem of multilateralism is this still-
dominant traditional state-to-state approach in international relations. Both the 
developing regional-global dialogues in security (sponsored by the UN) and the 
inter-regional processes have been pushing for the overcoming of this state-to-
state approach, leading to the slow but gradual creation of a sense of regional 
identity in East Asia. The present chapter tried to overcome this realist perception 
of international relations, showing how the regional level of governance is 
gradually becoming a preferred forum of dialogue and of response for security 
issues. This trend is visible not only at the vertical, regional-global level but also 
at the horizontal, inter-regional level. Multiregionalism is therefore becoming a 
major trend in international relations.
Because some regions develop institutions more slowly than others, the 
existing multiregional fora can be catalysts for further region-building as less-
institutionalized regions are becoming aware of their own regional identity 
when being perceived as a region. They realize they do need to cooperate 
intraregionally in order to have a ‘seat at the table’ in inter-regional and global fora. 
If multilateralism is developing both through regional-global cooperation and 
through inter-regional cooperation processes, than both vertical and horizontal 
cooperation ask for new regional processes. East Asia cannot be far from this 
trend.
The role of the EU and the ASEM dialogue in this process of gradual region-
building in East Asia is in this respect to be seen as that of a regional integrator, 
the EU therefore using inter-regionalism for region-building and the consequent 
strengthening of multilateralism. It is also supporting the development of 
a regional-global security mechanism through the encouraging of regional-
building in the weakest institutionalized region, which up to now has been 
under-represented in the regional-global process of cooperation. Furthermore, 
the role of the EU in its support for multilateralism within the ASEM process 
constitutes a policy of strengthening regionalism. Thereby the role of the state-
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to-state approach, which is considered to be the main reason for the present crisis 
of multilateralism, diminishes.
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ASEM and EU-style Economic 
Integration in East Asia
Michael Postert
The financial architecture of the Asian region is a cornerstone of competing 
political agendas: on the one hand, integration into the IMF/US global regime, 
and on the other, a more autonomous Asian regime more loosely connected 
and subordinated to the IMF. These competing agendas were clearly visible in 
the controversy over the introduction of an AMF and in the policy approaches 
of the US, Japan and other actors. The Asian financial crisis thus constitutes a 
focal point for financial integration models in the Asian region. As Maull points 
out: ‘International order will need to be multi-layered to be effective: given the 
complexities of international relations, an intermediate level between the state and 
the international system at large will often probably be indispensable.’1 Against 
this background it is instructive to study competing parties, ideas and concepts 
for shaping a financial and monetary intermediate layer in East Asia.
The competition can be seen as a sequenced one between the Asia-Pacific (e.g. 
APEC) and ASEM. Asia, under the de-facto guardianship of Japan, first tried to 
reach a joint solution with US/IMF interests to sufficiently safeguard its needs as 
a region. Ian Taylor summarizes these efforts within APEC. Realizing the limits 
of the approach, and to emancipate itself from US dominance, Asia increasingly 
leaned towards Europe to tap its experience in economic and monetary integration. 
Here Europe appeared as the more trustworthy partner, whose interests more 
closely resembled the needs of Asian states than the US’s agenda. The Euro was 
furthermore recognized as the most probable currency to challenge US Dollar 
dominance in the global economy.2
Bearing this Dollar/Euro competition in mind, cooperation within the 
ASEM process benefits EU as well as East Asian interests. From both Asian and 
European perspectives, enforcing the weak side of the US-East Asia-EU triad 
relationship makes sense. Building up a counterweight to US Dollar dominance 
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by strengthening the Euro or establishing an effective East Asian monetary 
arrangement as a potential third pillar strengthens Asia’s ability to counter future 
Asian crisis-style economic turmoil. In the light of the above, we pose the following 
questions: Do Asian-European relations and its model of an international system 
of multiple regional actors constitute the contours of a new multi-regional world 
order? What, then, is the role of the EU and of East Asia?
A reduction in current Dollar dominance coupled with the likely further 
emergence of the Euro as a more ‘benevolent currency’ will enlarge Japanese 
influence in the region. The very size of the Japanese economy virtually guarantees 
the importance of Japan in any economic and monetary integration scenario 
in the Asian region. Asian and Japanese positions will therefore be treated as 
synonymous below.
This analysis will address the transformation of the international system 
since the end of systemic bipolarity in international relations where competing 
interests over financial architecture can be seen as a case study in the broader 
struggle between the concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism on the one 
hand and regionalism on the other. Hettne subsumed this struggle of concepts 
by contrasting ‘Pax Americana’ with ‘Pax Europaea’, stating that ‘regionalism, 
implying the institutionalised multipolar world order structure preferred by the 
EU, is unacceptable to the United States, which, furthermore, has made it very 
clear that multilateralism, although desirable, also has its limitations as set by 
US security interests.’3 Or put differently, US efforts to establish a unilateral 
world order have provoked blowback,4 witnessed by Asian-European attempts 
to coordinate their efforts in the financial field – which can be interpreted as 
attempts to form a multilateral and inter-regional answer to the hegemonic 
ambitions of the United States.
Below we point to the economic rationale for closer Asian economic and 
financial integration based on the experience of the Asian financial crisis. 
Discussion of EU economic and monetary integration will allow for a comparative 
perspective on political and financial integration. Finally, analysis of inter-regional 
financial cooperation in the context of the ASEM process and the Kobe Research 
Project will provide an empirical account of the contours of a new multi-regional 
world order. As will be shown, European experience and policies serve as a point 
of reference for Asian monetary integration.
Economic Reasons for Financial Integration in Asia
A variety of factors hint there is need for closer cooperation in the economic 
and monetary field in East Asia. As Fee states, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
struck ‘despite robust economic growth, macroeconomic stability and favourable 
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investment flow’.5 Reasons for the so-called Asian crisis are manifold. Three 
theories that explain the developments have found many followers: 1) Rising 
short term debt, a growing current account deficit and fixed exchange rates;6 
2) The effects of crony capitalism: misallocated investment, low confidence 
in government policies, ‘weak supervision of the financial sectors, inadequate 
corporate governance and general lack of transparency’;7 3) The effects of 
a classical financial panic: a run on the banks, mass capital flight and global 
speculative attacks that Sachs called a ‘self-fulfilling crisis’.8
To prevent similar crises in the future and to accommodate increased 
economic integration in the region, many initiatives have been introduced. These 
were originally intended (before the crisis) to facilitate communication among 
central banks. In the aftermath of the crises the prevention of similar events 
moved to the centre stage of monetary coordination; activities and initiatives were 
thus intensified. 
In September 1997 the Japanese government proposed an Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF) at the annual IMF-World Bank meeting. The proposal sparked a 
controversy in the Asian region as well as in the US, as neither the IMF nor the 
US were willing to share their monetary supremacy with a regional institution. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government followed increasing Japanese influence in 
the region with suspicion.9
Subsequently the Japanese government was ‘forced to withdraw the AMF 
initiative because of U.S. opposition’.10 Instead Tokyo accepted the Manila 
Framework as a compromise in November 1997.11 The idea of an AMF, i.e. an 
Asian institution by Asians for Asians, was thus substituted with a looser and 
broader arrangement.12 Within the Manila Framework the participating states 
agreed on the following proposal for a loose institutional arrangement:13
1. Enhanced regional surveillance; 
2. Intensified economic and technical cooperation to improve domestic financial 
systems and regulatory capacities; 
3. Adoption of new IMF mechanisms on appropriate terms in support of strong 
adjustment programs; and 
4. A cooperative financing arrangement to supplement, when necessary, IMF 
resources.
The Japanese proposal of an autonomous AMF was thus watered down. At the 
same time the role of the IMF ‘to remain sole international lender of last resort’14 
was reinforced. The Manila Framework did not include any IMF-style sanctions 
such as linking financial support to commitments on fiscal policy by receiving 
states. It basically institutionalized a process of peer review of national policies 
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and measures through regular meetings. It also aimed for mutual understanding 
of each others’ financial and monetary policies through improved transparency. 
Because of its low level of institutionalisation, the Manila Framework did not 
threaten the IMF’s authority and role as lender of last resort in the region. It was 
merely considered a useful supplement under IMF authority.
In December 1998 Fred Bergsten proposed an Asian Pacific Monetary Fund 
(APMF) since ‘effective early warning systems’ of financial crisis were needed.15 
The new fund was to be based on the Manila Framework and was to share, 
together with the ADB, the same set of responsibilities on a regional level that the 
IMF and the World Bank share on the global level. This new institution should 
only act together with IMF programs, for three reasons:
1.  No Asian country could effectively lead the effort.
2.  An ‘Asia only’ grouping would risk dividing rather than uniting the two sides 
of the Pacific.
3.  The United States could indeed play a decisive role in making an APMF 
work.
These reasons reflect the different interests of the US and the IMF and the – to 
some extent disappointed – East Asian states led by an increasingly active Japan. 
The Japanese government was much more willing to use its economic weight to 
wield influence in the region than previously. The AMF proposal clearly indicated 
that Tokyo was moving towards a more assertive economic and financial self-
protection policy that was not synchronized with American or IMF policies.16 
Stiglitz concluded that the negative effect of the financial crisis would have been 
far lower, ‘if policy formulating would have been left to Japan, to the countries 
of East Asia’.17 According to Hettne ‘the affected countries were frustrated over 
the lack of remedies offered on the global level. In the West the opportunity was 
taken to impose neoliberal policies in a region known (and criticised) for its 
interventionism.’18
In the aftermath of the Asian economic and financial crisis, East Asian actors 
must choose to either have the US/IMF complex as an inseparable partner in 
the Asian region, or to seek a different solution. One possible answer is support 
from a ‘less intrusive’ EU. How such European involvement may look and why 
it may prove so attractive to East Asian actors becomes obvious when analyzing 
US interests.
The US’s Stake in East Asian Financial Integration
The interest of the EU and Japan in using their economic leverage to shape a new 
world order that assures stability (crucial for the economic well-being of their 
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societies) goes hand in hand with Washington’s demand that the EU and Japan 
should share the burden of assuring political stability in the world. However, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for the US to keep their formerly dependant cold 
war allies in line. Issue-based challenges to US supremacy occur frequently.
Sensing an imbalance and US supremacy within their respective bilateral 
relations with the US, both the EU and Japan share an interest in improving 
their bilateral relations, increasing policy coordination and counter-balancing US 
influence in case of conflicting interests with the US. Even though there is no 
open challenge to US supremacy in general, the EU and Japan do have an interest 
in promoting their own goals or at least in having the capacity, leverage and global 
reach to do so in case of need.
Looking at the US-EU-Asia triangular relationship, it can be concluded that 
the EU-Asia side is underdeveloped compared to the trans-Atlantic and trans-
Pacific sides. Economically the US is as powerful as the EU or Japan. Yet, in 
the political and security sphere the US is in a class of its own. The US is the 
only remaining superpower, unlikely to be challenged in decades to come due 
to its influence on the domestic and foreign policy behaviour of many states. As 
Takashi Inoguchi argues, this amounts to a virtual network of global governance 
dominated by the US.19 The US thus has tremendous influence in world politics, 
in the realm of global finance, and on the issues that appear regularly on the 
agenda of the ASEM process.
Within the APEC framework, US involvement complicated Asian actors’ 
search for support for crisis prevention and monetary integration in East Asia. It 
was felt that an East Asian strategy to surmount the crisis did not match the neo-
liberal globalization agenda championed by the US. Higgott states that the efforts 
of Washington D.C. and East Asian governments to avoid dispute by ostensibly 
stressing the need for liberalization ‘only superficially concealed a deeper schism 
between the two edges of the Pacific.’20 US/IMF initiatives even had a worsening 
effect on East Asian economies and societies. Taylor argues that an ‘ongoing 
economic antagonism between Washington and Tokyo [existed] at a time of crisis, 
[as did] a suspicion of American motives by many Asian leaders. For America, 
the Asian crisis presented Washington with a major opportunity to advance its 
influence in the region and subvert Japanese economic interests, which had built 
up during the boom times.’21 Taylor concludes that APEC served as a ‘US-centered 
counterfoil to an emerging Japan-ASEAN bloc’ and as an institution to further 
‘the structural power of US-based transnational capital’.22
Asian APEC members also seem uneasy with the US administration’s attempt 
to securitize the economic sphere in international relations. US attempts at 
several post 9/11 APEC Summits to subordinate economic and financial issues 
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to the US administration’s security agenda, i.e. the fight against terrorism, were 
met with scepticism by Asian actors. This policy was considered unbalanced, not 
reflective of the needs of East Asia and demonstrative of the US’s loss of interest 
in Asian economic integration.23
As a consequence the US has lost ground. Two explanations for the 
recent position of the US towards East Asian regional integration can be 
differentiated.24
1) The sceptical view: reflects US scepticism that regional integration in East 
Asia does not work due to Japan-China rivalry. US intervention against 
regional integration may trigger defiance among Asian countries and may 
thus result in blowback or in unwanted further steps towards integration. US 
indifference may reflect Washington’s reduced influence in East Asia due to 
China’s emergence as a regional power.
2) The optimistic view: Regional integration in East Asia does have a positive 
impact on US corporations and thus on the US economy. Furthermore, 
regional integration may have an appeasing and containing influence on 
Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the region. It thus satisfies overriding US 
security and balance-of-power concerns. 
Recent indifference of the US administration to economic issues in East Asia 
can be explained as follows: So long as East Asian regional powers accept in 
principle not to challenge the US over security issues, Washington is much more 
willing to accept economic or financial integration in East Asia, even if it is not a 
key participant. Alienated by the US preoccupation on security and securitization 
of the economic sphere, East Asian actors are making use of this window of 
opportunity for regional economic integration. Here the EU can be considered a 
successful model; the steps leading to the Euro are briefly outlined below.
Monetary Integration in Europe
The EU path to financial integration can be seen as a reference for East Asian 
economies to direct their own economic and financial integration process. This 
is not to advocate that the European model should be imitated in detail. Yet, it is 
instructive to highlight that in 1992/93 Europe was obviously in a situation that 
demanded the smoothing out of the effects of a financial crisis similar to the 
Asian one. The basic steps towards a Monetary Union shall be discussed as they 
may serve as a point of reference for closer monetary cooperation in East Asia. 
Two research reports have had important influence on the process towards a 
Monetary Union and a single European currency and served as a justification for 
the subsequent moves towards the euro:25
The ’Cecchini report’ in 1988 came to the conclusion that 4% gains in the 
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then EU-GDP would be achievable through the abolition of border controls, 
the reduction of trade barriers, the liberalization of services and the opening 
of national procurement markets. The report ‘One Market – One Currency’ 
analysed how the EC would profit from the transition from an EMS to an EMU 
within a single European market. The report identifies the following effects: 
Gains in micro-economic efficiency through the abolishment of exchange rate 
uncertainties and transaction costs, macro-economic stabilization through 
increased financial discipline due to the abolishment of exchange rates, more 
just allocation of goods and services and foreign trade and payments effects due to 
the international strengths of the euro and its influence on international currency 
order and coordination.
Finally, the EMU was realized in a three-stage approach:
1.  From July 1990 to December 1993 the single European market was finalized.
2.  From January 1994 to December 1998 four convergence criteria26 were set 
and measures to reach convergence in the EU member states were introduced. 
Meeting these criteria within a defined margin was mandatory for all EU 
member states that wished to be part of ‘Euro land’ from the start.
3.  On January 1st, 1999 the exchange rates between all participating member 
states and the Euro were fixed and on January 1st, 2002 euro bills and coins 
were introduced. 
The three stages leading to the EMU are a blueprint or at least a guideline for 
any East Asian activity of further economic and monetary integration. These 
activities may ultimately lead to an East Asian Currency or more likely to a less 
ambitious monetary integration. Kwan proposes a three-stage approach that is 
quite similar to the European path towards the euro that could be implemented 
in East Asia:27
1.  The countries peg their currency to Yen dominated currency baskets reflecting 
their trade relations with Japan.
2.  All participating countries peg against a currency basket (Asian currency unit) 
and allow their currency to float against other currencies outside the basket. 
3.  A common currency would be adopted and a common central bank would 
conduct monetary policy.
The European Union thus seems to serve as a silent point of reference for East 
Asian integration activities. What is more: the more the US/IMF approach 
got discredited in the eyes of Asian politicians and decision makers the more 
the European approach has become attractive without any proactive European 
contribution.
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Asia-Europe Financial Cooperation: The Case of ASEM
The ASEM process was created out of the perceived need for a link between East 
Asia and Europe. ASEM was thus established to complement the institutionalized 
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cooperation and policy coordination.28 The 
process offers its participants a forum to develop their own policy identity that 
can – if judged necessary – differ from US approaches. Furthermore, the ASEM 
participants are in political and economic terms strong enough not to be ignored 
by the US.
Loose regional structures in Asia, Japan’s dominance as the leading economic, 
financial and aid donating power in the region and its particularly close security 
cooperation with the US may be considered as ambiguous by Tokyo’s neighbours. 
Furthermore Tokyo does not consider an inter-regional organization such as 
ASEM as a ‘good place for an economic superpower to assert itself’ because of 
Japan’s ‘continuing commitment to bilateralism’.29 However, Reiterer identifies a 
‘stabilizing effect’ of ASEM on its partners and concludes that there are ‘enough 
elements to qualify ASEM as a partial regime or a regime in	statu	nascendi as the 
expectations of partners have not converged at the same intensity in the three 
pillars of ASEM.’30
According to Higgott besides original ASEM tasks, the ASEM process could 
also play a secondary supportive role in important areas such as the new monetary 
regionalism in the Asian region. Asia can profit from European experience 
and knowledge.31 The ASEM financial dialogue has so far concentrated on 
macro-economic issues through the exchange of views on the global economic 
situation, financial developments and the on international financial architecture. 
Furthermore, targets have been developed for the implementation of ‘existing 
supervisory principles and regulations in the financial sector such as combating 
money laundering and closer co-operation in the field of customs’.32 As a reaction 
to the Asian financial crisis two initiatives were adopted at the ASEM London 
Summit in 1998: An ASEM Trade Pledge expressing the vow of all ASEM 
members to avoid protectionism and to pursue multilateral liberalisation and 
second, an ASEM Trust Fund that assists policy reform by providing technical 
advice and training.
At the second Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ meeting in January 1999, 
the Finance Ministers continued discussions on the international financial 
architecture focusing on exchange rate regimes, financial transparency of 
financial institutions, and dealt with IMF experience concerning the control of 
capital movements. The politicians placed particular hope on the stimulus of the 
demand side in the Japanese economy and praised the financial aid packages of 
the Miyazawa Initiative along with the appraisal of US and Chinese efforts and 
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support. The EU experience with the Euro was shared among all ASEM partners. 
However the Chairman’s Statement did not suggest any link between European 
monetary integration and Asian initiatives.33 Emphasis was put on financial sector 
restructuring and supervision and technical assistance including the ASEM Trust 
Fund and the European Financial Expertise Network.
At the third Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ Meeting in January 2001 the 
Finance Ministers praised the important role ASEM had played in resolving the 
Asian financial crisis as well ‘as through the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) and the bilateral initiatives by ASEM partners’.34 The performance of 
the Euro was again reviewed. Yet, no direct link between the Euro and Asian 
financial cooperation was mentioned in the Chairman’s Statement, even 
though the lessons learned from European financial integration and the status 
of regional financial integration in Asia including exchange regimes were 
discussed. However, paragraph 29 of the Chairman’s Statement mentions the 
proposal of the Kobe Research Project. Thereby, the link between European and 
Asian financial cooperation finds its way into the official documentation of the 
discussions. Thus there exists an increased awareness about the relevance of the 
European experience for Asian monetary integration. It does not seem, however, 
that this issue was approached by the participants of the meeting in a holistic way. 
A particular emphasis was placed on ‘strengthening the international financial 
system and prevention of the recurrence of a crisis.’ The ASEM partners ‘welcomed 
the recent progress achieved to enhance the transparency and legitimacy of the 
IMF’ and ‘they also called on the IMF to enhance its accountability’. Thus the 
specific mentioning this topic in the Chairman’s Statement arguably reveals a 
certain discontent with the past performance of the IMF. 
At the fourth Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ meeting in July 2002 the 
ministers again discussed global economic development and agreed ‘that Europe 
and Asia should increasingly cooperate and coordinate in the economic and 
financial sphere’35 and that they should combat abuses of the global financial 
system. This time they encouraged IMF initiatives ‘such as Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (FSAP)’ in order to get an early financial warning system in place 
to avoid a future currency crisis. The introduction of the Euro was evaluated 
positively in the sense that it would support further integration of the European 
economies. In addition, regional economic integration within the ASEAN+3 
process was greeted by the ministers for the first time as a further step towards 
Asian monetary and economic integration. Also stressed on this occasion were 
activities such as the Chiang Mai initiative for more transparency, frequent 
meetings of central bank heads and active policy dialogue by the ASEAN+3 Finance 
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Ministers. The discussions showed that the ASEM Finance Ministers had an 
increased awareness of Asian ‘regionness’ on the ASEAN+3 level. It thus signifies 
a further step towards an equal footing between Asia and Europe. Making Asia 
and Europe more comparable in this regard may increase the receptiveness of 
EU monetary policy tools and experience on a regional level in Asia. It could thus 
reduce reservations on the Asian side concerning a loss of sovereignty because of 
the advantages that further integration in the financial field merits.
At the fifth Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Bali in July 2003 
basically all previously discussed topics were addressed again. However, more 
specific positions were taken on topics concerning the ‘Partnership for Growth 
and Development between Asia and Europe’ and ‘Development of inter-regional 
financial cooperation’. The ministers ‘acknowledged that sharing of experience 
and technical assistance from European partners is helpful in strengthening 
fiscal and financial cooperation both within Asia and between the two regions’. 
Furthermore, the politicians ‘welcomed progress in regional financial cooperation 
under the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) Finance Ministers’ 
Process, including the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, development of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, enhanced policy dialogue in the region, monitoring of capital flows 
and a model for an early warning system. 36
The sixth Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ meeting took place in Tianjin, 
China, in June 2005. For the first time Finance Ministers from the new EU 
member states as well as from the new Asian ASEM members were present. 
The President of the Asian Development Bank, the Deputy Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund, the Managing Director of the World Bank 
and the Vice-President of the European Central Bank attended as guests and 
the Ministers convened under the policy theme of ‘Closer ASEM Economic and 
Financial Cooperation’.37 Most initiatives that had been started earlier, such as the 
discussion of macro-economic developments and the global development agenda 
were discussed. In addition, the question of energy security, notably the potential 
of oil to trigger a substantial macro-economic shock to the world economy, was, 
inter	alia, part of the agenda as well. There was also agreement on continuing 
key initiatives such as the ASEM Trust Fund, and the establishment of an ‘ASEM 
Contingency Dialogue Mechanism for Emergent Economic and Financial Events 
to strengthen the institutional capacity of ASEM to respond to emergencies’.38
The seventh Asia-Europe Finance Ministers’ Meeting took place in April 2006 in 
Vienna, Austria. Senior officials of the Asian Development Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank attended again 
as guests. Their influence on the discussions is reflected by the similarity of the 
assessment of the global economic situation and its influencing factors in the 
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Chairman’s Statement of the ASEM event and reports of the Asian Development 
Bank (Asian Development Bank 2006) and the World Bank (World Bank 2006).39 
The Chairman’s Statement lists many additional concrete measurements that 
look beyond these general assessments of the current state of the world economy: 
structural policies (R&D, education, infrastructure), ‘a sustained stabilisation 
of oil markets’, Anti Money Laundering and various measurements on country 
or even local level with the target of ‘Making Globalisation a Success for All’. 
Moreover, many concrete measurements such as capacity building in important 
areas, dialogue between partners and initiatives are listed in the chapter: ‘Practical 
Aspects of the cooperation between Asia and Europe’. This hints at a more concrete 
orientation of the Asian and European partners on the one hand and a more 
relaxed attitude towards other regional and global institutions on the other. ASEM 
participants are accepting assessments and forecasts from institutions such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. They are displaying, thus, a more 
mature assessment of the current state of the world economy and of the positions 
of arguably competing institutions to ASEM. Furthermore, ASEM participants are 
more open towards the ambitions of actors like Japan that hint at regional financial 
integration. This development could not necessarily have been expected in light of 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.
It can be observed that the ASEM partners increasingly address details in their 
approach towards regional financial integration in Asia within the ASEAN+3 and 
the ASEM framework. Thus the actors of the ASEAN+3 process and of the EU 
increasingly view themselves as entities which are increasingly integrating. The 
review of each others performance, in the inter-regional context of the ASEM 
process, contributes to a more integrated view on economic and financial policies. 
In such an atmosphere of mutual respect it should be possible for East Asia 
to follow European footsteps in economic and monetary integration in its own 
shoes. One approach to tailor these shoes according to East Asian needs is The 
Kobe Research Project.
The Kobe Research Project
The Kobe Research Project focused on information sharing among ASEM 
partners in the macroeconomic and financial fields through developing a 
network among ASEM policymakers and think tanks. It aimed to provide a 
foundation for policy dialogue and decisions. The result of the Kobe Research 
Project will thus serve as a catalyst for giving an overview on the current status 
of research and policy choices available to evaluate policy decisions. Reference 
to European experience on monetary integration and the introduction of the 
Euro can be identified.
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The results of the Kobe Research Project were presented to the Fourth 
ASEM Finance Minister’s Meeting in Copenhagen in July 2002. More than 50 
economists authored papers on the following topics:40 Exchange Rate Regimes 
for Emerging East Asian and EU Accession Countries; Currency Regimes: The 
European Experience and Implication for East Asia, Strengthening Financial 
Cooperation and Surveillance; Enhancing Regional Monitoring and Integration: 
Instruments, Steps, and Sequencing; The European and Asian Financial Systems 
in Perspective: The Cases of Spain and China; China in a Regional Monetary 
Framework.
The individual steps of the progress of European monetary integration can 
be identified in the topics above. In addition, its conclusions show a certain 
disregard for IMF recipes. They clearly point to an economically and monetarily 
integrated, autonomous Asia, perhaps to be expected with the EU’s head start 
on Asian ASEM members concerning monetary and economic integration, and 
EMU serving as a model for Asian economic integration.
The Kobe Research Project makes six suggestions:41 
1.  A European-style symmetric approach to economic and financial integration. 
This should be supported by:
2.  A currency basket system of major currencies such as the US Dollar, the Yen 
and the Euro on a regional level and, in the long run, by a regional currency 
unit or even by a common currency like the Euro.
3.  A regional surveillance process should be established in the long run to 
monitor critical developments, to provide liquidity in critical times and to 
assist countries to overcome the impact of crisis that could not have been 
prevented.
4.  Bilateral swap agreements (like those of the Chiang Mai initiative) shall be 
upgraded to ‘more formal institutions for foreign exchange reserve pooling’.
5.  Structural weaknesses that led to the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 
should be overcome to ‘strengthen financial systems and deepen capital 
markets’. Global volatile currency flows and liberalization of national capital 
markets should be balanced carefully to promote a sound financial system in 
Asian countries. 
6.  In order to successfully realize this demanding agenda a dedicated political 
leadership with a long-term vision on Asian needs has to be established. 
Particular hope has been attributed to Chinese-Japanese co-leadership analogous 
to French-German guidance of European integration. A working group dedicated 
to the development of a long-term vision to provide guidance for political 
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leadership in Asian countries has been called for by the Kobe Project. The Kobe 
Research Project can be seen as a transmission belt to introduce EU monetary 
policy tools and experience to a broader audience of decision makers in the Asian 
region.
Conclusion
It has been shown in this text that, in terms of its economy, the Asian region 
moved from dependency on the US to a more self-assertive stance. Starting from 
this experience the state actors have moved to a more balanced approach on 
countermeasures to avoid another Asian financial crisis in the future. The main 
APEC project of the early 1990s to promote liberalization in the Asia/Pacific 
has been judged too singularly-focused on US interests. This policy did not take 
into account Asian peculiarities. It even hurt Asian countries unnecessarily in 
the months after the Asian financial crisis. This is due to the uncompromising 
use of the window of opportunity that opened after the crisis to push through 
liberalization policies.
Japan tried to fill the gap that had been left by the US and its arguably 
compromised liberalization project in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis to 
pursue projects like the AMF and the Miyazawa plans. These activities, generally 
welcomed by its Asian neighbours, were, as in the case of the AMF, heavily 
contested by the US due to their negative impact on the US-led liberalization 
project and the predominance of the US/IMF led policies in the region. Having 
an autonomous AMF or any other Asian dominated body operating in the region 
without US approval or US veto rights was not acceptable to Washington D.C. 
at that time. But the political context has changed. After 9/11 the US seemingly 
accepted greater economic and monetary autonomy and did not interfere in the 
discourse on economic and monetary integration in the region as long as Asian 
states enlisted in the US-led anti-terrorism alliance. This can be attributed to 
either American disbelief that regional economic and financial integration would 
work or to resignation on the US side that Washington will no longer be able to 
effectively influence economic developments in the Asian region.
What are the prospects for a future global financial system? Eichengreen 
suggests a gradual development without big leaps forward in the financial and 
currency field, viewing regional financial integration rather as an evolutionary 
process.42 Provided Japan and Asia come to terms with their past history on 
World War II and provided that individual national interests can be sufficiently 
pooled into this regional body, all countries in the region will profit from further 
integration initiatives. Yet, other world regions will adapt to this process and there 
will be a reaction of some sort to every move in some part of the global economy. 
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The outcome can hardly be predicted. As Bergsten points out, this development 
will be a major source of instability in a three-player game: ‘The basic reason 
is each of the three perennially fears that the other two will coalesce against it, 
thus fostering constant insecurities and pre-emptive strikes in an effort to secure 
tactical advantages.’43 The East Asian region catching up with its triadic partners 
(or competitors) can thus be seen as a major source of instability in the global 
system. This incertitude of future development should be taken into account. As 
Bersick argues, the management of the increasing interdependencies between the 
regions of Europe and Asia is thus what defines the effectiveness of the politics of 
inter-regional relations and the ASEM process.44
It is therefore very difficult to come to an objective judgment on whether 
economic and monetary integration will ultimately benefit the Asian region 
or whether the Asian states would be better off remaining in a more bilateral 
relationship with the US. Such a move would counter any positive effect 
Japan could hope to cash in as a regional economic hegemon. The windows of 
opportunity for Japan to set the rules in the economic and financial field will not 
stay open for long. Other countries such as China and probably India will soon 
claim a bigger say in the regional arena. In fact the competition for hegemony has 
already started and is affecting regional integration in East Asia.
The EU has little direct influence on the direction of economic and monetary 
integration in East Asia. However, the mere existence and success of the Euro as 
a single currency and its potential to challenge the US Dollar is a success story in 
itself, and may prove an irresistible asset in shaping the monetary landscape of 
the Asian region. Unlike a US Dollar dominated currency system, the Euro and 
any East Asian currency arrangement, however loose it may turn out to be, will 
support the respective regions. The Euro is so far the only success story of regional 
financial integration with a single currency. The research agenda and reports 
of the Kobe Research Project have shown that many aspects of the European 
experience had been analyzed with regard to its adaptability to the Asian region.
There have been many cooperation initiatives in the financial field. Some 
have followed a regional approach such as the Miyazawa initiatives under the 
Japanese lead and the Chiang Mai Initiative within the ASEAN+3 process. Some 
have followed a broader inter-regional approach as well, for example, the Manila 
Framework, which included extra-regional partners like the US into its financial 
integration efforts. Especially early efforts to face the Asian financial crisis with 
a quite rigid IMF approach were not well received by Asian governments. In this 
regard the role of the EU in shaping the financial architecture of East Asia is less 
prominent and direct. The non-binding character of the ASEM process and its 
overall principle to deal with each other as equals makes it easier for the Asian 
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partners to accept European-style financial integration as a point of reference 
or even as a blueprint for East Asian efforts. The recommendations of the Kobe 
Research project point in this direction. The EU experience had been adapted 
to Asian realities and potential political obstacles have been countered with an 
analysis of economical and financial necessities in the region. East Asian actors 
are working hard to catch up with the EU and the US to have a more competitive 
financial architecture that reduces negative financial impact on their economies. 
While still at odds over how to actually proceed toward further financially 
integration, East Asia seems poised to keep direct extra-regional influence over its 
financial architecture limited. As the relative power of the US over economic and 
financial matters in East Asia decreases, EU interests in East Asia is increasing 
and with an East Asia becoming more and more relevant and self-confident in 
the world economy and in the financial field, contours of a multi-regional world 
order in the financial field are emerging.
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India’s New Quest for Intra- and 
Inter-regional Politics 
Christian Wagner 
The invitation to the first East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 
once more highlighted India’s ambitions to become more closely associated with 
the dynamics of regionalism in East and Southeast Asia. This strategy started 
with the Look East Policy in the early 1990s following India’s comprehensive 
economic reforms after 1991. When looking at India’s foreign policy it is obvious 
that her quest for intra- and inter-regional politics is not a new phenomenon. 
Nehru had already been a champion of regional cooperation both within Asia 
and the de-colonized countries. But during the Cold War period India’s ambitions 
had been hampered both by the constellations of the international system and her 
lack of economic resources. India’s recent attempts for stronger participation in 
intra- and inter-regional arenas therefore seem to have much better prospects. 
First, the international environment is much more conducive to various forms 
of regional cooperation. Second, India has developed both the political will for 
regional cooperation and the material resources with the economic liberalisation 
and her policy of integration into the world market. This has enhanced the 
country’s attractiveness to become a member of regional organisations. 
In international relations forms of interstate cooperation can be conceptualised 
both under the institutional and neo-realist school of thought. Generally, 
institutionalism emphasizes common functional interests and the absolute 
gains of cooperation among states whether they take place in regional or inter-
regional institutions.1 Neo-realist variants like defensive or offensive realism link 
cooperation to national interests and look at the relative gains of collaboration 
for the states involved.2 Hence cooperation is only the dependent variable to be 
analysed in the overall foreign policy framework. With the focus on national 
interests this approach seems to offer a better suited theoretical tool to analyse 
India’s quest for intra- and inter-regional politics. 
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The impracticality of geographical definitions of ‘region’ in the international 
context has often been demonstrated in the past. A relevant region for security 
issues may not necessarily the same for closer economic collaboration.3 In order 
to evade the confusions of geographically defined concepts of regions, the term 
‘region’ will be understood here as a socially constructed entity. A ‘region’ is what 
states make of it, to use a common phrase from the constructivist discourse. 
Therefore, membership in regional organisations will be used to define a ‘region’ 
so that institutional aspects are emphasized and not geographical criteria like 
common borders. To differentiate inter-regional from regional cooperation, 
institutionalised external relations of regional organizations can be regarded as 
the main criteria.4 This institutional framework is not sufficient for a foreign 
policy analysis in which forms of regional collaboration are the dependent rather 
than the independent variable. Therefore regional cooperation will be understood 
as foreign policy initiatives that aim at the creation of new, or membership in, 
already existing organisations that may also have an inter-regional approach. 
Using this theoretical framework the argument can be made that India 
intensified her efforts for regional collaboration after 1991. By redefining her 
regional borders the focus of India’s foreign policy shifted from South Asia to 
Southern Asia including Southeast, Central and West Asia. This included the 
strengthening of existing organisations by new initiatives, efforts to become a 
member in already existing regional institutions and finally, a more pro-active 
role in establishing new organisations. This shift can easily be explained by the 
domestic and international changes that affected India’s foreign policy and by 
the larger gains that India can expect not only in economic terms but also in 
political and security issues. In order to underline the argument, India’s not very 
successful attempts to promote regional collaboration after 1947 in South and 
Southeast Asia shall be dealt with firstly. India’s new initiatives after 1991 on 
the regional level and her attempts to gain access to new regional organisations, 
especially in Southeast and East Asia, will be analysed in a second part. Because 
the focus of regional collaboration is on the multilateral level, India’s bilateral 
relations and initiatives will be mainly disregarded. 
Intra- and inter-regional Politics during the Cold War 
Even before independence in August 1947 Nehru developed his own ideas of an 
international order that centred on anti-colonialism and disarmament. Not military 
confrontation but cooperation was his answer to overcome both the problems of 
underdevelopment and to increase the importance of Asia in international affairs. 
As early as 1945, Nehru brought up the idea of an Asian Federation that should 
represent the interest of Asian countries in world affairs. In September 1946 
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he laid down the principles of his non-aligned foreign policy: ‘We propose, as 
far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against 
one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again 
lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.’5 In March 1947, even before India’s 
independence in August of the same year, the first Asian Relations Conference 
took place in New Delhi. The participants of the conference branded all forms of 
colonialism and imperialism and Nehru underlined his interest in strengthening 
the cooperation among Asian countries even if they were still colonized. Nehru’s 
attempt to establish a ‘third way’ at least among underdeveloped countries of 
Africa and Asia met strong criticism from the U.S., the Soviet Union and China.6 
In a bipolar world system, none of the dominant players seemed to be interested 
in Nehru’s vision of a third way.
The constellations of the cold war on the international level and Nehru’s 
dominance in foreign policy, as well as India’s inward looking economy on the 
national level, had far reaching impacts on India’s quest for intra- and inter-
regional politics. Despite Nehru’s strong rhetoric, commitments for regional 
cooperation bilateral relations dominated over multilateral strategies in India’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War period. 
India and South Asia 
Since the independence of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 1947 and 1948 
South Asian countries shared a number of common problems. The common 
challenges of economic and social modernisation in order to overcome the 
underdevelopment of colonial rule offered numerous opportunities for regional 
cooperation. The Colombo-Plan of 1951 seemed to offer a suitable platform not 
least because Nehru had always promoted closer collaboration among Asian 
and African countries. But despite the common historical legacy of British rule 
bilateral problems like Kashmir and the question of Tamil citizenship in Sri 
Lanka from the beginning hindered a common approach to tackling regional 
problems. In contrast to Southeast Asia where the concept of a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) of 1971 underlined the common security 
perception among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), South Asia was characterised by the divergent threat perceptions vis-
à-vis the super powers, bilateral conflicts like the Indo-Pakistan confrontation 
over Kashmir, which caused two wars, and India’s hegemonic ambitions towards 
her neighbours.7 
It was not until the end of the 1970s that ideas of regional collaboration were 
raised by smaller countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which saw it as a 
useful tool to counter India’s dominance in the region. After various rounds of 
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negotiations the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was 
finally established in December 1985 when the heads of states held their first 
summit meeting in Dhaka. A common secretariat was set up in Kathmandu in 
1987 but the overall development of SAARC remained slow until 1991. Bilateral 
security issues like Kashmir overshadowed and slackened the pace of regional 
collaboration. 
Security issues on the one hand and India’s mixed economy on the other hand 
hindered the expansion of intraregional trade. Except for landlocked countries 
like Nepal and Bhutan intraregional trade remained of minimal importance for 
the main economies. 
India and Southeast Asia 
Nehru’s ambitions for regional cooperation found greater resonance in Southeast 
Asia. Especially regional crises like in Indonesia 1949 or in Indochina in the 
1950s seemed to fulfil his ideas of India’s new regional importance. But because 
of the communist threat, the countries of Southeast Asia were more interested 
in ensuring their security needs with participation in bilateral military alliances 
with the United States or multilateral arrangements such as the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which was established in 1954. 
Yet, it was not only concepts of security that differed between India and 
Southeast Asia. A similar development could be observed in economic affairs. 
After the creation of ASEAN in 1967 there were serious deliberations in India 
to join the new regional organisation.8 Although India shared some of ASEAN’s 
threat perceptions such as fear of communist insurgencies, the pro-Western 
strategic outlook of ASEAN seems to have hindered India’s entry into the new 
organisation. There were also reservations in Southeast Asia because of India’s 
lingering Kashmir conflict with Pakistan.9 In the years following this missed 
opportunity India and Southeast Asia drifted even further apart.
Economically Southeast Asia developed into the world’s most dynamic region 
throughout the 1980s due to its export strategy. The ‘Tiger economy’ became a 
synonym for successful economic development and was regarded as a model 
for the developing world. On the other hand, India’s inward looking mixed 
economy was unable to overcome the so called Hindu rate of growth of about 
3.5 percent. In security issues, ASEAN became more closely linked to the United 
States. In contrast to this India avoided military alliances, became a nuclear 
power in 1974 and turned into a regional hegemon with Indira Gandhi’s South 
Asia doctrine. Politically, India with the exception of the emergency from 1975 to 
1977 followed a democratic path along Western traditions. In Southeast Asia the 
political development was characterised by a variety of authoritarian regimes that 
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began to develop their own set of political and cultural values in order to combine 
economic success with their political regimes. 
Looking at India’s achievements in her quest for intra- and inter-regional 
politics during the Cold War period, the results were more than modest. The 
multilateral tier of India’s foreign policy was concentrated on the global level, 
for example, her engagement in the United Nations (UN) and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). On a regional level, no matter whether it was South Asia 
or any other part of Asia, bilateral relations dominated clearly over multilateral 
initiatives. In South Asia, SAARC only started in 1985 and apart from India’s 
cautious attempts to join ASEAN in the 1960s there were hardly any other 
noteworthy multilateral approaches. 
Intra- and inter-regional Politics after the Cold War 
The year 1991 was a watershed for India’s political and economic development 
both at the domestic and the international level. The payment crisis of spring 
1991 initiated a policy of economic reforms under the Congress government of 
Narasimha Rao that fundamentally changed India’s economy. Probably even more 
important was the new consensus among the main parties from the communist 
parties on the left like the CPM to the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party that the 
‘clock of economic reforms’ would not be turned back. 
The end of the Cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union which was 
regarded as India’s most important political and economic ally also had a deep 
impact on foreign policy. Initially India was thought to be the ‘loser’ at the end 
of the Cold war.10 Yet, it turned out that few other countries benefited more from 
the international changes of the 1990s. India’s economic policy opened up the 
country to foreign direct investment and trade. Moreover the new consensus in 
the international community on democracy, market reforms and protection of 
human rights brought India much closer to the international mainstream than 
before 1991. India’s new international significance became obvious with her 
improved relations to the United States, China and the European Union. 
Besides the emerging international constellations in Asia and the expansion 
of regional groupings that initiated the debate about concepts of new or open 
regionalism,11 the most important change for India was that economic questions 
became important foreign policy issues. Connected with the new importance 
of economic liberalisation was the question of energy, which became another 
main driver of India’s foreign policy in the 1990s.12 During the previous period of 
mixed economy India followed a policy of import substitution rather than export 
promotion like in Southeast Asia. India’s share in global trade therefore shrank 
from about 2% in the 1950s to less than 0.5%in the 1980s. But the failures of 
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her development model became obvious in the early 1980s when Indira Gandhi 
started diffident economic reforms. At least after 1991 foreign policy decision 
makers in India recognized that economic power was not only important for 
national development but also for great power status on the international level. 
Thus the new economic priorities had far reaching impacts on India’s intra- and 
inter-regional policies. 
South Asia: SAARC, SAPTA, SAFTA 
India’s new foreign policy priorities had a far reaching impact on the development 
of SAARC, which received a new stimulus in the 1990s. India and Sri Lanka 
started an initiative at the SAARC summit of Colombo in 1991 to establish a 
commission on economic cooperation that worked out the details for the SAARC 
Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA). Two years later the agreement was 
signed in Dhaka and came into force in 1995. But SAPTA remained only a 
transitional agreement. In 1996 discussion started on establishing a SAARC Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA). Yet, despite the political problems, the Indo-Pakistan crisis 
of 2002 and the reservations of poorer countries such as Nepal and Bhutan an 
understanding could be reached. SAFTA was implemented in 2006 in order to 
increase intraregional trade in South Asia.13 
A further development in SAARC was the enlargement of the organisation 
with the new membership of Afghanistan after 2007. For the first time a 
new country was included into the SAARC framework. India supported the 
enlargement because of her traditional good relationship with Afghanistan and 
her rivalry with Pakistan. Moreover, the growing number of states that requested 
observer status underlined the new interest of great powers in the development 
of SAARC. Japan who has been a main sponsor of SAARC for many years 
was the first country to receive observer status. In 2005 China applied for an 
observer status, and that will be granted in 2007. In addition the United States 
and South Korea also applied for an observer status, which has been agreed for 
2008.14 
India’s new economic ambitions to increase regional trade with her 
neighbours could not only be satisfied by multilateral arrangements like SAPTA 
alone. Therefore India started various initiatives parallel to the SAARC process to 
strengthen economic ties with smaller neighbours. The conceptual background 
was the Gujral doctrine named after foreign and Prime Minister I.K. Gujral of the 
United Front government in 1996/1997. He underlined that India was willing 
to give up the principle of reciprocity in her relations with smaller neighbours 
and intended to make more concessions to them than they were able to grant 
towards India.15 Treaties on water disputes with Bangladesh and Nepal in the 
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mid-1990s were a first result of India’s new regional policy that was accompanied 
by negotiations on bilateral free trade agreements. A first success was reached in 
1998 when a free trade agreement was signed with Sri Lanka which is working 
much to the favour of the smaller country. 
India and Southern Asia
It was argued in the beginning that India’s new quest for intra- and inter-regional 
politics led to an extension and redefinition of her regional boundaries. India’s 
new regional ambitions became most obvious in the concept of Southern Asia 
that included West Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Jaswant Singh, foreign 
minister of the BJP government, had underlined that Southern Asia would be 
India’s future zone of interest. Besides new economic opportunities Southern 
Asia was important for India’s future energy needs.16 There was a series of 
initiatives throughout the 1990s to strengthen bilateral ties with countries like 
Iran, Israel, Saudi-Arabia, the central Asian republics and Southeast Asia. In 
regard to multilateral collaboration Southeast Asia became the focal point of 
India’s foreign policy in the 1990s. 
Following the economic liberalisation, export promotion and integration into 
the world market - the recipe that has been successfully adopted by the Tiger 
economies in the 1980s - became India’s new guiding principles in foreign policy. 
Prime Minister Rao underlined the new importance of the Asia Pacific for India’s 
economic development: ‘The Asia-Pacific could be the springboard for our leap 
into the global market-place.’17 It was therefore only consistent with these new 
ideas that Southeast Asia became a main focus of India’s foreign policy under 
the heading ‘Look East’. 
The 1990s saw consistent endeavours to bring India closer into the ASEAN 
network. In 1992 India became first a sectoral and in 1995 a full dialogue partner 
of ASEAN. In 2002 India became a summit level partner for ASEAN. In 1993 
India was invited to participate in the newly created ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) that dealt with security issues and included extra-regional powers like 
China, the European Union and the U.S. India’s integration into Southeast Asia 
was supported by a number of newly established committees and councils like 
the ASEAN-India Business Council (AIBC) and the India-ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation Committee. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century India has been harvesting the fruits 
of her diplomatic endeavours. Trade between India and ASEAN reached US$ 13 
billion in 2004 and is aimed for US$ 30 billion in 2007. In October 2003 India 
and ASEAN signed an agreement for a free trade area in 2011 and India acceded 
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).18 In November 2004 the ASEAN-
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India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity pact was signed. 
These developments have initiated a debate about ASEAN + 4 that would include 
India.19
Relations with ASEAN have certainly been the success story of India’s Look 
East Policy since the 1990s. Besides these multilateral activities it should not be 
overlooked that India has also intensified her bilateral relations with Southeast 
Asian countries. This included economic cooperation such as the Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore that was signed in 
summer 200520 and security cooperation, including among other things defence 
pacts with Indonesia and Vietnam.21 India’s new security posture in Southeast 
Asia is also underlined by joint efforts with the United States to patrol the Malacca 
strait. 
ASEAN countries have been very positive about including India in their 
multilateral networks. Economically, India’s liberalisation offered new investment 
opportunities. Strategically, India was regarded as a possible counterweight against 
China whose territorial claims in the South China Sea raised apprehensions about 
its future ambitions. Therefore it was unsurprising that ASEAN did not regard 
India’s nuclear tests of 1998 as a threat. This reaction by ASEAN was in turn 
interpreted by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as a signal that ASEAN has 
accepted India as a ‘balancing power’ vis-à-vis China.22
Besides India’s attempts to become more integrated with ASEAN another 
approach was the creation of new regional organisations that linked India 
and individual Southeast countries. This strategy became obvious with the 
establishment of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 
(IORARC) in 1997 and the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in the same year which is sometimes referred 
to as the Bay of Bengal Community (BOBCOM).23 In both cases India was among 
the driving forces in the creation of the new regional organisations that were 
both intended to promote economic cooperation. The IORARC covers the Indian 
Ocean, where India has always claimed a leading position, from South Africa to 
Australia. BIMSTEC was intended to strengthen the links with neighbouring 
Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Thailand. Neither organisation has 
been very successful thus far. They suffer from similar problems and limitations 
as other regional organisations in the developing world, i.e. the lack of economic 
complementarities. 
But India’s intraregional activities were not confined to Southeast Asia. In 
1996 foreign minister Gujral underlined India’s quest to join APEC which was 
regarded as one of the main institutions of the post cold war international system. 
India’s bid for APEC was supported by Vietnam, India’s most important long 
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time ally in Southeast Asia.24 But the attempt failed much to India’s regret. The 
remark of former Minister of Commerce Chidambaram that ‘APEC without India 
is like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark’25 reflected India’s frustration at 
being excluded from the organisation. 
Despite this unsuccessful attempt so far India has initiated various other 
activities to intensify her relations with East and Southeast Asia in the multilateral 
field. Besides BIMSTEC and IORARC, India also participated in the Kunming 
Initiative in 1999 between Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar and the 
Ganga-Mekong Co-operation in 2000 in which Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Vietnam tried to intensify their relations. 
In contrast to Southeast and East Asia, regions like Central and West Asia 
played only a minor role in India’s quest for intra- and inter-regional politics. 
This was mainly caused by the lack of multilateral structures in these regions, 
so the main focus was on bilateral relations. Both the countries of West Asia and 
the Central Asia Republics (CAR) gained new importance because of their energy 
supplies.26 India therefore consistently increased her bilateral relations during 
the 1990s. India achieved a recent success when she was granted observer status 
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2005. Besides ARF, 
SCO offers another opportunity for India and China to cooperate in regional 
institutions. 
India, Asia, Europe: ASEM 
The creation of a new inter-regional organisation was a consequence of the 
increasing trend towards globalisation and cooperation in the 1990s. Europe 
and Southeast Asia took the lead in this development when the European Union 
(EU) and ASEAN started their bilateral dialogue. In 1996 the first Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), held in Thailand, offered a new platform for dialogue and 
cooperation between Europe and Asia.27 India was not invited to participate by the 
Asian members probably because of China’s opposition during that time. This 
was even more astonishing because both Germany and the EU have advocated 
for the inclusion of India in the ASEM framework. Recognising India’s growing 
importance, the EU decided to start its own summit meetings with India in 2000. 
In 2004 the EU presented a framework for a strategic partnership with India that 
covered economic, political and security issues.28 
Gains and Losses from intra- and inter-regional Politics 
The gains of India’s new quest for intra- and inter-regional politics are much 
more evident in Southern and East Asia than in South Asia. They help to explain 
India’s foreign policy shift. Table 1 illustrates the gains and losses from intra- and 
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inter-regional cooperation and underlines the argument about India’s shift from 
South to Southern Asia. 
Table 1: Regional Collaboration: Gains and losses for India
 South Asia Southern Asia and East Asia
Economics (+/-): Intraregional trade still modest  (+): trade and investment from 
  ASEAN, China, Japan
Security ( - ): terrorism vs. freedom fighters (+): common understanding of terrorism
Politics ( - ): hegemon, regional bully (+): counterweight to China (ASEAN)
Image ( - ): no accepted leadership role  (+/-): India recognized as global power
(+): positive, ( - ): negative, (+/-): mixed
Economically, the increased cooperation with Southeast and East Asia is a much 
more attractive opportunity for India’s export business as well as for the foreign 
direct investment from that region. Looking at the trade statistics it is obvious that 
India’s trade with Southeast Asia, China and Japan is much higher compared to 
trade relations with Pakistan or Bangladesh. Mechanisms like SAFTA will increase 
intraregional trade but this will act more as a confidence building measure in 
South Asia than an economic opportunity. In the field of security there are also 
more advantages for India in Southern Asia compared to South Asia. There is 
a common understanding and a widespread consensus among most member 
states of regional organisations in Southern Asia on terrorism and militant Islam 
being the main security threats. This common understanding is not self-evident 
in South Asia where, especially because of Kashmir, India and Pakistan had for 
a long time divergent understandings on terrorism. In 1987 SAARC agreed 
on a convention against terrorism which could not be ratified because of the 
differences between both countries. The common statement of January 2004 
seemed to have solved the differences between India and Pakistan but infiltration 
over the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir has remained a problem. Politically, 
India’s relations with her neighbours transformed South Asia into a region of 
chronic instability in the 1980s. But India’s attempts to gain influence on the 
domestic developments of neighbouring states have not been successful. 
In contrast to South Asia, India’s entry into Southeast Asia was welcomed 
by most ASEAN countries. India has intensified her bilateral relations and is 
regarded as a possible counterweight to China. Finally, within South Asia India 
still has to cope with the negative image caused by her hegemonic ambitions in 
the 1970s and 1980s.29 Although India’s approach has changed fundamentally in 
the 1990s with the Gujral doctrine it will take some time until the resentments 
from the past will be removed in the smaller states. Again the situation is different 
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in Southern Asia. Because of her liberalisation India today is seen as an emerging 
power that offers new economic opportunities. India is regarded as a global 
power because of her engagement in the United Nations and as an advocate for 
developing countries in multilateral bodies like the World trade Organisation 
(WTO). India’s new engagement in regional organisations is therefore closely 
linked with her ambitions for great power status. 
Conclusion
India’s new quest for intraregional and inter-regional politics has to be understood 
in the overall framework of her foreign policy and her great power ambitions. 
Diplomatic activities since the early 1990s clearly show that Indian foreign policy 
today has a much more dynamic approach towards intra- and inter-regional 
organisations. India followed a multi-faceted strategy in the multilateral field 
throughout the 1990s. Indian foreign policy has aimed at closer intraregional 
cooperation by strengthening existing organisations like SAARC. It has 
furthermore looked for new opportunities for regional collaboration by becoming 
more integrated in existing organisations like ASEAN, applying for membership 
in APEC and ASEM or by establishing new institutions like BIMSTEC and 
IORARC. 
Regional organisations offered a new platform in which India could pursue 
both her national interests for economic growth and energy security and great 
power status. India’s new economic policies and her aspirations for great 
power status in the 21st century have redefined and shifted her focus of regional 
collaboration from South to Southeast Asia. Besides the multilateral level India’s 
improved relations with China and the U.S. illustrate at the same time that India 
is prepared to play the great power game on the bilateral level as well.
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Enhancing South-East Asia’s 
Security: The Aceh Monitoring 
Mission
John Quigley
Europe, as a geographic, political, security and economic entity has no rival in 
the world. The post-WW II security and economic environment posed serious 
questions as to the value of nation states seeking to remain apart and, when the 
multilateral system began to take shape, outside the scope of international co-
operation. The European Union, over the course of the last 49 years, has sought 
to address these questions by at first co-ordinating and then integrating the 
nation states’ economies and political decision making structures into a regional 
grouping. Realising the success of this model, including in terms of the security 
of its members, the EU has sought to export regional integration to the world. 
By co-operating with other regional groupings, the EU expects to establish the 
conditions that will bring peace and prosperity to others and develop the rule 
of law and democracy in third countries who will then support and maintain an 
international order based on rules and common norms. 
The judicious use of inter-regional co-operation and promotion of 
multilateralism has facilitated Europe’s emergence as a global player. The 
reforms and innovation undertaken in Europe, in particular in political and 
security matters, allow Europe to play a more political or diplomatic role in 
world affairs commensurate to its economic standing. The development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the subsequent emergence of 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have confirmed this trend and 
allow Europe to project its power, in either soft or hard terms, beyond its borders. 
Europe achieves this either through its own external relations instruments 
or through co-operation within a multilateral framework, chiefly the United 
Nations (UN).
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In order to analyze the evolving inter-regional security strategies of the 
EU and the ASEAN as well as their impact on the foreign policy behaviour of 
both regional organizations, the first-ever EU ESDP mission to Asia, the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia, will serve as a case study. What are the 
interests of the actors involved? Which patterns of interaction evolve? Does the 
AMM provide the EU and the ASEAN with a blueprint for further inter-regional 
approaches to regional crises? Finally, the risks of a foreign policy that follow the 
principle of multi-regional co-operation outside a multilateral framework will be 
assessed by discussing the EU’s security interests.
Multi-regionalism and Multilateralism in EU External Relations
The principle of engaging regions and, equally, regional organisations is a 
significant and important feature of the European Union’s external relations 
policy. The EU conducts this policy through all the instruments available to the 
Community in external relations including trade, development aid, the CFSP, 
enlargement and pre-accession aid, human rights and democracy initiatives 
and, more recently, through the ESDP. Europe elaborates its political, security 
and developmental priorities both inter-regionally and within a multilateral 
framework. 
Taking account of its own post-war emergence as a group of sovereign nation 
states coming together to pool economic and political authority, the EU has sought 
to develop relations with most other regional organisations it encounters. From 
the first attempt in 1994 to define an inter-regional framework for its interaction 
with the countries of Asia,1 the EU has sought to develop structure to govern this 
co-operation and to broaden the agenda that governs it. The objectives of the 
1994 Strategy were twofold; firstly, to improve Europe’s political dialogue with 
Asia and, secondly, to facilitate Asia’s engagement in international affairs, both 
in political and commercial terms. The new approach was reflected in Europe’s 
commitment to the launching of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), also in 
1994, as a multi-regional security dialogue process. 
The second attempt to define EU-Asia relations in 2001,2 coming seven years 
after the original framework, built on the experience learned and pointedly divided 
its analysis and outlook into the various sub-regions of Asia. The 2001 paper was 
the first to start talking about a ‘comprehensive strategic framework’ for EU-Asia 
relations and, in a touch of vainglory, the EU’s growing global weight. Naming 
Asia as a crucial economic and political partner for the EU, the paper stated that 
Europe must move to strengthen its ‘long-standing partnership’ with ASEAN as a 
‘key priority in the coming years’. The intensified dialogue would take place both 
at the inter-regional level and via bilateral relations with ‘key ASEAN partners’. 
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The European Commission (EC) felt that a review of the ‘strategic framework’ 
would be necessary by 2006 or 2007 at the latest. 
At around the time that Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, 
proposed his European Security Strategy in summer 2003, the EC adopted a 
specific regional strategy paper on relations with ASEAN, which talked about 
revitalising the relationship and offering a new impetus.3 The paper highlighted 
six strategic objectives for EU-ASEAN co-operation including supporting regional 
stability, promoting human rights, good governance and democracy, supporting 
less-developed countries and deepening dialogue in specific policy areas. On 
an inter-regional basis, arising out of the 2003 paper through the EU-ASEAN 
Regional Indicative Programme, the EU provides technical assistance and direct 
funding across a broad range of sectors including, for example, to programmes 
such as the Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) and the Regional 
EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI).
At inter-governmental level in the EU, there is strong support also for region-
to-region contact and clear recognition of the benefits that stronger ties with like-
minded regional organisations will bring to EU interests. The European Security 
Strategy, formally adopted by the member states meeting at Heads of State and 
Government level in December 2003, also lays out some key considerations for 
inter-regional co-operation. The Strategy suggests that regional organisations 
‘strengthen global governance’ and that groupings of nations such as ASEAN 
(and the African Union) make an ‘important contribution to a more orderly 
world’. The value of inter-regional relationships was praised by the EU Council 
of Ministers which has called this form of co-operation a valuable instrument for 
developing EU-Asia relations.
Given the history of the origin of the European project it should come as 
no surprise that the EU is a firm supporter of an international order based on 
peace between nations governed by international rules and norms. In the various 
strategy and policy papers mentioned above, the role of multilateralism in EU 
external relations is frequently explicitly outlined. In the Communication on 
relations with ASEAN, for example, there is reference to the need for a balance 
in international relations. For the EU, the principle of multilateralism serves 
to guide a framework that will establish that balance through a ‘rule-based 
multi-polar world order’ in conjunction with strong and respected multilateral 
organisations. This can also mean that there is a multilateral dimension to the 
concept of inter-regional co-operation and that by promoting integration through 
regional instruments the EU can also help countries to ‘shoulder responsibilities 
in global matters’.4
The role of the UN, as a guarantor and promoter of international peace, has 
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been central to EU diplomacy and in its relations with third countries. The Treaty 
on European Union enshrines the principle that EU foreign and security objectives 
will be carried out in accordance with the UN Charter.5 Indeed, two of the five 
CFSP objectives explicitly refer to the UN. The Treaty binds the EU, when acting 
to ‘preserve peace and to strengthen international security’ to accomplish such 
tasks within the terms of the UN Charter. Some within the EU see the threat to 
the international order as serious and call for decisive action to secure the current 
rules-based system for future generations. Europe’s Commissioner for External 
Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, understands that Europe can only achieve 
its political and security objectives through ‘global solidarity, multilateralism, 
democracy and human rights’.6
And yet, the United Nations is not the only example for the EU of multilateralism 
that operates at global level. Other examples include international trade relations 
through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the role it plays integrating 
and regulating economies into a rules-based order. Another example is the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which the EU has assiduously promoted to 
offer a global perspective to the protection and promotion of human rights and 
the rule of law. These are concepts raised in the European Security Strategy which 
states that it is a key European priority to strengthen the UN system and that 
international organisations, including the WTO, must be effective in ‘confronting 
threats to international peace and security’.7 
The EU’s Security Policy in the 21st Century
Apart from the ill-fated European Defence Community dating from the early 
1950s, which was based upon a plan drawn up by the then French Prime Minister, 
René Pleven, contemporary security and defence matters at a European level are 
a new concept for most EU member states. Some of the older member states, 
including the two permanent members of the UN Security Council, have had 
a long tradition of an independent foreign and security policy. Several member 
states have a colonial past and this continues to pre-occupy their external relations 
interests in the 21st Century. Other member states, including some smaller 
countries and many of the ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe, 
are more inclined to favour the use of common powers in Brussels.
Although the trans-Atlantic relationship is the linchpin of Europe’s external 
relations policy going back to the foundation of the European Economic 
Community, the EU also wishes to co-operate with those who adhere to the 
principles integral to wider multilateralism. The European Security Strategy fills 
a gap in the EU’s external relations policy by providing an overview or framework 
outlook that is missing from the EU’s bilateral relationships with individual 
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countries or regions. It provides the rationale to ESDP operations, including the 
first ESDP mission in Asia, the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Though the Security 
Strategy is commonly referred to as a ‘threat-driven’ document8 this analysis is 
overly simplistic. While the description and analysis of key threats facing Europe 
is outlined in some detail, the focus of the Strategy is how Europe views its place in 
the world. By 2003, the EU had been engaging at Heads of State and Government 
level with Japan, China and India since 1991, 1998 and 2000 respectively. Clearly, 
in the post 11th September 2001-world, the nature of these relationships would have 
to evolve. Whereas previous EU attempts to define an obvious European outlook 
in external relations, such as the Commission Communication on ‘Europe and 
Asia’ from September 2001 which talked of ‘enhanced partnerships’ with specific 
countries in Asia, Solana’s vision went one step further. The European Security 
Strategy developed the notion of ‘strategic partnerships’ and suggested the EU 
should develop a strategic vision of its co-operation with, inter	alia, Japan, China 
and India.
The Security Strategy presents three strategic objectives to Europe’s external 
relations policy in order to defend European security and promote European 
values in third countries. Firstly, the Strategy states that the EU must address the 
threats apparent both internally and those international threats that may impact 
upon the EU, in the era of globalisation. These threats are identified as terrorism, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure 
and organised crime. The second strategic objective is to build security in the 
European neighbourhood. The third objective is to promote an international order 
based on effective multilateralism. An effective multilateral system is considered 
essential in order to respond to globalisation taking account of security threats, 
financial markets, media and the prosperity of nations. When the EU launches 
military or civilian crisis management operations, the rationale of the mission 
is placed firmly within the context of the goals outlined in the Security Strategy. 
The Mission to Aceh to monitor the peace agreement, between the government 
and a rebel force, is no exception and both Javier Solana9 and the EU Head of 
Mission10 in Aceh have clearly stipulated their vision of how the Mission meets 
the objectives of the Security Strategy.
The Aceh Monitoring Mission: Context and Structure
Over recent years, the European Union’s policy of engaging Asia in security 
matters has taken place either through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
process or through the ARF. Although the security agenda has been built up in 
recent years11 there is a general acceptance that the dialogue process was more 
declaratory than specifically action oriented. Although the range of issues and 
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countries or regions under discussion had grown substantially, actual avenues 
for implementation were limited. The establishment of the AMM needs to be 
considered in this context. As the EU’s first crisis management mission in Asia, 
under the ESDP, the Aceh operation represents a ground-breaking precedent for 
the EU both in terms of a qualitative improvement of the EU’s capabilities and 
in terms of the implementation of decision making processes. The Mission also 
sends an important signal to Europe’s Asian partners about the new status of 
the ESDP and the ability of the EU to launch crisis management operations with 
limited outside assistance. 
The decision to consider deploying an EU force to monitor the terms of 
the peace agreement was reached once representatives of the Indonesian 
government and the rebel force – the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) – reached 
an agreement on the status of Aceh within Indonesian sovereignty. The peace 
agreement was formally signed on 15th August in Helsinki by Hamid Awaluddin, 
Minister for Justice and Human Rights, from the Indonesian government and 
Malik Mahmud, Head of the GAM Delegation and ‘Prime Minister’ of Aceh. 
The talks were the culmination of a long series of efforts to try and forge some 
kind of settlement acceptable to both sides. Negotiations to end the 30 year old 
conflict, which has cost 9000 lives, started in 1999 between the Swiss-based 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the representatives of the GAM. This 
process collapsed in May 2003. A series of private initiatives gradually led to 
new peace negotiations which, in turn, received a fillip following the change 
of government in Jakarta. These talks in November-December 2004, included 
former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, and the pro-independence ‘Prime 
Minister’ of Aceh. The latest phase of the peace talks began in Helsinki 
in January 2005 and ended with the Agreement – a Memorandum of 
Understanding – in mid August. The EU, through the High Representative 
for CFSP, Javier Solana, was invited to consider taking a more overt role in 
the talks process by former President Ahtisaari, during the course of February 
2005, and an EU Council Secretariat official was eventually seconded to 
the negotiations. As the talks were coming to a conclusion, the process of 
negotiations was very delicate and was carefully choreographed by the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI).12 After the fourth and penultimate round of 
talks in late May, the CMI prepared a draft Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) and both parties had over one month to consider the text before the 
fifth and final round in mid July. As the final round started, the Indonesian 
government wrote to the EU requesting their assistance and the EU’s positive 
intention was presented to the talks. The day after the talks ended, EU Foreign 
Ministers publicly announced this intention. 
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When it became clear that the talks would lead to the signing of a peace 
agreement, the EU began looking for contacts within ASEAN. On 12th July, 
the EU received an invitation from the government of Indonesia, through its 
Foreign Affairs Minister, to assist Jakarta in implementing any agreement. 
Once the Helsinki text was confirmed, the Secretariat of the EU Council of 
Ministers was given a mandate to approach the Indonesian government with 
the idea of identifying the precise nature of the contribution from the ASEAN 
side. The Indonesian government was able to propose that Brunei, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand had been approached for assistance. EU 
Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels on 18th July, agreed that Europe might 
provide ‘observers’ to monitor the implementation of the MoU. The document 
contains commitments for political reforms in Aceh including a new autonomy 
law for the province,13 the political participation of former rebels, security 
arrangements, the protection of human rights, an amnesty for GAM fighters and 
their re-integration into society and the creation of the international Monitoring 
Mission. The July meeting also agreed that the Council, on an inter-regional basis, 
should establish contact with ASEAN and with individual potential contributing 
countries from ASEAN. It can be noted that although the EU seemed interested 
in sending some kind of mission, there was ongoing negotiations between the 
member states themselves about exactly what kind of mission could be deployed 
and final agreement was far from certain.14 In the end, the five ASEAN member 
states, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand joined the 
EU-led AMM, which also includes Norway and Switzerland. The AMM was 
established following a formal request from the government of Indonesia for 
assistance in implementing the terms of the peace agreement that was signed on 
15th August in Helsinki. At EU level, the Council adopted a CFSP Joint Action,15 
on 9th September, authorising the deployment of the Mission. 
The CFSP Joint Action from 9th September set out a three tier structure for 
the inter-regional monitoring mission, within the concept of an Operational Plan 
(OPLAN) adopted by the Political and Security Committee of the EU. At the top, 
the headquarters of the Mission would be based in Banda Aceh, supported by a 
number of District Offices which, in turn, would co-ordinate the work of teams 
of personnel involved in the registration and destruction of weapons handed over 
by the GAM. The OPLAN, which was partially declassified in February 2006, 
set out, inter	alia, the Mission mandate, the structure of the joint EU-ASEAN 
forces, the conduct of operations and the political background to the Indonesian 
government’s request for assistance. Under the terms established in the OPLAN, 
the AMM created the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA) to 
implement the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding through the co-
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operation of the parties. In the early months of the Mission, COSA met weekly 
although, after some 34 meetings, it now sits every two weeks. The meetings have 
been described as the driving force behind the peace agreement. Representatives 
of the government and the GAM meet at AMM headquarters under the 
chairmanship of an AMM official, usually the Head of Mission. COSA considers 
plans for decommissioning, the relocation of Indonesian forces and economic 
assistance packages. The institutional set-up of the Mission also included the 
formation of a Committee of Contributors, as provided for in the Joint Action of 
9th September. However, the Committee was not actually established until 15th 
November, after the EU Council of Ministers adopted a Decision of the Political 
and Security Committee. The EU, Norway, Switzerland and the five ASEAN 
countries all sit on the Committee.
The Activities of the Aceh Monitoring Mission
In terms of headquarters personnel, the Mission is led by the: Head of Mission, 
Pieter Feith, Principal Deputy Head of Mission, Major General Rozi Baharom, 
Malaysia, who succeeded Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek of Thailand; 
Deputy Head of Mission, Operations, Major General Jaakko Oksanen; Deputy 
Head of Mission, Amnesty, Reintegration and Human Rights, Dr Renata Tardioli 
and Chief of Staff, Justin Davies, from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office.
At its height, the AMM was composed of 227 people from the EU, Norway, 
Switzerland and the five ASEAN countries.
The Helsinki agreement outlined in the MoU the nature of tasks that any 
monitoring mission to Aceh would entail.16 Within the EU structure, the Council 
adopted a Joint Action – a decision taken by the member states within the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy framework, unanimously, binding them 
to a particular course of action – setting out eight tasks for the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission including:
Monitor the demobilisation of GAM fighters, decommission and destroy 
weapons; monitor the re-location of non-organic Indonesia military and police 
forces out of Aceh; monitor the re-integration of GAM fighters; monitor the 
human rights situation relating to the first three tasks; monitor legislative 
changes; rule on disputed amnesty cases of GAM fighters in prison; investigate 
and make rulings on possible violations of the MoU; maintain good links with all 
parties to the peace agreement.
The Monitoring Mission was formally launched on 15th September 2005 
in Banda Aceh with three main objectives: decommissioning weapons, 
monitoring the demilitarisation of Indonesian security forces and facilitating the 
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re-integration of ex-fighters into Acehnese society. As an official from the EU 
Council of Ministers Secretariat, Pieter Feith17 had been able to join the latter 
stages of the negotiations underway in Helsinki. In early July 2005, the EU sent 
an Assessment Mission, which was made up of officials from the Commission 
and the Council (including the Civil-Military Cell), to Aceh to make a technical 
assessment of what would be needed in terms of resources, personnel and 
an indicative timeframe. The meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, on 18th July, 
considered the report of the Assessment Mission and recommended that some 
EU force should monitor the MoU. However, it was clear, in light of the EU’s 
institutional architecture, that the planning, funding and deployment of an EU 
mission would take time. Several member states decided that it would be vital 
to have observers in place as soon as possible after the formal signing of the 
peace agreement. A further Technical Assessment Mission, this time made up 
of both EU and ASEAN officials, again went to Aceh. This led to the decision to 
create an Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) comprising some 82 observers, from 
the EU and ASEAN, with the objectives of having boots on the ground, by 16th 
August, and to help prepare for the formal start of the AMM. The Mission was 
launched with 227 personnel comprising 127 from wider Europe and 83 from 
the five ASEAN countries. These personnel were deployed into eleven District 
Offices18 established by the AMM throughout Aceh and into four mobile weapons 
destruction teams to travel throughout the province with the aim of destroying 
weapons as publicly as possible. This would be a message to both the GAM 
fighters of the seriousness of the AMM and to those in Aceh that did not support 
the aims of the GAM that security was improving.
The funding mechanism for the operation in Aceh proved complicated and 
controversial. When the IMP was launched, on 16th August, funding came from 
individual EU member states. After the Indonesian government and the GAM 
concluded the peace agreement in Helsinki, there was widespread recognition 
that existing EU procedures would be too slow and cumbersome to be able to 
either fund or launch a monitoring mission quickly. Equally, this applied to the 
mechanism to finance any ESDP operation. It was established that some EU 
member states, Finland, Sweden and the UK (the AMM would take place largely 
during their Presidency of the EU), were prepared to contribute to a ‘start-up 
fund’ in order to ensure that the Acehnese people would witness a visible and 
immediate presence to help consolidate the peace agreement. It was not until 9th 
September, when the EU Council of Ministers adopted the CFSP Joint Action that 
EU money became available. 
For the period September 2005 to March 2006, the AMM was allocated 
a budget of € 9m from the EU with a further € 6m coming from individual 
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EU and ASEAN member states. Pieter Feith described the budget as ‘clearly 
inadequate’ noting that in the closing months of 2005, the EU’s funds for ESDP 
missions ‘tend to be largely exhausted’.19 For future similar operations, he said, 
EU member states should consider establishing a start-up fund. Although the 
financial commitment is small, he said, the Mission would have ‘enormous gains 
and benefits’. When the Mission was extended until June 2006, the Council did 
not increase the budget but added a further € 300,000 when the Mission was 
extended until September 2006.
The MoU signed in Helsinki established precise terms for the number of 
weapons to be handed over to the AMM and the numbers of local military forces 
and police that could remain in Aceh after December 2005. To complete these 
objectives, the MoU established four stages starting on 15th September and ending 
on 31st December. During this period, the AMM destroyed 840 weapons20 handed 
over by the GAM and witnessed the withdrawal of 25,221 non-organic military 
troops and 4700 police. For normal peacetime conditions, the Indonesian 
government will be able to keep 14,700 military and 9,100 police in Aceh, which 
has a population of just over 4m people. The Initial Monitoring Presence started 
on 16th August 2005 lasting one month. As of 15th September 2005, the operation 
started under the formal AMM mandate with a timeframe until 15th March 2006. 
This was extended until 15th June and a further extension was granted until 15th 
September 2006. This last extension, granted in May 2006, provided that the 
mandate could continue and that the operation of the Mission could be extended 
at the latest until 15th September 2006, around the time of proposed local elections 
when by that stage the Mission would be exactly one year old. The local elections 
are meant to take place under the proposed Special Autonomy Law for Aceh. The 
Head of Mission has indicated that he still sees a role for the Mission, now down 
to 85 observers, working with any personnel deployed from Europe as part of an 
Election Observation Mission (EOM).21 
ASEAN Responses to EU Security Policy
The emergence of ASEAN dates back to August 1967 and, similar to the EU, has 
undergone a series of enlargements bring the total membership to ten states.22 
Like the EU, there is a remarkable difference in the comparative economic 
development of the member states but, unlike the EU, the political development 
of several ASEAN countries is stagnant. This fact is now openly acknowledged 
within some ASEAN countries and patience with countries holding back the 
political, economic and security development of the regional grouping is wearing 
thin. Equally, there are significant differences in the decision-making structures 
and operationalisation processes of the two regional organisations. However, the 
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EU and ASEAN share some commonality of views and, not least, no member 
state has, since joining their respective grouping, fought a war against another 
member state. This is not to deny that non-traditional or soft security threats are 
still pervasive in some regions and have cross-state boundary implications. 
The Mission to Aceh, billed as a joint EU-ASEAN operation, exposed a weakness 
in the administrative structure of ASEAN. As the Mission was launched, the ten 
member group did not have any comparable civilian or military structures to the 
EU to plan, generate or conduct crisis management missions or any mechanism 
to review the performance of the mission. Equally, ASEAN states, wary of 
pursuing EU-style integration seem hesitant to describe the European Union as 
a ready role model for ASEAN. The EU role in the AMM did not even get a direct 
mention at the last ASEAN Heads of State inter-governmental Summit, held in 
Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. The Summit Statement could only refer to the 
AMM as a model for co-operation between ASEAN and other regions, possibly 
including the EU.
In contrast, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP was able to recognise the 
valuable role of the five contributing ASEAN states in the context of inter-regional 
co-operation. ‘The joint EU-ASEAN Mission’, Javier Solana said on 27th February 
2006, ‘has proven its worth’ and has ‘been very effective’23. Indeed, Lieutenant-
General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director General of the EU Military Staff, speaking 
in Brussels in February about the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
said that, following an internal EU review, there was no longer any geographic 
limitation to the deployment of EU crisis management (civilian or military) 
missions.24 Within ESDP operational thinking, EU military officials believe that 
a mission could be deployed on a case-by-case basis to anywhere in the world.
Although the financial contribution of the 5 ASEAN countries to the AMM 
was, in effect, quite limited, ASEAN has used the experience gained from 
interacting with the EU to build structures that will be available in the future for 
either ASEAN-only missions or multi-regional missions that could include the 
EU. Furthermore, in early June 2006, at a meeting in Singapore25 it was proposed 
that the countries of South-East Asia should introduce a crisis management 
centre. This view has developed quickly as, in January, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime 
Minister, Dato’ Sri Mohd. Najib Tun Razak, did not think it was necessary.26 The 
proposed Centre is intended to provide a humanitarian relief co-ordinating role 
for the wider South-East Asian region. Similar to some EU mechanisms, the 
Centre would be able to call upon both civilian and military forces to respond to 
a crisis. Similar to the EU, these forces would not be a standing reserve force but 
would be pre-identified, thus requiring a force-generation process to be launched, 
at short notice, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. 
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Another significant development that has taken place since the deployment 
of the Aceh Mission has been the convening of the inaugural ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting. The Ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in early May 2006. 
Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, who chaired the first-
ever meeting, noted that the mechanism of an ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
provided a good impetus to the development of the notion of an ASEAN Security 
Community. For ASEAN’s level of institutional and political development, this 
can be considered an advance. If ASEAN and the EU are to conduct further joint 
Missions, presumably where ASEAN will take on a greater role and responsibility, 
then both regional organisations will have to consider developing closer 
administrative links in order to allow for the rapid deployment of either a civilian, 
military or humanitarian mission. The inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers 
meeting affirmed the central role of the UN Charter as the basis for the ASEAN 
Security Community. If the Defence Ministers could elaborate a Security Strategy, 
this could demonstrate to the EU that ASEAN can be an increasingly reliable and 
responsible part of future multi-regional missions. This would also be the case 
if ASEAN were to decide to contribute to the new United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission, to be made up of regional organisations contributing military and 
security forces, as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, expects.
Coherence in the EU’s External Policies in South-East Asia
The deployment of the ESDP civilian crisis management mission to Aceh 
represents the culmination of the implementation of a broad range of EU external 
policy instruments to the province and to Indonesia. All of these instruments 
work under the overall theme that the territorial integrity of Indonesia will be 
protected. The long-term commitment of the EU to one country and its regions, 
across so many different sectoral priorities, is remarkable and unprecedented. 
Over time, the EU has engaged a range of external relations policy options towards 
Indonesia (Aceh and before towards East Timor). This includes external assistance 
consisting of both humanitarian and development aid, election observation, the 
possibility of an EU Special Representative all culminating in Europe’s first ESDP 
mission in Asia with civilian-military crisis management implications. 
These kinds of instruments generally demonstrate the soft power dimension to 
Europe’s external relations for which the EU is well-known. For the EU, ‘security’ 
means more than hard or traditional concepts of security. The EU recognises that 
soft power and the ability to project it into third countries and regions will help 
build development and security, both abroad and, as a complementary benefit, for 
the European continent. The EU sees it as a strategic interest to expand a zone of 
stability, security and prosperity beyond its borders,27 arguing that the coherence 
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of the deployment of the external relations instruments will impact on Europe’s 
security. 
The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was established in February 2001 to 
provide the EU with a flexible and fast mechanism to allocate funding for external 
assistance in areas other than humanitarian aid. The RRM has been used to 
finance technical assessment missions, crisis management projects, post-conflict 
reconciliation or reconstruction measures after a natural disaster. The brainchild 
of former Commissioner Chris Patten, the first use of the RRM in South-East 
Asia was in Indonesia in 2002. In July 2002, the EU funded a project, worth 
€ 520,000, supporting community-based peace initiatives assisting Jakarta’s 
efforts to address Indonesia’s internal regional conflicts. In December 2002, the 
European Commission allocated € 2.3m to the RRM to finance a ‘cessation of 
hostilities framework agreement’ supporting the ceasefire agreed between the 
GAM and Jakarta. Then, several months after the December 2004 tsunami, in 
March 2005, the EU provided € 220,000 through the RRM to help facilitate the 
role of Acehnese civil society in post-tsunami recovery plans. As the progress in the 
GAM-Jakarta talks started to become substantial, the EU undertook to once again 
support the peace process. In April 2005, the European Commission used the 
RRM to provide EU funding totalling € 270,000 to the Indonesian government-
GAM negotiations that began in January 2005 under President Athisaari and the 
CMI. Also in April, the Commission used the RRM to finance post-tsunami aid 
worth € 12m in Indonesia, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Within Indonesia, the 
assistance was targeted at the local government structures in Aceh in order to 
help the local population be involved in the selection and design of post-tsunami 
recovery projects. Then, on 1st September, as the Initial Monitoring Presence of the 
EU and ASEAN was underway in Aceh, the EC proposed allocating € 4m from 
the RRM to support the demobilisation and re-integration of both former GAM 
fighters and detainees. This would include providing € 600 to 5000 individuals 
(2000 detainees and 3000 fighters and their families) with the balance spent on 
25,000 people in Aceh over a six month period. Through relatively small amounts 
of aid, the EU has been able to help the sustainability of the political talks and 
ensure that the peace agreement had grass-roots support. 
Through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 
the EU has a long history of monitoring elections in selected third countries. 
Since 1996, when the process started in Asia, the EU has deployed a total of 
seventeen Election Observation Missions (EOM) to seven countries including 
three missions to East Timor (1999, 2001, 2002) and two to Indonesia (1999, 
2004).28 With limited resources, the EC has chosen to continue to focus on 
individual countries and try and make an impact there rather than spread the 
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EIDHR programme across all of Asia. As specified in the MoU, the Indonesian 
government is tasked with promulgating a Special Autonomy law for Aceh. Once 
in place, it is expected that Aceh will hold local elections by September 2006. 
The EU has indicated that it will send an EOM to monitor the conduct of the 
elections including events leading up to polling day, the count and the aftermath. 
The Monitoring Mission, although substantially reduced in size, will remain to 
provide some measure of security to the EU election teams.29 
Several EU member states were keen to establish the post of EU Special 
Representative (SR)30 for Aceh in order to improve the co-ordination of EU 
assistance programmes and offer political direction to EU policy. The decision 
not to appoint a Special Representative, although not a surprise given Asia’s 
lowly political importance to the EU, stands out when compared to the EU’s 
inter-regional engagement in other areas of the world. Several other crisis 
management operations in Europe’s neighbourhood and in Africa have serving 
Special Representatives including:
1.  EU JUST THEMIS, a rule of law mission in Georgia, which is covered by the 
EU SR for the Southern Caucasus
2.  EUPM, a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which is covered 
by the EU SR for BiH
3.  EUPOL PROXIMA, a police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), which was covered by the EU SR for FYROM - the 
mission finished in December 2005
4.  AMIS II, a civil-military mission supporting the African Union in Darfur, 
which is covered by the EU SR for the Sudan. 
The EU provides external assistance aid to Indonesia in three main mechanisms 
namely via humanitarian aid (the greatest disaster to befall Aceh in recent 
memory was the December 2004 tsunami), in development aid and, lastly, 
economic aid. By March 2006, the EU had committed € 186m to Aceh from 
the € 207m pledged in January 2005 for humanitarian relief and to start 
reconstruction projects.31 Obviously, the EU does not provide humanitarian aid 
on a political priority basis; yet, within a limited budget, choices have to be made 
and the amounts allocated to Indonesia are significant in comparative terms. 
In September 2005, the European Investment Bank allocated € 50m in loan 
credit to Rabobank International Indonesia to support small and medium sized 
enterprises and to private or public sector companies investing to reconstruct or 
rehabilitate businesses affected by the tsunami. Outside extraordinary aid, such 
as for tsunami relief, the EU prepares Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for third 
country beneficiaries of EU aid. Indonesia’s CSP covers the period 2002 until 
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2006 and has a financial allocation of € 216m to fund two priorities including 
god governance and democracy projects and programmes on the sustainable use 
of natural resources. 
While the deployment of the instruments described above in Aceh, Indonesia 
and the wider South-East Asia generally demonstrate a significant degree of 
coherence in terms of EU priority setting and implementation, there are still 
some questions regarding the coherence between civilian and military structures. 
Indeed, Javier Solana suggests that the effectiveness of the EU, in terms of 
external relations actions, can be achieved through greater coherence between 
CFSP-ESDP and European Community policies. Nevertheless, while the two 
extensions to the mission timeframe have worked in practice rather well between 
the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, the same may not be 
true for other possible missions. The EU will need to examine how to improve 
mission planning in order to evaluate better the potential duration of a mission 
and when it should be terminated. 
Further lessons will probably be identified as the AMM comes to an end. 
In October, the Presidency of the EU Council, under the Finnish government, 
who played an important role in the peace negotiations, will hold a conference 
of senior member state officials to assess the Aceh Mission and its impact on 
the still evolving ESDP. What is clear now is that although the EU is rapidly 
developing the institutional architecture and force capabilities in foreign policy, 
across a broad range of external relations instruments, it remains unlikely that 
the EU will ever want to pursue an interventionist global security policy. As the 
military capabilities evolve, in particular through the Battlegroups,32 the central 
role of the UN for the EU efforts to promote multilateralism in its relations with 
third countries will remain. 
Two Scenarios for Future EU-ASEAN Security Co-operation
What implications does the inter-regional AMM have for possible future co-
operation on a multi-regional level? Although the Aceh Mission is the first ESDP 
operation in Asia, the EU already co-operates with another regional organisation 
in Africa – the African Union (AMIS II in Darfur). If the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission33 is able to deploy troops on behalf of regional organisations, as 
Kofi Annan aspires to, then there will be a multilateral framework for the EU to 
co-operate with other regional groupings on crisis management missions. It is 
intended that the UN Peacebuilding Commission would act to stabilise countries 
emerging from conflict allowing for their economic recovery and development. 
The added value of any EU involvement in missions in third countries or regions is 
the perceived honest broker role that the EU promotes of itself and, as a corollary, 
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Europe’s apparent neutrality compared to UN machinations. Europe-the-project 
or Europe as a regional grouping may not be well understood in political terms 
in Asia but to many countries the EU also benefits from not being identified with 
American unilateralism.
As mentioned earlier, the EU accords a relatively low political priority to its 
relations with Asia both at bilateral country and regional level. Nevertheless, 
taking into account the viewpoint of senior military officials in the EU Military 
Staff about the removal of any geographic limitation to future EU missions, 
there may be scope for additional operations in Asia, in association with ASEAN. 
Until such time as the ESDP concepts, structures and practice have been more 
seriously tested, it seems probable that the EU will continue to seek inter-regional 
partners for theatre operations at significant distance from the EU. Furthermore, 
there does seem scope for other possible missions in Asia, two of which share 
similarities with the Aceh Mission. 
The first such possibility is Thailand. For many decades, four southern 
provinces of Thailand have been advocating independence and fighting a low-
level insurgency trying to achieve this goal. The southern provinces of Pattani, 
Narathiwat, Songkhla and Yala are made up of a majority Muslim population in 
contrast to the Buddhist dominated north. These Muslims are also predominantly 
ethnic Malays. In response to the insurgency – this phase dates back to 2004 
– the Thai government has imposed martial law and increased the numbers of 
the security forces serving in the southern part of the country. There is some 
urgency to getting peace talks underway as both the governments of Thailand 
and of Malaysia are concerned that the Muslim separatists could attract foreign 
jihadists eager to exploit another local low-level Muslim insurgency. With the 
Thailand election crisis resolved, the Thai government may feel more open to 
making concessions and stopping the hardline pre-election talk. One of the 
insurgent’s groups is based in Sweden and a representative of the Pattani United 
Liberation Organisation is reported to have offered to conduct talks with the 
government based on a goal of a higher level of autonomy rather than outright 
independence.34 The EU could serve as peace talk negotiators or leave this to 
Sweden on a bilateral basis. There seems, in principle, to be many similarities 
with the Aceh peace talks process and Europe certainly enjoys a positive profile 
in the region following the level of humanitarian and reconstruction aid provided 
after the December 2004 tsunami. 
A second possibility is the Philippines. The situation in the Southern 
Philippines province of Mindanao has been ongoing for more than thirty years 
where Muslim groups have been fighting for an independent homeland. The 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been fighting the Philippine army on-and-off 
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since its formation in 1977. The two sides signed a ceasefire in June 2003 and, 
at the time, the EU stated that it would consider funding ‘projects’ that would 
support the peace process. The ceasefire has proved tenuous but it seems that a 
final peace agreement may be signed before the end of 2006. 
In either theatre, Thailand or in the Philippines, there would seem scope 
for a monitoring and re-integration Mission very similar to the Aceh operation, 
including the re-integration of former combatants, livelihood projects, the 
return of exiles, small arms destruction and human rights monitoring of the 
conditions that might be outlined in any peace accord. Although ASEAN is 
clearly developing the capacity to respond to such situations, if any accord is 
signed by the end of 2006, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting may not have 
had enough time to get appropriate planning and implementation procedures 
in place. Equally, the EU is more likely than individual ASEAN countries to 
stump up the necessary funding and would, thus, demand a greater say in how 
any mission is run. 
Conclusion
The Aceh Monitoring Mission represents a qualitative improvement in the EU’s 
ability and willingness to engage in Asia beyond traditional economic, commercial 
and human rights concerns. The EU will continue a policy of engaging with 
regional group actors, both in Asia and elsewhere, for low-level conflict resolution 
or crisis management operations while leaving larger-scale operations to the 
multilateral level, as represented by the UN. 
The two situations arising in ASEAN member countries, namely the Southern 
Philippines and Southern Thailand, have been mentioned both in Asia and 
in Europe as possible areas of future collaboration on an inter-regional basis, 
dependent upon sustainable peace agreements being signed. This coincidence of 
opinion strongly suggests that some European involvement in crisis management, 
either in civilian of military terms, is possible within the next twelve to fifteen 
months. However, any expansion of inter-regional co-operation, in the military 
and security sectors, will need an appropriate conceptual framework as more 
operations are deployed and joint projects implemented. An ASEAN Security 
Strategy will become essential if not inevitable as the meetings of ASEAN Defence 
Ministers become more regular and the interest of the group in both traditional 
security issues and soft security concerns assumes a greater profile. As noted 
above, ASEAN and the EU do share a commonality of views on many issues. 
Through their inter-regional co-operation, ASEAN has been confident to embrace 
multilateralism in its external relations, even if it does not always call its actions 
by that name. This is reflected in the ASEAN Security Community which, apart 
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from obvious regional and international security objectives, is based upon the 
principles outlined in the UN Charter. 
Within the EU, the European Security Strategy will be three years old by the 
end of 2006. Yet, within the short time that has elapsed, the nature of the threats 
facing the EU internally and the civil and military options open to it in external 
relations terms, have changed, in some instances dramatically. Even within 
Council structures, for example, there has already been an evolution in thinking 
stressing that the EU should anticipate crises rather than merely react to them. 
It is clear that the Strategy, as it exists today will need updating. This is because 
Europe’s third country and regional grouping partners need to have an up-to-
date understanding of the EU’s capabilities and theoretical grounding in a single 
framework paper. 
Although the EU billed the AMM as a civilian crisis management operation, 
the mission clearly had military and security undertones. Certainly, the 
contributing ASEAN countries thought so when their senior observers were 
serving military officers. Its success owed much to the ability of GAM leaders to 
enforce decisions down the chain of command to local commanders to respect 
the ceasefire and co-operate with the AMM and to the political commitment 
of the Jakarta government to restrain the military and police forces. The Aceh 
Mission timeframe was extended several times, indicating a significant degree of 
flexibility from the operational side but some constraints from the initial planning 
side. This suggests that the European missions undertaken through the ESDP 
may need greater resources to enable more strategic planning of operations. 
At the same time, the sustained use of a variety of EU external relations policy 
instruments in Indonesia and Aceh, through two different European Commission 
administrations, is remarkable. This level of coherence in external policy and 
assistance benefited from the central role Indonesia has played in ASEAN as 
well as the long-term dialogue the EU has had with South-East Asia on inter-
regional level. Through the Aceh Monitoring Mission example, we can therefore 
identify that the EU conducts a policy of cautious and targeted use of a balance 
between multilateralism and inter-regional co-operation in meeting its political 
and security priorities in external relations policy. 
The analysis of the Aceh Monitoring Mission shows that the EU, through 
an inter-regional approach, has successfully followed its security interests 
as formulated in the European Security Strategy. This development will be 
reinforced by the progressive engagement of regional organisations in the UN 
framework. Yet the experience of the AMM shows as well that the EU needs to 
improve its mission planning. However, with an ASEAN Security Community 
in the making, both organisations id	est the EU and ASEAN will need to develop 
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closer administrative links thereby deepening their security ties if future joint 
crisis management missions, for example, in Thailand or the Philippines, shall be 
as successful as the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Therefore, the AMM can usefully 
serve as a blueprint for the enhancement of South-East Asian security.
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6
ASEM and the Expanding China-
European Union Relationship
Marc Lanteigne
One of the most critical changes in Chinese foreign policy over the past decade 
has been Beijing’s increasing interest in pursuing multilateral engagement and 
cooperation on a variety of global issues, a marked contrast from the country’s 
preference during the Maoist and Dengist eras for bilateral cooperation coupled 
with mistrust towards international regimes. With the turn of the century, as 
China continues to grow not only as an economic power but also as a political and 
diplomatic one, the effects of China’s institutional engagements are becoming 
more visible and relevant to the study of international organisations, regimes 
and regional cooperation, but also to more recent analyses into inter-regional 
relations.
During the early 1990s, Beijing approached international regimes in 
a conservative fashion, stressing the need to gather information, while at 
the same time showing great willingness to adapt to largely Western-based 
rules of institutional cooperation. Today, as a result of growing foreign policy 
confidence and greater information about regional and global organisations, 
Beijing increasingly endeavours to integrate its own distinct interests within its 
institutional engagement process, with the understanding that many modern 
international issues have become too large to address unilaterally or bilaterally, 
even by a great power. Chinese foreign policy has become increasingly proactive 
rather than reactive, marked by greater international exposure and the ability to 
address the complex patterns of cooperation and competition in the political and 
economic arenas.
China’s pattern of modern international engagement can be viewed in stages. 
In the 1990s, China placed much focus on improving its foreign policies with its 
immediate neighbours, working to resolve many lingering political or territorial 
disputes left over from the cold war. A result of the zhoubian (peripheral) diplomacy 
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of that decade has been that China now benefits from the most stable periphery 
it has enjoyed since before the cold war, with much calmer borders in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia as well as the former USSR.1 It is partially as a result of this 
peace dividend that Beijing has been able, particularly over the past five years, to 
expand its diplomatic endeavours beyond Asia and Oceania, to the Middle East, 
Latin America, Africa and the subject of this study, Europe. As the European 
Union continues to grow and mature into a larger power, the EU has become 
the focus of great interest to China’s expanding foreign policy, both as a single 
actor and as a collection of European states economies which Beijing has been 
anxious to engage. This was demonstrated by the comprehensive EU Policy Paper 
released by China’s Foreign Ministry in October 2003, outlining China’s political, 
economic, cultural and social priorities in its relations with Brussels.2 The desire 
for greater cooperation has been mutual, as evidenced by the numerous high-
level contacts between Chinese and European policymakers seeking agreements 
on a variety of political and trade issues. 
In 2005, China and Europe celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the 
establishment of relations between the two entities. Engaging Europe presents 
distinct challenges to China, first and foremost due to the fact that while Europe 
has largely been successful in integrating its domestic-level trade and economic 
development policies, a common EU foreign policy has remained elusive, and 
therefore other states seeking engagement with ‘Europe’ often require dialogue 
with a ‘giant with many heads’. Nevertheless, Beijing has made great strides in 
developing a comprehensive policy with the EU and its membership, and both 
sides recognise each other not only as potentially lucrative trade partners, but also 
potential counterweights to American political and economic power.3 Since the 
end of the cold war Beijing has expressed a foreign policy preference for a multi-
polar international system rather than one dominated by a single great power. 
This is a viewpoint with which the European Union, especially some of its larger 
members such as France and Germany, has identified. In the case of Bonn and 
Paris, they have greatly deepened their ties with Beijing as their relations with 
the United States became more complicated in the wake of considerable foreign 
policy differences over the post-2003 American-led international intervention in 
Iraq. 
Since the creation and expansion of the European Union, Beijing has 
expressed support for the EU development process as a means of redressing what 
China sees as an unbalanced post-cold war international system. One possible 
solution has been seen to be the promotion of the European Union as a great 
power ‘pole’.4 This perception has been maintained largely due to the erratic 
state of Sino-American relations over the past decade. While relations between 
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Washington and Beijing have warmed considerably since both sides pledged their 
support for the international war on terror following the events of September 
2001, various issues such as the Iraq conflict, the Taiwan question, American 
policy in Central Asia, recent trade, currency and investment-related disputes 
and possible diverging overall strategic policies, have adversely affected the Sino-
American relationship.
From a macro-level view, there is the question in China of whether the 
country’s relations with the United States will be adversely affected by great power 
frictions, especially should Washington consider Beijing’s development into a 
great power as a potential strategic obstacle. Some international analysts in China 
have emphasised the idea that although the war on terror is a very serious security 
issue, it has not eclipsed the greater question of power shifts among the world’s 
great powers in the post-cold war system.5 Both China and some European states 
have expressed concerns about the emerging distribution of not only political but 
also economic power since the cold war’s end. Therefore, maintaining strong ties 
with Europe is important to China not only from an economic viewpoint but also 
through the lens of emerging power politics. 
In choosing to expand its relations with the European Union, Beijing has, as 
have other governments, needed to strike a balance between bilateral relations 
with EU members and with the Union itself, an entity which was, and many argue 
still is, in the process of adapting a unified foreign policy outlook. As has been 
argued, however, despite initial reservations in Beijing about China choosing 
to focus on the EU as a multilateral entity rather than solely concentrating on 
specific member states, this policy changed significantly in the 1990s after 
Beijing acknowledged the potential for the Union to become a great power 
actor. This approach had to be tempered with the fact that the development of 
the EU has not been a linear process, with periods of little change and others 
of significant transformation appearing at erratic intervals. Thus, China, like 
other actors in the international community, has had to continually monitor the 
balance of relations between ‘Europe’ and the EU.6 This evolution in policy can 
also be considered part of a wider foreign policy development within China, one 
which has seen a strong suspicion of international institutions rapidly give way 
to an acknowledgement that multilateral engagement has brought about many 
foreign policy goods to China which bilateral relations cannot effectively provide.7 
Emerging Sino-European relations, therefore, represent a valuable laboratory for 
both sides, with Europe testing its ability to engage a rapidly growing political 
and economic power, and China attempting to craft a ‘two-tier’ foreign policy for 
the European sphere, one which incorporates relations with the top two levels of 
‘European government’: the national and supra-national one.
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Sino-European engagement has also served as a means for China to develop 
its foreign relations beyond that of a periphery policy by becoming a crucial 
test case in Beijing’s evolving inter-regional policy, an area which has grown in 
importance for China over the past decade for a variety of reasons. First, inter-
regional cooperation has been a key method of projecting China’s international 
interests to a much wider arena. As a result of China’s increasing foreign policy 
experience and self-confidence, the country is more prepared to participate in, and 
support more comprehensive agendas for, regional and inter-regional dialogues. 
Second, China’s economic growth, which since the late 1970s has been on a steady 
upward path, is greatly dependent upon increasing imports of raw materials and 
energy as well as goods and services. Beijing has had a comparatively short time 
in which to adjust to the politics of economic interdependence, and in some ways 
is still in the learning process.
Third, China has been seeking over the past few years to develop a foreign 
policy based on the ideas of ‘peaceful rise’ (heping	 jueqi) or more recently 
‘peaceful development’ (heping	fazhan) and the building of a ‘harmonious world’ 
(hexie	shijie) phrases more frequently used in Chinese policy speeches, including 
those by Chinese President Hu Jintao. These terms refer to Beijing’s wish to 
demonstrate that while China is a rising power in the international system, it 
would not act as a potential hegemon or challenger to the present international 
order.8 Instead, Beijing has stressed that its growth would be tempered by a 
focus on international engagement and cooperation in Asia and beyond. Closely 
connected to this idea has been Beijing’s development of the New Security 
Concept (xin	anquan	guandian) since the late-1990s. The NSC, a revised and 
updated view of China’s Maoist-era Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, calls 
for cooperation in strategic matters with a focus on non-hierarchical cooperation, 
mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, and community-building.9 Finally, China 
is interested in addressing its own concerns about a potentially increasing 
expansionist and unilateralist American foreign policy while continuing to 
maintain close ties with the United States. The development of Sino-EU relations 
has been an important means of addressing all of these areas within Beijing’s 
emerging inter-regional foreign policies. 
Although relations between Europe and China have been increasingly cordial 
and multifaceted for the past decade, there remain a number of political and 
economic issues which divide the two sides and have been the subject of much 
debate not only bilaterally but also within inter-regional institutions which have 
emerged since the end of the cold war. One of the largest of these which brings 
together Chinese and European interests has been the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) process, created in 1996 based upon the idea that many political and 
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economic issues have bound Europe and East Asia together and therefore 
require greater multilateral dialogue.10 However, although ASEM links Europe 
with many East Asian states, China’s growth has made that state a potentially 
stronger voice within the institution, and therefore ASEM has the ability to act 
as an important canvas for emerging issues between the EU and China. 
ASEM remains a new construction and in many ways is still attempting to 
define itself beyond the well-worn labels of ‘talking shop’ or ‘debating society’. 
However, the group is distinct not only due to the large number of economic 
powers within its membership, but also to its existence as one of the largest 
inter-regional institutions without the US as a member, and because of its 
consensus-based, non-formal construction. The latter factor may have made 
decision-making more complicated, but the benefits have included a greater 
potential to examine mutual inter-regional issues within an informal milieu. 
China’s role within the ASEM group will be an important yardstick by which to 
determine the direction ASEM is taking and what future goals it will be setting 
in the name of greater Asia-Europe Cooperation. At the same time, ASEM will be 
an important regime for China as it adjusts to an increasingly globalised world 
with growing levels of regionalism and inter-regionalism. 
The Origins of ASEM and China’s Role
The Asia-Europe Meeting was constructed at a time when regionalism in the 
post-cold war international system was well underway, a time when political 
cooperation became increasingly less constrained by ideology and could instead 
develop based on geography and the seeking out of economic territories. The 
1990s, however, also saw the development of inter-regionalism, the meeting of 
regions on an equal footing, with the idea that the regions accept each other as 
such.11 The process of developing inter-regionalism is based on the assumption 
that economic globalisation has been creating ties not only between state actors 
but also between regions, ties which needed to be better addressed to produce 
the most optimal number, and quality, of ‘goods’ for the actors involved. In order 
to do so, the norms, rules and institutions which governed state behaviour within 
regions needed to be internationalised.12 In the case of inter-regionalism, norms 
and rules had to be created to guide the behaviour of two disparate regions. 
Economic, political and strategic links between two of the most powerful 
regions, Europe and North America, had been forged during the cold war, but 
with the rise of Asia over the past three decades it too had to address the question 
of inter-regionalism. The creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum (APEC) in 1989 was the first major endeavour to connect Asia to an 
inter-regional institution, in this case bringing together Pacific Rim economies 
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with those in the Americas, with ASEM following seven years later. Both regimes 
are developing into important test cases for the development of inter-regional 
cooperation between large economic powers.
Like APEC in the Pacific Rim, ASEM had its origins in formal and informal 
dialogues which led to the founding of a more formalised regime. Discussion of 
a Europe-Asia institution at the leadership level was undertaken by various public 
and private sector actors at a 1989 Eminent Persons’ conference in Berlin, as well 
as at meetings between European and North and Southeast Asian representatives 
in the 1990s.13 However, the idea was given more weight in October 1994 during 
the Europe East Asia Summit at the world Economic Forum. Then-Singaporean 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called for the development of a summit-level 
dialogue which would bring together leaders from the European Union and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The atmosphere was certainly 
congenial for an inter-regional dialogue of this type as far as Asian leaders were 
concerned, especially since the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) had been held in July 1994, with the EU being permitted representation as 
an observer.14 The ARF had been created out of a desire by the ASEAN members 
to cast a wider net when examining post-cold war security, recognising the need 
for expanded multilateral dialogue. As well, ASEAN was interested in further 
engaging a rising China, recognising its pivotal role in the emerging political 
and strategic arenas in Asia, as well as maintaining its relevance alongside 
the Pacific Rim great powers of the United States, China and Japan.15 It can be 
argued that the rationale behind the ASEM-building process echoed that of the 
ARF in its early stages. 
The ASEM framework was designed to rest on three ‘pillars’ which form the 
policy framework of the institution. 
The political	pillar has been able to address numerous international issues 
which have affected both continents, including nuclear proliferation, secessionist 
issues and the question of preventive diplomacy. More non-traditional security 
matters which have been well-suited to ASEM’s informal structure, including 
transnational crime, migration, drugs and health issues, have also been presented 
via this pillar. The economic	pillar has focused primarily on trade, globalisation, 
communications, small and medium enterprise development and information 
networking. Europe and East Asia, including China, have recognised each other 
as valuable markets and powerful actors in the globalising economy. Finally, the 
cultural	pillar has looked at education, youth, and heritage promotion as well as 
environmental and labour matters.16 Many of these discussion areas have been 
based upon the idea of the traditional ‘Silk Road’ historical linkages between the 
two sides, including communications and transport routes, leading to the idea 
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of re-establishing historic trade routes between China and Europe. The ASEM 
process has stressed informality and consensus-building in forging agreements, 
and stressing the effective use of high-level summits, using similar methods as 
other emerging Asian institutions such as APEC and the ARF. ASEM also seeks 
to become complimentary to other regimes rather than duplicating them.
Within the economic sphere, Europe had recognised, as was written in 
its 1994 New Asia Strategy paper, that in keeping with the European goal of 
promoting greater unrestricted international trade, further engagement was 
required with the development states of East Asia as well as with China, which 
was recognised as having followed many previous Asian patterns of economic 
growth and was becoming an important puzzle piece in understanding the rise 
of Asia.17 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8 brought a temporary halt to the 
idea of the Asian economic miracle, and also sparked a regional rethinking 
in Asia about the idea of Asian ‘exceptionalism’ towards its economic growth 
and cooperation, namely that the Asian economies were not immune to the 
pressures and problems of globalisation and economic interdependence. Instead, 
there came a new pragmatism in many parts of Asia which opened the door to 
discussion on new forms of economic and political cooperation both on the 
regional and inter-regional levels. Despite the aftershocks of the crisis, however, 
the requirement for Europe to enlist the Asian economies as necessary allies in 
their policy on expanding international trade liberalisation did not abate. At the 
same time, in the wake of the crisis, conventional ideas of regional cooperation 
in Asia were also questioned and re-evaluated by many of the economies directly 
and indirectly affected.18 
The end goal of the ASEM regime was to not only improve EU-Asia ties 
but also to increase the number and quality of linkages between the two sides. 
China entered the ASEM process aware that at the time of its founding, the 
rate of EU investment in China was far below what Beijing was seeking, less 
than one percent of the Union’s total foreign investments.19 Much, it should be 
noted, has changed since that time, since as of 2005 China became the EU’s 
largest trading partner after the United States, with total EU investment in China 
averaging € 3.5 billion (US$ 4.2 billion) since 2000. Overall trade between 
the two sides stood at € 175 billion (US$ 210 billion) in 2004, with a growing 
trade deficit on the European side totalling € 78 billion (US$ 94 billion) by that 
year.20 The development of ASEM has allowed Sino-EU trade and investment to 
increase within a multilateral milieu, providing much economic information 
exchange and confidence-building. As well, ASEM’s founding is a further 
acknowledgement of the increasing ties between security and economic issues 
on a regional and international level,21 with economic security now becoming 
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an expanding research area for both European and Asian policymakers and 
analysts. 
Formal ASEM summits have taken place biannually since the founding 
meeting in Bangkok in 1996, with satellite meetings representing specific sectors 
taking place around them. China, along with the ASEAN countries, the Republic 
of Korea and Japan, met with the then-fifteen members of the Union. In addition, 
during the same year as the Track I-level ASEM was created, a complementary 
Track II mechanism, the Council for Asia Europe Cooperation (CAEC), was 
founded. As with other Track II regimes, the CAEC brings together governmental 
and non-governmental actors and think-tanks to act as a supporting coalition 
and an incubator of policy ideas which often filter upward to the governmental 
policymaking stage.22 However, the CAEC was hampered by internal disputes 
over membership, leading to the non-recognition of the group as ASEM’s official 
Track II mechanism.23 Nevertheless, the CAEC, the Asia-Europe Foundation and 
other associated research groups have continued to act as idea-generating tools 
for ASEM.
As other scholars have noted, the development of ASEM reflected a growing 
‘trilateralism’ among great power cooperation in the post-cold war era, as well as 
the acknowledgement of the development of trading blocs which accelerated in 
the 1990s, and the need to address one side of the triangle which in the 1990s 
remained underdeveloped, namely the link between Europe and Asia. Even today, 
compared to the other two main links the Asia-Europe wing is still very much a 
work in progress.24 With North America having established strong ties with the 
Asian and European spheres, while consolidating its own economic regionalist 
policies with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) talks, it became apparent that a mechanism 
was required to complete the chain. With the ambitious development of the APEC 
forum and its expansion to include leadership-level meetings after 1993, Europe 
was especially concerned that its interests in Asia would not be marginalized.25 
An institution was therefore needed to produce another link in the chain, adding 
to the Europe-North America and Asia-North America links.
The ASEM idea was approached by European actors as a method of allowing 
Brussels to develop as both an alternative and a counterweight to growing 
Asia-North American ties. At the same time, however, one can also point to the 
‘contagion’ effect in order to explain the genesis of the ASEM idea. This concept 
has been viewed as twofold. First, there is the wish to develop institutions similar 
to those which have been effective elsewhere in the hopes of copying their 
successes. Second, there is the defensive desire to copy a successful international 
institution in order to protect domestic interests from being adversely effected by 
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the very external institution in the process of becoming more powerful.26 APEC, 
during its halcyon first years in the early 1990s, could be considered a source 
of a ‘contagion’ which led to ASEM’s development, as APEC was perceived by 
European and Asian policymakers as a useful method of standardised multilateral 
engagement, and also by Europe as a potential competitor for Asia’s attentions. 
There was therefore a need to ‘close the triangle’ by creating an Asia-Europe 
mechanism. At the same time, concerns in the 1990s in Asia about a strengthened 
EU which might turn inward were also catalysts for Asia’s growing support for 
ASEM, since such a regime would offer a window and potential door into the 
increasingly unified European market.27 Meanwhile, Asia’s economic dynamism 
was a magnet for European trade interests.
The removal of the Soviet Union as a geographical (as well as ideological) 
barrier between Europe and Asia also produced a far more congenial atmosphere 
for ASEM dialogue. It allowed the idea of greater inclusiveness in both political 
and economic matters to flourish.28 As with many other regimes which appeared 
in Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, the sudden growth of regional identity politics 
and a ‘sense of community’29 in Asia were a direct result of the erosion of 
ideological divides in much of the Pacific Rim, opening up the possibilities for 
region-based cooperation rather than the hub-and-spoke patterns of cooperation 
in Asia common during the cold war. Organisations based on ideology began 
to fade as groups based on regional, and inter-regional issues have proliferated 
throughout much of the world. The development of dialogues such as ASEM and 
APEC represents a second stage of the regime-building process in Asia, the first 
arguably being the development of Southeast Asian cooperation via ASEAN after 
the late 1960s. In the case of ASEM, the removal of the formidable Soviet barrier 
between Europe and Asia can be credited for assisting in ASEM’s genesis.
Since the time of ASEM’s founding, however, power dynamics in Asia have 
shifted significantly, reflecting China’s rise as a regional and increasingly an 
international power. During the first meeting of ASEM in 1996, then-Chinese 
Premier Li Peng viewed the organization as one with the potential to promote 
equality, set aside differences between states, promote trust and encourage 
mutual development, themes very much in keeping with China’s traditional 
foreign policy doctrine of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. During 
subsequent meetings, Beijing representatives made use of the forum to promote 
their views on the need for respect for sovereignty and non-interference.30 
Moreover, Beijing found itself on the same page as much of Europe on the 
subject of ‘multilateralising’ international relations as a counterweight to the 
perceived encroaching unipolarity headed by the United States since the 1990s. 
Although neither the European nor the Asian wings of ASEM seek to marginalize 
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Washington, both sides have agreed that promoting multipolarity via ASEM 
serves the interests of its membership. China was no exception, as it has agreed 
that an inter-regional institution with Washington on the sidelines is useful in 
providing an approach to international cooperation which augments multilateral 
ideas.31 As China continues to develop its grand strategy for the new century, 
multilateral initiatives such as ASEM will remain high priorities.
The formalising of Sino-EU relations greatly served China’s post-cold war 
economic needs as well, since Beijing has been concentrating on diversifying its 
trading partners regionally and internationally as part of its ongoing foreign policy 
reforms. Europe was not an exception, as Beijing has been expanding economic 
ties with European states in the wake of high-level visits by Li and then-president 
Jiang Zemin to EU capitals in the late 1990s where they sought economic and 
industrial agreements as well as support for China’s eventual accession to the 
World Trade Organisation. ASEM threw its support behind Chinese membership 
in the WTO despite lingering American misgivings.32 China joined the WTO in 
December 2001 after an extended application process often marked by policy 
clashes between Beijing and Washington. 
During subsequent ASEM meetings, China has been in strong support of the 
expansion of the ASEM membership, including the ambitious 2004 enlargement 
which saw ten new EU member states and the remaining three ASEAN members, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, enter the ASEM process. However, Beijing has 
also called for the group to re-orient itself more towards cooperation rather than 
dialogue, while retaining its flexibility in terms of structure and agendas.33 As well, 
the role of Myanmar (Burma) within ASEM has been a divisive issue between 
European and Asian ASEM actors due to concerns over Yangon’s human rights 
record.34 Nevertheless, Beijing’s increased engagement with ASEM has added 
to China’s overall development of greater confidence within regional and inter-
regional regimes, especially in the sense that Beijing is far more comfortable 
playing a more active and less conservative role in these types of institution-
building.
Security (and Insecurities)
Although many specific hard defence issues have so far not been part of the 
ASEM agenda, many matters related to ‘non-traditional’ security issues, such 
as sustainable development, migration, food security, human rights, and more 
recently anti-terrorism have been the subject of ASEM conferences and events. 
For example, ASEM has been endeavouring to increase the visibility of gender-
specific security issues by addressing the growing problem of human trafficking, 
especially of women and children. China was an active participant in the 2001 
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meeting of Law Enforcement Agencies on Child Welfare which outlined the need 
for both wings of ASEM to take greater care in addressing crimes against women 
and children, coinciding with the publication in China that year of ‘Guidelines 
for Chinese Women’s Development (2001-2010)’ and the ‘Guidelines for Chinese 
Children’s Development (2001-2010)’, both of which called for greater legal 
safeguards to protect the rights of women and minors. The meeting was headed 
by then-Chinese State Councillor Luo Gan.35 Legal and illegal human migration 
and the role of women in non-traditional security and development has remained 
an important issue in subsequent meetings. 
Another recent example of the blending of non-traditional security concerns 
within ASEM has been the 2005 Bali Declaration, an initiative tied to the cultural 
field of cooperation within the ASEM process, calling for peace between faiths 
and non-discrimination based on faith as well as a more concerted policy against 
corruption and a greater acknowledgement of the role of women in peace-building 
and inter-faith communication.36 These initiatives have all formed part of ASEM’s 
growing policies on non-traditional security as well as the linkages between 
security and economic development. Also, policy coordination in the wake of the 
December 2004 tsunami disaster, as part of the ‘Tianjin Initiative’, was added 
to ASEM’s strategic agenda. The ‘ASEM contingency dialogue mechanism’ was 
established in order to both coordinate assistance and to minimise the financial 
damage of future crises of this nature.37 The backing of this idea by China, seen as 
an extension of the ASEM Trust Fund, further demonstrates China’s commitment 
to stable Asian economic growth which was first made internationally visible 
during the Asian Financial Crisis, where China was an active participant in the 
assisting of crisis-hit states in Southeast Asia while spurring requests to reduce 
the value of the yuan, despite domestic pressures, in order to avoid further 
destabilising the Pacific Rim’s shaky economic situation.38 From these initiatives, 
China built much regional goodwill, especially with its immediate neighbours 
and this has translated into new bilateral and regional links.
Via ASEM, China has been able to make use of another channel to promote 
its regional foreign trade policy of stability as well as growth. As was noted in 
recent empirical research, Beijing’s overall participation levels in international 
institutions had risen considerably by the end of the 1990s, reflecting a greater 
comfort level with such regimes and a greater acceptance for multilateral solutions 
in regional and global issues.39 China has also made use of ASEM to better define its 
international trade policies, similar to its policies within APEC in the 1990s when 
it utilised its membership in that forum to demonstrate its policy commitment 
to joining the World Trade Organisation. ASEM has provided a useful forum 
for Beijing to enunciate its economic policies, which is increasingly important, 
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given China’s growing impact on international market forces. For example, at an 
ASEM meeting in 1999 then-Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan outlined 
China’s evolving views on globalisation but also noted the shortcomings on the 
international financial system in the wake of the Asian Crisis.40 As with APEC 
and other regional organizations, ASEM has proven a useful forum for Beijing 
to articulate its global-level policies and concerns about international trade and 
economic development.
Future Tasks and Challenges
Although there remain many international policy questions which have been 
the subject of debate between the two sides, the development of stronger Sino-
European ties over the past decades has brought many political and economic 
goods to both sides, and has resulted in the further diversification and confidence-
building of China’s foreign policy beyond its immediate periphery. ASEM remains 
a relatively new institution, and due to its size and complexity, it will require more 
time to determine its future policy directions and to further entrench itself as 
an indispensable forum for the airing of specific inter-regional issues. In the 
case of China, although relations between Beijing and the European Union have 
improved greatly both from a political and a strategic viewpoint over the past 
decade, there are still many important issues upon which both sides are still in 
the process of seeking common ground. ASEM has the capability to mitigate 
some of these disputes as the regime matures.
Economic issues are in many cases front and centre on ASEM’s ‘to do’ list. 
The economic rise of China has attracted the attention of many large market 
economies, including the United States and the European Union. Since 
China announced its ambitious ‘walking out’ (zouchuqu) strategy of increased 
international engagement of foreign businesses in the late 1990s, Chinese 
economic interests have been engaging many global markets, bringing many 
benefits but also creating some friction. For example, there has been the question 
of whether the European Union should recognise China as a ‘market economy’, a 
situation hampered by recent trade conflicts between the two sides over Chinese 
textiles, shoes and strawberries. The European Union’s Trade Commissioner, 
while acknowledging China’s expansive economic reforms, maintained in July 
2005 that Chinese trade policy had not yet matured to the point where the country 
could be named a market economy. The EU was still concerned whether Beijing 
had adequately addressed the problem of dumping, meaning the selling of goods 
abroad below local market value, of Chinese goods in international markets. As 
well, the EU has called for Beijing to allow more European imports to create 
a more equitable trade relationship.41 Moreover, although a possible long-term 
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Sino-EU trade conflict over textiles was averted in June 2005 after an agreement 
in Shanghai between the two sides, the issue of European trade deficits with 
China still vexes some EU governments and it has also been an increasing source 
of discomfort for the European Commission, which noted the concerns about job 
losses in the EU and the growing trade deficit with Beijing.42 
The deteriorating talks in the WTO constitute another economic area which 
could conceivably bring China and Europe closer together but paradoxically 
could also potentially place them at opposite sides. Both sides favour an orderly 
completion of the Doha Round in a manner most beneficial to the global 
economy. However, since joining the WTO in December 2001, China has been 
calling for a more equitable approach to trade facilitation within the WTO which 
favours developing states. In the months before the watershed WTO conference 
in Cancun of September 2003, Beijing aligned itself with other large developing 
economies, later known as the Group of 22, to present a united front advocating 
greater trade rights for emerging economies. The G-22 locked horns with both the 
United States and the EU over agricultural subsides as well as the four ‘Singapore 
issues’ (which Brussels supported being put on the WTO agenda) of investment 
protection, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and 
trade facilitation.43 The question of what should and should not be included in the 
post-Cancun talks continues to preoccupy the world’s major economic actors. 
Both the EU and China have a strong interest in seeing the successful completion 
of the round, but at the same time East Asia has seen a rise in ‘preferentialism’, 
namely sub-regional trade agreements as a result of concerns over the WTO’s 
abilities and the need for alternative economic arrangements.44 There is now 
the question of whether Asia’s trade priorities are shifting significantly from an 
international to a regional outlook. ASEM, which encompasses the trading giants 
EU and Japan as well as large emerging markets including China and Southeast 
Asia, does have the capability to address some of these issues in an inter-regional 
format but many obstacles separate the various sides. Moreover, should ASEM 
members reach a common consensus on the best way to break the deadlock with 
the WTO negotiations, this group, like other large trade regimes in the Pacific 
Rim, could act as a facilitator for the successful and equitable completion of the 
Doha Round. 
The aforementioned ASEM meeting of finance ministers in Tianjin in June 
2005 was heavily dominated by debate over whether China was in a position 
to revalue its currency, which had been pegged to the US dollar at what some 
American policymakers had complained was an artificially low rate, perpetuating 
trade deficits with China. Chinese representatives used the ASEM meeting to 
explain their views on why the yuan issue should be addressed according to 
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China’s economic needs rather than external pressure, a stance which was 
acknowledged by the European participants at the event.45 One month after 
the Tianjin meeting, the government in Beijing agreed to reform its currency 
exchange policy, dropping the dollar peg in favour of a managed currency float 
based on a basket of currencies, including the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese 
yen and the South Korean won. As a result of the policy shift, the value of the 
Chinese currency immediately rose by 2%. Nevertheless, some American 
policymakers insist the yuan’s value is still too low and have continued to press 
for further reforms.46 Europe, by contrast, took a more gradualist stance. At an 
ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting in April 2006 in Vienna a confrontational 
approach towards Beijing was dismissed by EU officials as Brussels wanted to see 
greater flexibility from China in improving its monetary policies.47 In short, the 
yuan question has the potential of placing China, the United States and Europe 
in increasingly difficult positions should the controversy persist. 
Another question which is of great interest to both the EU and China is 
what the eventual role of Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus will play in the 
geopolitics of the region. Although Ferguson referred to ASEM as playing a role 
in creating a ‘sandwich of super regions’,48 namely Europe, Eurasia, and East 
Asia, at present the sandwich is heavy on bread but low on filling. Both Brussels 
and Beijing have expanded their interests into Eurasia since cold war’s end, but 
to date much international attention in the trans-Caspian region has focused 
primarily on security, especially anti-terrorism, and the region’s extensive energy 
and raw material supplies. While these issues are certainly not marginal, other 
longer-term problems in the area, including government stability, economic 
development (or in the case of some areas like Afghanistan, the South Caucasus 
and Tajikistan, economic reconstruction), infrastructure and transportation are 
also of key concern. Human security is declining in much of the region over 
concerns about underdevelopment, transnational crime (including especially the 
role of Central Asia as a corridor for illegal drugs to international markets) and 
the weakened institutions within the former Soviet republics. Both the European 
Union and China have much at stake in promoting a stable Eurasian region, one 
that is able to participate more fully in international discourse and global markets, 
and thus should be a prime area of interest for ASEM’s external agenda. 
Engaging Russia as another major bridge could also form part of ASEM’s 
role in filling in the blank spaces between Atlantic and Pacific. Relations between 
Russia and the EU have occasionally been prickly over issues such as energy, the 
EU’s eastern expansion, and differing policies on promoting democratisation in 
former Soviet states (including Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus), and the question 
remains of where Russia fits vis-à-vis a maturing EU and a rising China and East 
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Asia. Regional institutional development in former-Soviet Russia and Central 
Asia has begun sporadically. For example in 2001 the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation was founded as a security community linking Russia, China and 
most of the former Soviet Central Asian states in the name of security development 
and region-building.49 However, the progress made so far would be considerably 
augmented with greater participation from European and East Asian actors. 
ASEM, therefore, can be an important mechanism to promote these ideas and 
gradually eliminate the political, economic and strategic ‘chasms’ between the 
two sides in Central Asia. 
Another mitigating factor in ASEM’s development, one with much 
relevance to Chinese foreign policy, is how the Asia-Europe Meeting will effect 
the development and cohesion of developing institutions, as well as bilateral 
preferential trade agreements, within Asia itself, many of which gained 
momentum in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis and concerns about the 
viability of the WTO talks. Among these Asia-specific groups is the ASEAN-
Plus-Three mechanism, an institution which appeared in the late 1990s but 
has slowly been developing as a stronger economic institution within Asia.50 
During the first few years of APEC’s development, an alternative regime which 
would represent only East Asian economies (China, Japan, South Korea and 
ASEAN) was proposed. Known as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 
the would-be institution did not materialise, largely due to Western opposition 
and concerns in Asia about alienating non-Asia trading partners. However, 
the development of ASEM almost appeared to codify the EAEC idea since the 
membership of the Asia-Europe meeting is de	facto the European Union and 
the would-be EAEC states.51 The APT has the same membership as the Caucus 
and can be seen as an heir to the EAEC idea. However, unlike the EAEC which 
was viewed as being largely led by Japan, the APT has been greatly affected by 
Chinese economic and diplomatic growth. ASEM’s development will have a 
strong affect on the course of the APT, and to some degree the reverse is also 
true, since ASEM will have to seek ways of accommodating stronger post-
financial crisis Asian regionalism. 
Adding to the complexity of the interplay between regionalism and inter-
regionalism within Asia is the emergence of another fledging mechanism. In 
December 2005, the first East Asian Summit (EAS) was held in Kuala Lumpur, 
bringing together the APT members with Australia, India and New Zealand, 
but leaving North American and European actors on the sidelines. While the 
Summit achieved the modest goals of calling for deeper cooperation in political 
and strategic issues, economics and development, and cultural matters, there 
were few formal documents.52 Despite its slow start and uncertain regional role, 
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however, there is still the possibility that the EAS may be a platform for the 
development of an East Asian Community, which might serve to divert attention 
in Asia away from the APEC and ASEM processes.
Finally, as ASEM develops, it must guard against two potential problems, 
namely the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect and the ‘Pacific ratchet’ effect, which may lead 
to the group becoming increasingly marginalized as a result of the proliferation 
of regimes in East Asia since the 1990s. The spaghetti bowl effect refers to 
the problem of overlapping agreements and institutional commitments which 
can lead to duplication and potential stagnation.53 ASEM was created at a time 
when European regionalism had been well established as a result of decades of 
institution-building which led to the founding of the European Union. Asia, by 
contrast, arguably only developed a strong sense of region in the 1990s, and most 
regional organisations in Asia are comparatively new and still maturing.54
To avoid the problem of over-duplication among institutions, it will be a 
priority for ASEM to determine the best way of distinguishing itself amongst the 
growing number of bilateral, sub-regional and regional regimes in the Pacific 
Rim, notably by further articulating what ‘value-added’ goods it can provide for its 
members. Establishing a set of priorities which all three pillars of ASEM can and 
should undertake will prevent the problem of excessive overlapping with other 
regimes. As China cements its role as a pivotal state within Asia, the assistance 
of Beijing will be essential for ASEM to determine what specific goods the regime 
can develop, as well as answering the questions ‘Why is ASEM essential?’ and 
‘What can ASEM do better	than other regimes?’.
The Pacific ratchet effect is also a product of ongoing Asian regime proliferation 
since the 1990s, and can be defined as the tendency for different regimes to 
compete for the attention of its members though ongoing policy advances 
designed to prevent defections.55 Each new regime is under great pressure to 
distinguish itself from the others, and therefore there is the risk of too much 
emphasis being placed on advertising and branding of the new regime rather 
than less-flashy but more substantive policy debates and implementation. The 
current proliferation, and some might argue overabundance, of new international 
regimes in East Asia, is another strong incentive for ASEM to work hard at 
differentiating itself. One method of doing so involves the process of greater 
public engagement and advertising in order to dispel the impression among the 
citizens of ASEM members that the regime is primarily elite driven and mainly 
a bureaucratic mechanism with little public participation. The fact that ASEM 
is a large institution with informal structures and low exit costs increases the 
possibility of defections unless the group continues to stress its specific value to 
the membership.56 Setting viable agendas and recognising ASEM’s abilities and 
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limitations will therefore be an ongoing process. At the same time, keeping China 
engaged in ASEM’s construction will contribute much to the regime’s continued 
growth. 
Conclusion
The growing political and economic relationship between the European Union 
and China, despite some ongoing issues which have set the two at odds, is 
nevertheless a positive development not only for their mutual foreign policies 
but also for the development of inter-regionalism in today’s globalising world. 
The ASEM process is still on track to develop into an indispensable regime, and 
the promotion of the link between Beijing and Brussels is necessary to further 
strengthen ASEM and allow it to form part of the growing triangular relationship 
between the North American, European and Asian regions. Not only does ASEM 
fill the role of bringing Asia and China closer to European economic interests, 
but it forms the cornerstone of community-building between the two continents 
in areas beyond trade, including traditional and non-traditional security matters. 
ASEM has the potential to form an important part of China’s ongoing regional 
and inter-regional diplomacy as it further integrates into the international system 
while attempting to follow its doctrine of ‘peaceful’ engagement. ASEM will be an 
important test of China’s abilities to move beyond its regional diplomacy of the 
1990s to the patterns of inter-regionalism being developed today. With Beijing’s 
interests moving from Asia-Pacific to international, however, there will be many 
actors and regimes vying for its attention, and therefore the relationship between 
China and the EU must continuously be nourished. 
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China and Latin America:  
The Economic Dimension
Marisela Connelly
Latin America has been linked to China throughout its recent history. During 
the 1960s the Latin American communist parties participated in the ideological 
struggle between China and the Soviet Union; in the 1970s they regarded China 
as the paladin of the struggles of the Third World. In the 1980s South American 
countries began to feel the presence of a new China so concerned for its own 
process of economic modernization that it was beginning to compete with them 
for financial aid in the international organizations. As China’s economic growth 
accelerated in the 1990s, its exports began to inundate the markets of Latin 
America. Yet, at the same time China began to regard these countries as potential 
suppliers of raw materials and agro-industrial products. For these economic 
reasons and because of the weight China had acquired in the international stage, 
the contacts between these two regions increased notably in the first years of the 
new millennium.
In the following article the relation between China and Latin America 
during the 1990-2004 period shall be analyzed by putting particular emphasis 
on the economic sphere. Firstly, a general overview of China’s foreign policy 
shall be made. Then China’s Latin America policy will be analyzed. Thirdly, the 
economic relations between China and Latin America will be critically assessed. 
Furthermore China’s relations with some countries of South America, Mexico and 
the Caribbean will be reviewed in more detail. Finally the impact of the Taiwan 
issue on the relations between China and Latin America shall be explained.
China’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s and at the Beginning of the New 
Millennium
The events of 1989 in Beijing had a negative effect on the perception of China 
and of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership throughout the world. It was not long 
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before sanctions were applied; China reacted in a hostile manner, repudiating 
the policies of the United States and the West in general. The isolation which 
followed was not beneficial to the process of economic reform and the resurgence 
of the old guard made it more difficult for those leaders who were fighting for 
greater openness.
Some months later, Deng Xiaoping himself became aware of the need to 
deepen the economic reform in order to be able to continue with his strategy of 
modernization. He reactivated the reforms and in 1991 recommenced the process 
in regards to housing, social security, health and wage contracts. At the beginning 
of 1992 Deng made a visit to the south of the country in an attempt to put an end 
to the ideological and political debate.1
As far as foreign policy was concerned, the Chinese government sought to 
restore the pre-Tiananmen status	quo. It tried to win back the sympathy of foreign 
powers by cooperating and seeking solutions to problems that troubled the world 
as a whole by working within the United Nations Organization. At the same time 
it sought to make up for the loss of economic aid and Western political support by 
recourse to other countries. The world was changing at a rapid pace: the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe and in the USSR left China without viable 
alternatives for finding the support it needed.
The outbreak of the Gulf War brought about large-scale changes in the 
international arena. The old strategic triangle consisting of China, the USSR and 
the United States was worn out, to be replaced by informal agreements between 
the five powers: the United States, Europe, Russia, China and Japan. The currents 
impelling countries towards democracy, the market economy and interdependence 
were growing ever stronger.
In view of this situation, the Chinese government put into practice a foreign 
policy which included the promotion of relations with the greatest possible number 
of countries, a greater openness to foreign investment, resolution of trade disputes 
and greater international presence as a responsible partner.2 In recognition of the 
ever more preponderant role played by economic factors in international relations, 
Chinese diplomacy sought as a priority the creation of an international medium 
favourable to the development of the Chinese economy. This was to become the 
starting point for a reformulation of the foreign policy. The Beijing government 
clearly indicated that it would put into practice an economic diplomacy, working 
on both bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to promote its economic interests, 
guarantee its economic security and the development of trade. Thus China set 
about participating actively in international and regional fields of economic 
cooperation, accelerating the integration of its economy in the world economy, 
and likewise upgrading its economic cooperation with the developing countries.3
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At the same time, China engaged in a diplomatic effort aimed at improving 
the quality of its relations with neighbouring countries in the Asian region under 
the title dazhoubian	waijiao (great regional diplomacy). From 1996 onwards, 
China began to put into practice its policy of partnerships (huoban). This was 
a quite different concept from that of the alliances of the Cold War period: one 
characterized by the mutual respect of states within the multi-polar configuration 
of power; by equality between states, promotion of mutual benefit, the search for 
consensus and tolerance in view of differences; by commitment to cooperation and 
avoidance of confrontation, and by the absence of defensive alliances against third 
countries. In these partnerships, economic cooperation and exchanges of visits by 
heads of state and high officials were key elements for good functioning.
From that moment on China began to work to establish a strategic partnership 
with Russia and another with the United States; a broader partnership with France, 
Canada, Mexico, Pakistan and Great Britain; a constructive partnership with the 
European Union, and a partnership based on good will with the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).4 This concept of ‘partnership’ or association 
has been in constant flux as it has been constructed step by step.
The Chinese government upgraded its participation and activity within the 
multilateral and intergovernmental organizations as a means of promoting its 
economic and security interests. In 1995, Beijing began holding annual meetings 
with officials of the ASEAN. Two years later, China contributed to the start of the 
‘ASEAN+3’ mechanism, in which the 10 countries of the ASEAN, plus Japan, 
Republic of Korea and China met. Later on came the meetings of the ‘ASEAN+1’ 
in which China proposed a series of economic cooperation initiatives. 
In 1996, China set up – with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
– the ‘Shanghai Group of 5’. In June, 2001 it held a meeting at which Uzbekistan 
was also represented formalizing the existence of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. The expressed purpose of this group was to work on the resolution 
of border disputes and to introduce security measures on common frontiers in 
order to control terrorist, criminal and separatist activities.
During Jiang Zemin’s leadership, emphasis was placed on the term duojihua	
(multipolar), with the aim of demonstrating to the world that despite the existence 
of a superpower that was trying unilaterally to make its own points of view 
dominate, China was intent on constructing a multipolar world.
Since late 2003, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao have 
been concentrating on the term heping	fazhan (peaceful development), which 
evidences China’s good-neighbour and global responsibility policy. In response to 
continuous allusions by US politicians to the threat to the world posed by Chinese 
economic growth, the Chinese leaders have insisted that their country’s economic 
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advance represents an opportunity for the development of Asia and the world. At 
the same time Hu and Wen have adopted a more realistic policy in view of the 
world configuration by recognizing that, effectively, the United States is still an 
entity wielding a power superior to all other countries, and hence the need to avoid 
unnecessary confrontations. They acknowledge that diplomacy must concentrate 
on the achievement of consensus between states that participate in a variety of 
multilateral organizations in order thus to defend their interests.5
The Chinese government argues that democracy must prevail at the 
international level, understanding by this concept that all countries, whether big 
or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, are equal members of the international 
community and have the same right to participate in international affairs. With 
regard to the domestic level, respect for each country’s sovereignty has priority.
It is within this framework that China’s relations with Latin America are currently 
being developed.
China’s Strategy Regarding Latin America
Latin America has long been present in Chinese foreign policy, whether as part 
of the so-called Third World or within China’s concept of South-South relations. 
As early as 1988, Deng Xiaoping had pointed out the importance of Sino-Latin-
American relations as exemplifying South-South cooperation. While it is true that 
before the 1990s political and economic contacts were already on the increase, 
they were, however, sporadic. It was not until 1990 that a Chinese president 
actually visited some Latin American countries.6 China has perceived Latin 
America as geographically distant, its nations as different in terms of ideology, 
social systems and culture. Nevertheless, China shares with these countries 
a certain level of economic development and a similar position regarding the 
defence of national sovereignty and the rejection of the policy of force.7
The Chinese government – in keeping with its strategy of establishing links 
with all those countries that might in some way contribute to China’s economic 
development and its aim of obtaining a privileged place in the international 
system – has increased its presence in the American continent, especially in 
the Latin American part. Since the mid 1990s, China has begun to emphasize 
those factors that favour economic cooperation e.g. potential markets, natural 
resources and the complementarity of China’s economy vis-à-vis some Latin 
American countries.
Little by little, through declarations by its leaders, the principles established 
by China for its relations with Latin America were enunciated. These involved: 
the strengthening of political links by means of high-level political contacts; the 
exploration and development of new channels of economic cooperation; the 
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promotion of cultural and educational exchanges; the increase of consultations 
with the aim of improving coordination in international affairs in order to defend 
mutual interests as developing countries.8
However, studies carried out in China showed that the Latin American region 
was still strongly linked to the United States and that China’s presence in the 
region was still precarious.9
This policy of intensifying links with Latin America, and the greater frequency 
of official visits it entailed, was aimed not only at increasing economic cooperation 
in general but also at persuading the Central American and Caribbean area to 
become more closely linked to China and thus, in the medium term, to persuade 
these countries to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. For the Taipei 
government this region has been an important bastion, since 12 countries 
recognize the island as a state in its own right. 
The Chinese government managed to work its way gradually into the 
American continent’s regional organizations. In 1994, China became an 
observer state of the Latin American Integration Association. In May, 1997, 
the Caribbean Development Bank officially accepted China as a member state. 
In October of the same year, a delegation of the South American Common 
Market (Mercosur) visited China holding its first dialogue with China. Since 
1990, the Rio Group and China have engaged in a dialogue at foreign minister 
level. Since 1991, China has attended, as an observer, the annual meetings of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); China hopes to be accorded 
the status of member state of this institution, but at the last annual meeting, 
which took place in Okinawa, Japan, in April, 2005, its request was once again 
turned down. China is aware that as a member state it would have the right to 
vote on tendering for projects financed by the Bank, and to take part in contracts 
for construction projects and for the supply of equipment and machinery.10 
China is also an observer at the meetings of the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Amazonian Parliament and the 
Association of Caribbean States.11 In 2004, China became an observer at the 
Latin American Parliament and a permanent observer at the Organization of 
American States.
Within the policy line of expanding high-level contacts, in 1996, Li Peng 
carried out a tour of several Latin American countries. In his speech before 
the representatives of the Latin American Economic System at Caracas he 
enumerated the points on which China was giving attention to stimulating 
economic cooperation in Latin America: greater commercial exchange, promotion 
of cooperation between Chinese and foreign corporations in the form of joint 
ventures or exclusive capital companies for carrying out construction projects 
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and for exploiting natural resources as well as technical and scientific exchange. 
In the same year China sent a trade and economic delegation headed by the 
Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi to several Latin 
American countries in order to promote economic exchange and an increase in 
investments.12
In 2001, President Jiang Zemin carried out a tour of six Latin American 
nations: Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil. Jiang proposed 
that four principles needed to be followed in order to support cooperation and 
the development of relations in the long term: 1. Building relations of equality 
favouring mutual understanding; 2. Strengthening of consultation and mutual 
support for defending the legitimate rights of China and Latin America in 
international arenas; 3. Building mutual benefit and joint development through 
increasing trade and economic cooperation; 4. The construction of a broad 
network of cooperation for the future based on a long-term vision.13
China’s interest in expanding high-level contacts was favoured by President 
Hu Jintao’s visit to four Latin American countries in November, 2004 (Chile, 
Brazil, Argentina, Cuba). In his speech before the Brazilian parliament on 
November 12, Hu Jintao explained the guiding principles for the development of 
relations with the countries of the Latin American region: 1. Consultations on an 
equal footing and an increase in mutual confidence; 2. Reciprocity and mutual 
benefit in expanding trade and economic contacts; 3. Ongoing consultations and 
coordination in order to favour international cooperation; 4. Promotion of non-
governmental exchanges. President Hu Jintao pointed out that China and Latin 
America should engage in joint efforts to promote world peace and democracy 
in international relations as well as fostering the interests of the developing 
countries. They should also seek to complement each other economically so as 
to construct a ‘win-win society’ and should take action to increase bilateral trade 
to US$ 100 billion by 2010 and investment to the same amount. Finally they 
should increase cultural exchange so as to serve as a model of dialogue between 
civilizations.14
Chinese leaders of the fourth generation such as Hu Jintao have implemented 
these principles in China’s relations with Latin America. They have raised the 
level of relations with countries like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, 
with which they have established strategic partnerships and strengthened 
commercial exchange. They also signed economic and technological cooperation 
agreements with eleven countries on protection of investments, and on avoiding 
double tax imposition with five countries.
Against the background of the failure of the neo-liberal policies since the 1990s 
that have merely served to exacerbate the problems of poverty, unemployment 
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and underdevelopment the countries of Latin America have gladly accepted this 
Chinese policy. At the same time, the countries of Latin America are disillusioned 
at seeing that the United States is more interested in other regions of the world 
and has forgotten about partnership with the region that it has for so long seen 
as its ‘back yard’.15 The Latin American countries have great expectations as far 
as Chinese investment in infrastructure projects, or an increase of Chinese trade 
and tourism, are concerned. They see all this as a potential aid to the sustained 
growth of their economies. Direct investment in Latin America fell from US$ 78 
billion in 2000 to US$ 36 billion in 2003.
Table 1: Latin America and the Caribbean: net Direct Foreign Investment inflows  
(millions of US dollars)
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 20 427 31 006 18 499 14 939
South America 57 716 38 528 26 480 21 527
Total 78 143 69 534 44 979 36 466
Data from: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘Foreign Investment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 2003’. May 2004.
China’s efforts to develop contacts continued in February, 2005, with the 
visit by Vice-president Zeng Qinghong to several Latin American countries 
accompanied by businessmen and officials prepared to invest in the region. On 
a visit to Colombia in May national advisor Jia Qinglin stressed the role played 
by China’s economic development in the recovery of the economies of Latin 
American countries.16
China has also expressed its concepts about the form that South-South 
relations ought to take in the era of globalization which inevitably affects 
its relations with Latin America. Precisely because globalization deepens 
interdependence between countries, South-South cooperation is taking on an 
increasing importance. In order to avail of the inherent opportunities and to 
meet the challenges developing countries have to unite if they wish to be taken 
into account at moments when the rules of play are being established, and so 
defend their interests.17
Hu Jintao explained this point clearly when he stated: ‘(…) to widen our ways 
of thinking and deepen South-South cooperation we should expand cooperation 
channels, enrich cooperation connotations, innovate cooperation models, expand 
mutual trade and investment, and strive for a win-win result by drawing on each 
other’s strong points (…)’.18
Chinese leaders have also emphasized the need to propagate knowledge about 
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China in Latin America and vice-versa, with the aim of correcting prevailing 
myths and false perceptions, especially in connection with the image Latin 
Americans have of China. They have proposed that both sides deepen academic 
research with respect to each other and that the results of such research be made 
available to the public. They have also begun a campaign for setting up institutes 
for teaching the Chinese language in several countries of Latin America that 
might also serve as centres for presenting Chinese culture.19 Confucius Institutes 
have been established in 2005 in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba. China has 
signed agreements on cultural, educational and sports exchanges with more 
than ten Latin American countries and agreements on student exchanges with 
Mexico, Cuba, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.
To sum up, China is pursuing a strategy regarding Latin America in 
accordance with principles established in its foreign policy aimed at raising its 
level of participation in the multilateral and regional bodies and promoting its 
own economic interests.
Economic Relations between China and Latin America
The economic growth experienced by China in recent decades has led both 
to a greatly increased consumption of natural resources20 and to the search 
for markets for its products. While China’s economic relations with the 
industrialized countries of Europe and with the United States are stronger, the 
Chinese government by no means overlooks the potential for growth in trade 
and investment offered by other areas such as Latin America, which enable it to 
diversify its supplies of raw materials and broaden its markets. 
China has been successful in raising its levels of economic relations with 
Latin America during the last fifteen years. Trade has increased as can be seen 
from the following table.
Table 2: China Trade with Latin America: 1990-2004 (US$ million)
year quantity
1990 1 900
1992 2 976
1994 4 700
1996 6 729
1998 8 310
2000 12 596
2002 17 824
2004 40 100
Source: Chinese Custom Statistics.
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China’s exports to Latin America grew from US$ 5.3 billion in 1999 to US$ 18.3 
billion in 2004. China’s exports to Latin America constituted 2.71% of its total 
exports in 1999, and 3.09% in 2004. In the same year, 4% of Latin American 
exports went to China. China had a deficit of US$ 3 billion in 2003 and US$ 4 
billion in 2004. To the extent that China continues to base its growth on 
manufacturing exports, its demand for raw materials originating in Latin America 
will continue to increase. The products China imports from Latin America include: 
iron ore, copper, oil, wood, leather and other agricultural and forestry products. 
China exports to Latin America finished industrial products such as electrical 
appliances, woven and knitted apparel, computers, office machinery, and mineral 
fuels. In 2003, 92% of China’s exports to this region belonged to this type of 
products, while 60% of its imports from Latin America were primary products. 
Table 3: Export and Import by Products
Country Exports to China Imports from China
Argentina Soybean, leather, gas oil Computers, motorcycles, lamps, 
organic chemicals.
Brazil Soybeans, iron, automobile parts, 
space technology products, iron 
ore, wood pulp
TV sets, electric equipment, 
electronics, air conditioners, 
electrical machinery, coke, oil.
Chile Copper, wood pulp, grapes, 
fisheries, skins, iron pipe
TV sets, shoes, textiles, toys, raw 
materials for the chemical industry, 
tools.
Colombia Iron ore, copper Electronic equipment, computers, 
textiles
Peru Copper, fish meal, zinc, tin TV, motorcycles, radios
Cuba Sugar, nickel, aluminum, other 
metals
Rice, vegetables, shoes, TV, 
electronic products
Venezuela Oil, iron ore Machinery and equipment for transport
Mexico Synthetic fibres, steel products, 
raw cotton, plastics, electronic 
equipment, high-tech products
Textiles, electronic equipment, 
household appliances, high-tech 
products
Mexico is one of the countries in Latin America that bears most similarity to 
China with regard to its range of export products. It is for this reason that both 
countries have become competitors on third markets such as the United States. 
From 2001 to 2003, China increased by 35% its share of the United States market, 
while Mexico experienced a deterioration of 5%. The Mexican products that have 
been most affected are textiles, clothing, electronics, equipment and footwear.21
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Argentina also felt the consequences of China’s emergence into the world 
market. On the one hand, this has provided Argentina with opportunities for 
exportation. On the other hand it has constituted a threat as regards to competition 
in third country markets.
The desire of several countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago as well as Venezuela) to increase their trade relations with 
China has led them to grant China recognition of market economy status, while 
failing to analyze the negative effects of such a policy: viz. that it makes it harder 
to impose antidumping penalties on goods. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are in 
damage-control mode. They have forfeited the possibility of adopting unilateral 
safeguards and other measures to defend local industry and must follow 
WTO rules, which entail lengthy procedures when one member nation files a 
complaint against another. The Argentina Toy Manufacturers Association and 
the Toy Producers Association of Brazil announced recently that they would work 
together to submit applications to the WTO Safeguard Measures Committee to 
allow members of South Mercosur to take safeguard measures jointly against 
toy imports from China. The main reason for the application delivered by the 
manufacturers association of the two countries was that, in the first half of 2005, 
imports of toys from China to the Mercosur increased by 75% over the same 
period of the previous year.
Table 4: China’s Foreign Trade with main partners in Latin America: 2000-2003  
(Unit: US$ 10,000)
COUNTRY 2000 2001 2002 2003
Latin America 1259549 1493889 1782440 2680681
Argentina 154029 185470 142483 317627
Bolivia 1684 1726 2163 1872
Brazil 284499 369848 446940 798555
Chile 212203 211819 256535 353160
Colombia 18813 23221 31638 45866
Cuba 31394 44582 42635 35681
Mexico 182353 255149 397862 494377
Panama 129118 124158 127638 150861
Peru 70459 67460 97825 111375
Uruguay 34436 28447 17302 20337
Venezuela 35128 58922 47763 74140
Source: China Facts and Figures 2003 and 2004.
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From 2002 onwards China became the principal destination of Brazil’s exports 
to Asia. In August of that year, both governments signed an agreement on 
sanitary equivalences which opened the possibility for trading in beef.22 By 2004, 
another agreement facilitated the export of beef and chicken. In 2003, Brazil 
became China’s second trading partner in Latin America with an overall trade 
worth US$ 7.985 billion, while its exports to China increased by 79.8%. Brazil is 
one of the countries in the region which has a surplus in its trade balance with 
China. In 2003, this amounted to US$ 2.23 billion. Brazil’s exports to China are 
concentrated in basic products of agricultural or mineral origin, while its exports 
to the rest of the world consist mainly of manufactured products. 
Chile’s exports to China are concentrated in copper, slag and ash and wood 
pulp which together represent 85% of total exports. Copper dominates these 
exports to China. In 1998, bilateral trade amounted to US$ 1.041 billion. In 1999, 
it increased to US$ 1.269 billion; in 2000 bilateral trade rose to US$ 2.122 and by 
2004 it was close to US$ 5.4 billion. Between 2000 and 2004 Chile maintained 
its position as China’s third trading partner in Latin America following Brazil 
and Mexico. Chile occupies the fourth place in Latin America as destination for 
China’s exports and the second, after Brazil as an exporter to China.23 In view of 
the need to ensure its supplies of copper, China, through its Minerals and Metals 
Corporation (Minmetals), signed a contract between Chile’s National Copper 
Corporation (CODELCO) and the Chinese National Development Bank, which 
financed the project, for importation of Chilean copper ore which is expected to 
rise to a value of US$ 500 million. Minmetals and CODELCO have equal shares 
in the joint venture.24
China and Chile signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on November 18, 2005, 
the first between China and a Latin American country. Under the agreement many 
of the existing customs duties between both countries would be immediately 
abolished, benefiting 92% of current Chilean exports to China. For China, 50% 
of the goods it exports to Chile would have their tariffs reduced. Chile would enjoy 
immediate duty free access to China for its exports of copper, other minerals 
and some agricultural products. Others goods such as frozen and fresh salmon, 
grapes and apples will have their tariffs phased out over a ten-year-period. Among 
the Chinese exports expected to benefit from the FTA are machinery, computers, 
cell phones, DVDs and printers.25
China has a well defined strategy regarding trade with Latin America. This 
is aimed, on the one hand, at obtaining the raw materials it needs and, on 
the other hand, taking advantage of this region’s markets as a destination for 
China’s manufactured products. Aside from the rhetoric and the desire for a 
win-win situation, China’s main priority is to forge ahead with its own economic 
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modernization. China-Latin America economic relations are a function of China’s 
global strategy that aims at strengthening the Chinese economy.
The Latin American countries have not paused to analyze their relation with 
China. They have allowed themselves to be dragged along by the enthusiasm 
aroused in them by China’s interest in the region and have been dazzled by this 
country’s economic advances. Hence the continuous trade missions that have 
visited China in recent years. They wish to follow China’s example, but do not 
know how to go about it. Unlike China, they have no defined strategy; nor, for the 
most part, have they clearly identified their objectives. As a consequence of this 
they have followed the path that China has marked out for them.
Investment
It is not long since China took its first steps in foreign investment. Nonetheless, 
its strategy in Latin America already includes investment in strategic sectors for 
the exploitation of natural resources and infrastructure and in manufacturing in 
countries such as Mexico in order to take advantage of the possibilities offered by 
NAFTA. By the end of 2004, the amount of China’s overseas direct investment 
had approached US$ 3.7 billion; US$ 1.67 billion, or 46.2%, of this was directed 
towards Latin America.26
Since 1992, the Chinese Capital Iron and Steel Company bought the Peru Iron 
Mine Company for US$ 120 million, which was the biggest Chinese investment 
Project in the region. By the end of 1992, China had established around 80 joint 
venture companies of various types in 17 Latin American countries, and by 1997, 
Chinese investment in the countries of the region amounted to US$ 300 million, 
principally in the exploitation of iron in Peru, timber processing in Brazil, fish 
meal production in Chile and assembly of bicycles in Argentina.27
From 1996 onwards, Chinese officials have been stressing the importance for 
China’s economic development of Latin America’s mineral, forestry, agriculture, 
livestock and fisheries resources and the need to carry out investment projects 
in these sectors to facilitate access to these resources.28 They have also been 
pointing out that the process of economic integration that was underway in the 
Latin American region represented an excellent opportunity for Chinese firms 
since any factories established there could expect to benefit from the distribution 
of their products within integrated markets.
In 1998, the China Chamber of Commerce for Machinery and Electronic 
Product Importers and Exporters carried out a mission to Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile to explore the markets in these countries. They found that the Latin 
American countries had a high demand for machinery and electronic products. 
They thus recommended stepping up Chinese exportation of these products, 
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since their technological content and their prices corresponded to the needs of 
these countries. At the same time, they advised that assembly plants should be 
set up in the region instead of exporting finished products.29
In Brazil, Baosteel of China and the Compania Vale do Rio Doce (CURD) 
formed a joint corporation worth US$ 1.5 billion in order to produce up to 8 million 
tons of iron per annum. The Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica (EMBRAER), 
which is one of the world’s two major regional plane producers, set up a joint 
company with the Chinese aircraft manufacturer Corporation II with a total 
investment of US$ 50 million, to make RJ145 jets at Harbin in the province of 
Heilongjiang. The first jet built by the joint enterprise was test-flown in December 
2003. 30 China Eastern Airlines agreed in March 2005 to buy five ERS145 aircraft 
from Embraer from its manufacturing venture in Harbin. Embraer has already 
sold six jets to China Southern Airlines.
Chinese investment in Brazil has been directed towards the production of 
telecommunications, equipment and electronic products. Huawei Technologies 
and Shandong Electric Power Group have both invested in this country. Brazilian 
firms have also tried to take advantage of the investment opportunities promoted 
by their government. In July 2004 the Chinese Yankuang Group, the Japanese 
Itochu Group and the Brazilian CURD formed a joint enterprise to produce 
coke, a vital resource for the steel industry.31 In Mexico, China has invested 
US$ 67 million (accumulated over 1994-2004) which is distributed across the 
manufacturing industry (62.3%), trade and commerce (27.8%), services (14.5%) 
and the building sector (0.4%).32
In November 2004, during his trip to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, President 
Hu Jintao offered to invest in infrastructure, roads, ports and railways. In 
Brazil, he announced an agreement on investment for two years worth US$ 10 
billion, in both energy and transport infrastructure. In Argentina he announced 
a future investment in the country of US$ 20 billion mainly in infrastructure, 
communications, building and energy.
China and South America
For China South America offers access to the raw materials it needs in order to 
continue with its process of economic modernization. These include petroleum, 
iron ore, timber, copper, etc., and agricultural products such as soybean.
Brazil
Brazil is the country in the region that has exercised the most attraction for China, 
not only because of its political weight but also on account of the opportunities it 
offers for trade diversification and investment. Brazil exports increased to US$ 
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118 billion in 2005 from US$ 96 billion in 2004. Brazil is the world’s third largest 
agro exporter (US$ 44 billion in 2005) after the United States and the EU.
Furthermore, Brazil has become the leader among the South American 
countries. In 1991, Brazil took the initiative in the formation of Mercosur with 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Recently, Mercosur signed an agreement to 
form a free trade area (FTA) with the five countries of the Andean Community: 
Venezuela (which has already been admitted as a special member of Mercosur), 
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. Brazil also withstood pressure to sign the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) under the terms desired by the United 
States. Led by Brazil, the Latin American Countries defied and rejected the dictates 
of the northern colossus.
The Group of 20
Both Brazil and China are members of an organization of developing countries 
known as the G-20, which emerged from ministerial meetings of the WTO in 
2003.33 The G-20 has demanded that rich countries completely eliminate their 
domestic production and export subsidies. The group has also been pushing for 
steep cuts in import tariffs and the abolishment of trade distorting measures by 
the US and the EU. They also wanted freer and fairer trade in farm goods to help 
increase both export volume and prices, giving their farmers a chance to improve 
their quality of life.
On that occasion, the Minister of Commerce of China, Li Fuyuan commented:
‘We	believe	that	all	members	should	have	equal	participation	in	the	WTO	negotiations	
with	their	interests	fully	respected	and	reflected.	The	overwhelming	majority	of	WTO	
members	are	developing	ones.	Therefore	enabling	developing	members	to	genuinely	
benefit	from	the	negotiations	essentially	safeguards	the	success	of	the	DDA...’34
And Celso Amorin, the Minister of External Relations of Brazil stated the 
following:
‘Perhaps	no	other	area	of	trade	is	subject	to	so	much	discrimination	as	agriculture.	
Distortions	in	agricultural	trade	do	not	simply	harm	developing	countries	by	denying	
them	market	opportunities.	Domestic	and	export	subsidies	in	developed	countries	depress	
prices	and	income	throughout	the	world,	cut	into	the	export	earnings	of	competitive	
exporters	and	increase	food	insecurity	in	developing	countries.	Their	addictive	power	does	
not	contribute	to	productivity	or	creation	of	wealth.	They	only	generate	dependency	on	
one	side	and	deprivation	on	the	other’.35
In subsequent ministerial meetings held in 2004 and 2005, the G-20 
continued to put pressure on the developed countries to attend to their demands. 
The concessions made by the United States and the European Union in the WTO 
meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 were not enough to satisfy the G-20. Nevertheless, 
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the leaders of the G-20 have strengthened their position by fighting for their 
demands.
Reforming the United Nations
China has supported Brazil in its attempt to become a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council. However, when Brazil joined forces with Japan, Germany 
and India in the Group of 4, China altered its position since it did not want its 
eternal rival Japan to occupy a permanent seat. On 3 August 2005, Wang Guangya, 
Chinese Ambassador to the UN said that China and the USA had agreed to 
make joint efforts to hold back the draft resolution on the enlargement of the 
Security Council put forward by Japan, Germany, India and Brazil. Wang said that 
their objective would be to oppose the G-4.36 In its Position Paper on the United 
Nations Reforms China specified that ‘increasing the representation of developing 
countries should be given priority because these countries account for more than 
two thirds of the membership.’
Li Zhaoxing, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made clear China´s position:
‘China	supports	the	reform	of	the	Security	Council	aimed	to	strengthen	its	authority	
and	efficiency	and	improve	its	working	methods.	Representation	of	developing	countries,	
particularly	the	African	countries	should	be	increased	so	that	small	and	medium-sized	
countries	will	have	more	say	in	the	decision	making	of	the	Council.	No	reform	proposal	
can	work	that	only	addresses	the	concerns	of	a	few	countries	in	disregard	of	the	interests	
of	the	majority	of	countries	and	treats	unfairly	developing	countries	in	Africa	and	other	
parts	of	the	world’.37
The Brazilian government showed its discontent with the position adopted by 
China and declared that the latter was running the risk of isolation if it exercised its 
power of veto on the reform of the Security Council. For his part, Wang Guangya 
pointed out that if Brazil achieved its goal of occupying a permanent seat on the 
Security Council it would also have to overcome regional differences, above all with 
Argentina and Mexico. On this matter it was revealing that China changed position 
regarding its initial support to Brazil once it saw that this country had allied itself 
with Japan in order to further its interests. Likewise, there is an obvious tendency 
in the declarations of the Chinese representative at the UN to give stronger support 
to the African nations in the organization than to the Latin Americans.
Scientific and Technological Cooperation
In 1993, the Chinese and Brazilian governments signed an agreement for a joint-
aerospace program for producing and launching Earth Observation Satellites. The 
program was extended in 1995. The first China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 
(CBERS) was launched in 1999. The CBERS 2 was launched in 2003. The first 
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satellite generated a tremendous amount of data with more than 8 thousand 
images, covering 99% of Chinese territory. In Brazil, CBERS images have been 
used to monitor deforestation, to plan land use and to study the environment. The 
CBERS program represents one of the most successful cooperation partnerships 
between China and Brazil.
The Case of Venezuela
Economic and technological cooperation between China and Venezuela has shown 
important advances from the 1990’s onwards. The Chinese government has been 
engaged in establishing closer relations with Venezuela since 2000 with the aim of 
obtaining greater investment opportunities in the petroleum sector and ensuring a 
large supply from the country. Venezuela sells 60% of its oil to the United States, 
and President Hugo Chavez has expressed on several occasions his wish to reduce 
dependency on the US market. 
Since June 1997, the National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation of China, 
under international tendering, obtained extraction rights in the Caracoles field and 
the Intercampo unit with a value of US$ 358 million. In February and May 1998 
respectively, production came on line. In April 2000, the National Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Group of China signed with the Corporación de Hidrocarburos de 
Venezuela a memorandum on cooperation in the production of orimulsion – a 
bitumen-based fuel.
During President Hugo Chavez’s visit to China in December 2004, China 
promised an investment in petroleum infrastructure of US$ 350 million involving 
15 oil wells, which was reiterated during Vice President Zeng Qinghong’s visit 
to Venezuela in January 2005. China also promised to invest US$ 460 million 
in a gas project and in renovation of the railway and refinery infrastructure. In 
exchange, China will obtain 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tons of fuel oil 
per annum and 1.8 million tons of orimulsion.
The Junín 4 block of the Orinoco Strip, comprising 640km2, was allotted to 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for certification and quantification 
of its reserves estimated at a total of 20 billion barrels of oil. PDVSA and CNPC 
signed an agreement for the carrying out of this study. Once this is completed, they 
will go ahead to discuss a joint project for production and improvement combined 
with a refining project in China. Both companies also signed an agreement to set 
up a mixed company for the purpose of developing hydrocarbons in fields located 
in the Zumano area, in eastern Venezuela. This area has residual reserves of light 
and medium petroleum estimated at 400 million barrels and some 4 trillion cu. 
ft. of gas.38
China’s interest in Venezuela is evident: to obtain new sources of petroleum 
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in order to diversify its supply and reduce its dependence on the Middle Eastern 
countries. Since 1993, China has been a net importer of petroleum and since 2003 
the second consumer after the United States, replacing Japan. In 2005, China 
consumed 318 million tons of oil with a dependence on imports of 42.9%. For 
this reason China is seeking to increase investment in the Venezuelan petroleum 
sector. This is the interest that the Chinese government takes into Venezuela. 
Beijing does not intend to ally itself with the populist Chávez – as some groups 
in the United States believe. The Chinese leaders are not interested in involving 
themselves in the contentions and mutual accusations in which the United States 
and Venezuela have been recently engaged, nor in letting themselves be used by 
Chávez as a dissuasive element against Washington.39
The South American countries – precisely on account of the characteristics 
of their economies – have managed to obtain advantages from their economic 
relations with China, increasing their trade with China which, in order to obtain 
the natural resources it needs, has set about increasing its investment in the 
region.
The Case of Mexico
China and Mexico have traditionally sought to strengthen their relations through 
cooperation in the field of international politics and in cultural exchanges. Chinese 
leaders have frequently emphasized the mature and responsible attitude of the 
Mexican government in international organizations. They have granted Mexico 
their recognition as a leading interlocutor among the Latin-American countries.
China and Mexico have coincided in their view of international affairs and this 
has facilitated cooperation within the multilateral institutions. Mexico has e.g. 
supported China at meetings of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
by abstaining from voting against China.
Yet, because of the Mexican trade deficit with China the economic relations 
between Mexico and China have not improved. Since the early 1990s the presence 
of Chinese products in the Mexican market has been increasing at an accelerating 
pace. On 15 April 1993, the Mexican government established countervailing 
duties ranging from 33.34% to 1,105% on more than 4,000 Chinese products 
in 10 categories, including: garments, electrical and mechanical equipment, 
chemical products, metals and minerals. These measures have not solved the 
problem of the imbalance in trade: Chinese imports have continued to outdo 
Mexican exports. In general, Mexican exports have performed poorly due to three 
factors: 1. Mexican governments, especially that of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
have chosen to implement a liberalization policy unilaterally. At the same time, 
China maintained its barriers to imports so that the opportunities were unequal. 
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2. Medium-size Mexican exporters have not possessed the kind of organizational 
structure necessary to penetrate the Chinese market and have received little 
support from the government. 3. Since the Mexican state withdrew from its role 
as development agent, there has been no coherent industrial policy.
During the 1990s, Mexico drew apart from the developing countries, became 
a member of the OECD and abandoned the group of 77. At the same time, the 
Mexican government gradually gave up its place as leader of the Latin American 
countries, which began to turn towards Brazil. This tendency was accentuated 
with the government of Vicente Fox and the PAN that has prioritized relations 
with the United States and the EU and has shown little tact in its dealings both 
with China as with the rest of Latin America.
China, on the other hand, has continued with its policy of rapprochement 
towards Mexico. In September, 2001, China and Mexico signed an agreement on 
China’s entry into the WTO in which Mexico undertook to lift those antidumping 
measures that contravened WTO regulations after a period of 6 years.
Unlike previous Mexican governments, that of President Fox has broken with 
diplomatic tradition. This, and the inexperience of its officials, has led to frictions 
with China. A series of rather unfortunate declarations about the Chinese political 
system, commercial competition, and other matters, have caused considerable 
setbacks to the excellent relations that Mexico and China had enjoyed since the 
1970s. The Chinese government has made efforts to demonstrate that it is not 
a competitor of Mexico and that the opening of markets offers opportunities to 
Mexican entrepreneurs. In December 2003, during Wen Jiabao’s visit to Mexico, 
the Chinese Prime Minister reiterated this point of view and suggested that 
the two governments work together in order to increase trade and improve its 
structure. Wen formally announced establishing a strategic partnership between 
China and Mexico.40
In August 2004, Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, together with 
other Mexican ministers, travelled to China in order to sign agreements for 
the establishment of a Mexico-China Permanent Binational Commission. The 
agreements signed covered the economic, cultural, scientific, communications 
and agricultural fields. Thus, the foundations were laid for the development of 
the strategic partnership. In January 2005, Vice President Zeng Qinghong visited 
Mexico with the purpose of advancing the implementation of the agreements 
reached in the First Binational Meeting.
In September, 2005, Presidente Hu Jintao made an official visit to Mexico. 
In his speech before the Mexican Senate, Hu made a three-point proposal for 
increasing bilateral relations. 1. Development of strategic cooperation by putting 
into practice agreements reached by the two countries. 2. Construction of a 
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platform facilitating cooperation on the economic plane in harmony with both 
parties’ interests. 3. Strengthening exchanges at different levels and in different 
fields in order to deepen mutual understanding.41 He also pointed out that 
developing countries ought to strengthen cooperation and maintain consultation 
in the framework of joint efforts to participate in the formulation of international 
trade and financial regulations.
However, there has been no advance in bilateral relations. Mexico merely 
reacts to Chinese initiatives, failing to draw up a strategy that might really allow 
it to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the opening up of the Chinese 
market since that country’s entry in the WTO. Nor does Mexico have an active 
policy to engage in joint efforts with other Latin American countries in order to 
respond to the challenges of the globalized world.
Mexico has not carried out structural reforms that are necessary in the fields 
of industrial relations, taxation, quality of education, good administration and 
solidity of institutions, management of natural resources and the rule of law. 
The country will continue to lament its inability to face the challenge of Chinese 
competition as long as it fails to make the necessary domestic reforms.
The Case of Cuba
During the Cold War, Cuba maintained a distant relation with China. With the 
changes that took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, China and Cuba started a process of gradual rapprochement. 
In 1993, President Jiang Zemin visited Cuba, and in 1995, Fidel Castro, leader 
of the Cuban revolution and the island’s president, visited China. This led to the 
regularization of trade.42 Sino-Cuban trade has been conducted on account for 
settlement under the annual trade protocol signed at the end of each year. Cash 
trade began from 1996 and coordinated barter trade was also introduced between 
certain corporations in the two countries.
The relation grew even closer with Jiang Zemin once again visiting the 
island in 2001 and Hu Jintao’s visit in 2004. Fidel Castro visited China again 
in 2003. Hu signed agreements on the postponement of the payments on loans 
received by Cuba during the 1990-1994 period without generation of interest 
as well as on a Chinese investment of US$ 1,800 in a ferronickel plant and the 
exploitation of nickel deposits at San Felipe (Camaguey) by a mixed company. 
From 2005 to 2009, the Cubaniquel corporation will sell to the Chinese company 
Minmetals, 20,000 tons of nickel sinter. Likewise, Shengli Oilfield, which forms 
part of Sinipec, signed a contract with Cubapetróleo for the joint development of 
one of the country’s potential oil fields, on the Western coast of the province of 
Pinar del Río. 
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Cuba has benefited from the agreement between Hai’er and Grupo Electrónico 
de Cuba which will together produce a million television sets for education, 
internal consumption and exportation into the Latin American region. China 
is selling Cuban locomotives and transport equipment.43 China benefits from 
Cuban advances in the area of health. With 10.6% of Cuban trade China has 
become Cuba’s third largest trading partner, after Venezuela and Spain.
It would seem that China is occupying the place left vacant by the Russians in 
Cuba after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Hu Jintao himself stated during 
his visit to Cuba that ‘We are friends and brothers...’,44 but this does not mean 
that China is thinking in terms of cooperation and aid inspired by ideology. The 
relations China is developing with the island are of a pragmatic nature and, as with 
other Latin American countries, it seeks to enhance economic links for its own 
benefit and not for altruistic motives. The Cuban leaders understand that China 
has no interest in a relation with the island that might involve commitments that 
would endanger its relations with the United States.
China, the Caribbean, Central America and the Taiwan Issue
The Caribbean and Central American region is of particular interest for the 
Chinese government because it represents a concentration of countries that have 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts Nevis, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The Chinese government sees reunification with 
Taiwan as a medium-term goal, and has thus tried to isolate the Taipei government 
internationally, preventing its entry into international bodies such as the World 
Health Organization, and pursuing a strategy aimed at persuading its allies to 
break off diplomatic relations with the island.
China has used both its economic power and its position as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council in order to trigger a rapprochement with 
these countries. In 1996 China tried to prevent an extension of the presence 
of UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti. It obtained the acceptance by Haiti of the 
mutual opening of trade offices in the respective capitals.45 When once again the 
stationing of UN forces was due for renewal in 2005 China aimed at preventing 
the extension of the presence of UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti, which on this 
occasion included a contingent of Chinese forces. Finally, China agreed to the 
prolongation for another six months.
Guatemala is another Central American country that suffered Chinese 
reprisals in 1997 on account of its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China 
refused to support the resolution calling for UN military observers to be sent 
to Guatemala for a period of three months in order to monitor the end of the 
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guerrilla war. China negotiated with Guatemala and agreed to withdraw its veto 
on condition that Guatemala did not support the efforts of Taiwan to enter the UN 
that year, a request that the Taiwan government had been repeating since 1993 
with the support of its diplomatic allies.46
In May, 1997, China established diplomatic relations with the Bahamas 
which had had relations with Taiwan since 1989.47 This change can be explained 
in connection with the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. China 
put pressure on the government of the Bahamas to fall in line if the latter 
wished to retain its consulate in Hong Kong. Likewise, the Hong Kong based 
company, Hutchison Whampoa, invested US$ 80 million in a container port 
in Freeport Harbor in the Bahamas and also bought three hotels there. Santa 
Lucia established relations with China as well. The Chinese government also 
put pressure on Dominica without obtaining the results it was hoping for, and 
in retaliation demoted the Dominican consulate in Hong Kong to the status of a 
trade office following the handover. Nonetheless, Beijing continued to pay court to 
the government of Dominica. In 1999, China invited the chairman of Dominica’s 
Senate, Ramon Alburquerque, to Beijing. Finally, in 2004 Dominica broke off 
relations with Taiwan in order to establish them with China.48 In January, 2005, 
China obtained another triumph when Grenada decided to renew diplomatic 
relations which had been broken off in 1989.49
Since the mid 1990s, China has maintained a policy of rapprochement towards 
the countries of Central America and the Caribbean that continued to maintain 
relations with Taiwan. In April, 1997, China’s United Nations Ambassador Qin 
Huasen visited St. Kitts Nevis and Costa Rica. In the same year, China gained 
the Caribbean Development Bank’s acceptance of its application to join the 
organization as a non-regional non-borrowing member country. This means that 
China can lend money to the Caribbean countries through the bank and influence 
lending policies.
In 1998, the then Vice Premier Qian Qichen carried out a tour of the Caribbean 
offering economic aid to the countries of the region. In 2003, Vice Premier Wu 
Yi headed a Chinese delegation to eight Caribbean countries in order to promote 
economic relations with these nations. In February, 2005, Vice-president Zeng 
Qinghong took part in the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-Caribbean 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum. During this meeting a framework 
for cooperation in trade, investment, agriculture, building of infrastructure and 
development of natural and human resources was signed. Trade between China 
and the Caribbean reached US$ 2 billion in 2004.50
China has offered the countries of Central America and the Caribbean its 
economic support for investment projects and for an increase in trade. It has 
China and Latin America: The Economic Dimension
126
established commercial offices in Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republican. 
China has important trade relations with Panama and, besides, is the third most 
important user of the Panama Canal. China’s direct investment in 2004 was US$ 
200 million. In 2003, China’s imports from Panama totalled US$ 26 million.51 
Consequentially, the Chinese government is hoping that the government of 
Panama will decide to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Conclusion
China’s foreign policy over the last fifteen years has been very active in the 
different regions of the world by stimulating and promoting trade relations in 
order to avoid conflicts generated by the competition for markets. It has achieved 
important successes such as the attainment of good relations with its neighbours 
by finding solutions to long-standing bilateral problems.
Furthermore the Chinese policy of establishing strategic associations with 
different countries has enabled Beijing to deepen its bilateral relations and obtain 
benefits without provoking confrontation with third parties. China’s relations with 
the United States, in spite of their ups and downs, have also remained stable.
The Chinese government has expressed clearly the need to remain uninvolved 
in conflicts that might inhibit its economic growth. Its economic modernization, 
the preponderant role of foreign trade and that of foreign investment have made 
China part of global dynamics, and thus vulnerable to the changes generated 
within the system. At the present level of China’s economic development, raw 
materials such as petroleum, coal, cement, steel, etc. are vital. As China’s domestic 
production of raw materials is insufficient it has to look for these commodities 
in other regions. Similar dynamics impel China to a continuous search for new 
markets for its products.
At the same time, the Chinese government is trying to create the networks 
it needs in order to be able, at a given moment, to counteract the overwhelming 
influence wielded by the United States in international affairs. Multilateral 
organizations have been an effective instrument in which China has shown its 
skill in acting with moderation and yet decisively.
It is in this context that China’s relations with Latin America need to be analyzed 
in order to put them into perspective. Chinese leaders have paid special attention 
to Latin America for various reasons. They know that the region contains high-
profile countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. These countries 
enjoy considerable prestige in international organizations because of their leading 
position among the remaining Latin American countries. They are also countries 
that make their voices heard in defence of their respective positions, particularly 
Brazil. As their economic weight is not negligible the Chinese government knows 
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that it must negotiate with them if it wants to enjoy the advantages they have to 
offer as trading partners, as markets and as places to be invested in.
One of the priorities of the Chinese government is the ‘recovery’ of Taiwan 
and one of Beijing’s strategies for achieving this is obstructing Taiwan’s entry into 
international institutions as well as persuading Taipei’s diplomatic allies to break 
off relations with Taiwan in order to establish them with China. It is here that the 
region Latin America is of special importance to Chinese foreign policy because 
a fair number of countries in the region (12) maintain relations with Taiwan.52
The Chinese leaders have made it clear that they have no intention of 
challenging the United States for influence in the Latin American region. This has 
been reiterated on numerous occasions in an attempt to calm the preoccupations 
of those who see China as a threat to United States interests in the region. Nor 
does the Chinese government have any desire to occupy the position abandoned 
by the Russians in Cuba or to propagate its own political model among the Latin 
American countries.
Yet, the economic relations with China cannot serve as a panacea for Latin 
American countries’ domestic deficiencies. Mexico, in particular, has been 
unable to take advantage of the decades of good relations it has enjoyed with 
China. Mexico’s economy cannot compete with China because the latter is more 
productive and more efficient. China has carried out the structural reforms that 
remain pending in Mexico.
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Beyond ASEM 6: Lessons for the 
Actors
Bart Gaens
It is now more than a decade since awareness in Europe grew that ‘the rise of Asia 
is dramatically changing the world balance of economic power’, as the EU’s New 
Asia Strategy (1994) phrased it. The first Asia-Europe Meeting, held in Bangkok 
in March 1996, was born out of Goh Chok Tong’s suggestion to bridge the gap 
between Asia and Europe by establishing an institutional framework for the two 
regions to systematically engage with each other. Many perceived ASEM 1 as a 
first step towards filling in the ‘missing link’ in the triadic international economic 
structure. Ten years later, however, ASEM is criticised for failing to live up to 
expectations, for falling short of making an impact in the international arena, 
for its ambiguity and insufficient visibility. More importantly, ASEM’s actors and 
participants often seem to disagree on the principles and norms that serves as its 
normative framework. The divergence of opinions on the potential and desired 
outcomes of ASEM as a meta-regime1 is one of the most significant challenges 
this dialogue and cooperation framework presently faces.
ASEM’s anniversary is therefore not only an occasion for celebration. It offers 
an opportunity for critical reflection on the past decade, to look beyond the Helsinki 
summit and to put the process on track towards the next gathering in Beijing 
in 2008. This chapter takes a practical and empirical approach and examines, 
from a European point of view, three keystones of ASEM cooperation. These 
key principles are laid out in ASEM’s prime political document, the Asia-Europe 
Cooperation Framework (AECF) 2000, and pertain to (1) the informal approach; 
(2) the achievement of tangible results; and (3) the non-institutionalised approach. 
This chapter will look at these guiding principles, objectives and mechanisms 
to explore lessons the ‘comprehensive and future-oriented partnership’ between 
Asia and Europe can learn from the past and possible directions for the second 
decade. 
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ASEM’s Informal Approach
Support in Europe for the creation of ASEM was rooted in Europe’s ‘rediscovery 
of Asia’ in the early 1990s. Europe’s growing awareness of Asia as an awakening 
economic world power, including opportunities this held for Europe – but also 
the potential threat it posed to European industry – led to the the European 
Commission’s 1994 document ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’. Besides economic 
considerations, the development of a proactive US economic policy in the Asia-
Pacific and the ensuing creation of APEC were important underlying factors. Yet 
it is important to keep in mind that the EU, above all the European Commission, 
considered ASEM only as one tool, albeit an important one, to call into life a 
new and wide-ranging Asia-Europe partnership. Emphasis has always been on 
the bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral fora already in existence; ASEM 
was not intended to substitute or add to these other instruments. Instead the 
European Commission has always stressed ASEM’s complementary role, as a 
political catalyst for achieving results at other levels. For example, ASEM was 
seen as an opportunity to revive long-standing region-to-region cooperation with 
ASEAN, while at the same time offering the chance to extend bilateral contacts to 
include the Republic of Korea, Japan and (perhaps most importantly) China. As 
Sebastian Bersick argues, the concept of ‘open regionalism’ is embedded in the 
ASEM regime – ‘open regionalism’ being a strategy to facilitate the inter-regional 
management of interdependence.2
It is equally important to bear in mind that the EU did not aim for ASEM to 
function as an international organisation or as a framework to conduct binding 
negotiations. Open, informal and non-binding dialogue has been at the core 
of the ASEM philosophy. According to a 1996 ‘Declaration on behalf of the 
Commission’, the summit was not intended to produce new agreements, treaties 
or contracts. Rather, it was envisaged as a process that could foster closer personal 
and professional relationships between leaders, contribute to converging views on 
political issues such as security and international crime, and allow discussion on 
improved access to trade and investment in Asian and European markets.3 ASEM 
was only intended to ‘set the scene’ and ‘create a climate of trust and respect’ 
for discussions on issues of common concern, aiming to achieve understanding 
rather than provoke conflict. 
Within the EU this approach was acknowledged as ‘Asian-style’ and linked 
to the Asian origins of the idea behind ASEM: ‘The instrumental role of Asian 
countries in creating this forum is reflected in its working method: it is informal 
and centred on the participating personalities and their mutual understanding 
rather than on agendas and procedures’4. This Asian-style approach is often 
regarded as the ‘ASEAN way’, reflecting the ASEAN community’s commitment 
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to confidence-building, consensus, compromise, non-confrontation and non-
interference. The existence of a distinct Asian way juxtaposed to a European 
or ‘Western’ one can easily be called into question. For example, the informal 
dialogue style gradually eroded over the years and was replaced by prepared 
statements, not least by Asian participants. 
European displeasure with the set scripts hampering free discussion may have 
been a cause for ‘ASEM fatigue’ and lower levels of participation.5 Five years after 
ASEM’s birth the European Commission noted that formality and preparation 
had replaced the initial idea of an informal and open dialogue.6 It has also been 
noted that the EU may actually be the strongest proponent of a generally vague 
and uninstitutionalised approach. Julie Gilson, for example, has referred to the 
‘ASEAN Way’ as a means of reinforcing pre-existing institutional parameters. 
The absence of institutions provides the EU with a means to channel its vested 
interests and strengthen European agendas and procedures ‘which come to be 
presented as the “evolution” of collective practice’.7 
Irrespective of whether ASEM’s approach is Asian or not, many Asian 
countries and individual EU Member States had high expectations of ASEM, 
above all its economic pillar, to deliver far-reaching results. Yet ASEM does not 
possess the legal tools or binding mechanisms to implement regulations or 
treaties. ASEM can only provide the groundwork, delineate main areas for action 
and issue recommendations. However, the informal and ‘Asian-style’ approach 
offers advantages for networking and comprehensive approaches to global issues. 
The argument goes that when negotiations in broad fora such as the WTO and 
conflict-ridden bilateral relations such as EU-ASEAN face a cul-de-sac, ASEM 
offers a way out, precisely because it is more informal and loose. In addition it 
can function as a ‘real time observatory’ for transformations and shifting power 
relations in Europe and East Asia. The value of non-binding dialogue cannot 
be denied and should remain at the heart of the process. How, then, can ASEM 
remain a forum for dialogue while yielding tangible results? The answer lies in 
sharpening its focus, to aim for results that are less spectacular but not necessarily 
less important.
ASEM as a Tool for the Achievement of Tangible Results
Concrete projects must follow dialogue, not least because the success of the 
first summit and the high-level focus of the meeting created (perhaps undue) 
expectations.8 A decade of Asia-Europe dialogue and cooperation has certainly 
not been without achievements or impact. Positive developments in the political 
pillar include the opening of a regular, informal exchange of views on human 
rights, the emerging security dialogue on terrorism and other global threats and 
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expanding discussions on environmental issues. Important groundwork laid 
in the economic pillar includes the identification of priority areas for concerted 
action in the Action Plans for Trade Facilitation and Investment Promotion 
(TFAP and IPAP respectively). Two-way trade between the EU and Asian ASEM 
countries has increased substantially from ten years ago, even though the EU has 
not succeeded in raising the relative importance of East Asia for total exports. The 
relative success of ASEM’s ‘third pillar’ is visible in the projects of the Asia-Europe 
Foundation (ASEF) including educational, intellectual and people-to-people 
exchanges – even if engaging civil society and tackling social questions (such as 
labour issues and outsourcing) in a meaningful way remain challenges. 
A recently published Overview Report on ASEM Initiatives9 lists eleven 
political, forty-six economic and thirty-nine social/cultural initiatives. The study 
also mentions the lack of clear direction and mid- to long-term vision, failure to 
attract public awareness and media attention, and overlap with other projects 
as ASEM’s main shortcomings. The ASEM 6 summit in Helsinki is expected 
to narrow the agenda and focus initiatives to avoid the so-called ‘laundry list’ 
or ‘Christmas tree’ phenomenon in the future. The grouping of projects into a 
limited number of thematic and cross-pillar ‘clusters’ will enable ASEM to more 
clearly define its short- and long-term objectives, focus accompanying initiatives, 
and show more continuity. In 2005 the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kyoto 
outlined key areas for substantive cooperation: strengthening multilateralism 
and addressing security threats and challenges; human-centred and sustainable 
development; and dialogue among cultures and civilisations. These broad themes 
offer the overarching framework for policy dialogue and for future programmes 
and projects under the ASEM umbrella. 
ASEM’s mandate is also to yield results in other fora and to facilitate the 
functioning of other multilateral institutions through inter-regional consensus-
building and coordination. Critical views contend that ASEM has scored below 
par in this field as well. Christopher Dent, for example, has noted that ASEM 
has failed to connect and proactively interact with the wider global system to 
realize and shape the goals of multilateral institutions. ASEM’s inability to 
display real ‘multilateral utility’ reflects leaders’ hesitancy to explore and develop 
the possibilities of the framework.10 Jürgen Rüland has likewise pointed out that 
ASEM has done little to contribute to the functioning of global institutions by 
coordinating positions inter-regionally or steering the agenda of these institutions. 
ASEM, in other words, has failed to become a ‘clearing house for decision-making 
bottlenecks in global multilateral fora’ such as the UN, the WTO or the OECD.11 
Yet ASEM holds the potential to produce tangible results while functioning 
as a consensus-building forum facilitating progress in different fora. The field of 
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intercultural and interfaith dialogue and cooperation, for example, can produce 
concrete results under the ASEM umbrella and tie in with ongoing collaboration 
on other levels. Intercultural and interfaith dialogue are an important area of 
cooperation in the sphere of soft security. Michael Reiterer12 has pointed out that 
ASEM’s structure is well-suited to allow a comprehensive approach covering 
political, economic, social and cultural areas – necessary to address the root 
causes of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. Rather than attempting to address 
‘hard security’ issues, ASEM can achieve valuable progress in the area of ‘non-
traditional security’ through its ‘Cultures and Civilisations Dialogue Programme’, 
seeking to promote cultural diversity, intercultural understanding and dialogue 
across civilisations.13 
Progress in this field can be summarised as follows. First, the ASEM 4 
Copenhagen summit (September 2002) issued the Declaration on Cooperation 
against International Terrorism and endorsed a programme including the 
establishment of a consultative mechanism enabling ASEM coordinators and 
senior officials to confer on significant international events, convene conferences 
on non-traditional security issues, and increase cooperation to combat money-
laundering and financial crime. This led to the creation of the ASEM dialogue 
among Cultures and Civilisations, now one of ASEM’s priority areas for 
cooperation and a major theme for the Helsinki summit. Second, the policy 
dialogue at ASEM 4 led to two Conferences on Cultures and Civilisations and 
meetings of ASEM Ministers of Culture, seen as instrumental in rallying support 
for and achieving a common standpoint on the UNESCO draft convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Though there 
are no concrete means to measure its effect, work done in ASEM meetings may 
have had an impact on reaching a common Euro-Asian stance. Third, a series of 
ASEM conferences on counter-terrorism, the fourth one held in Copenhagen in 
June 2006, built support for UN-sponsored programmes and Security Council 
resolutions. Finally, the Bali Interfaith Dialogue Meetings (Bali 2005, Larnaca 
2006) contributed to the promotion of tolerance through practical action in the 
fields of education, culture, media, and religion and society. 
The Issue of an ASEM Secretariat
ASEM has always renounced institutionalisation. At the same time, lengthy 
Chairman’s Statements, ministerial reports and declarations, and the intricate 
structure of coordination and management show that ASEM is not without formal 
elements. The perceived lack of tangible results and progress – and the desire to 
upgrade cooperation to make ASEM into an international organisation which 
would include ‘grand’ projects such as an Asia-Europe Free-Trade Area – have led 
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to repeated calls for the establishment of an ASEM secretariat. The Asia-Europe 
Vision Group (AEVG) already suggested in March 1999 the establishment of a 
‘lean but effective’ ASEM secretariat to cope with the growing complexity of the 
process. International relations scholars such as Jürgen Rüland have also argued 
that a secretariat and permanent working groups in key areas of cooperation, 
combined with a decisive move towards high politics, would counter eroding 
interest among European governments and publics, and assist ASEM in turning 
to achievement-orientation.14 
A recent evaluation study15 on ASEM’s first decade revealed that calls for 
turning the dialogue into actual cooperation through institutionalisation are 
much stronger in Asia than in Europe. While some EU Member States support 
the creation of a secretariat in the long term, the European Commission opposes 
strengthened institutionalisation as it would lead to a weakened sense of ownership 
and responsibility for initiatives among partners.16 As the EU already has channels 
for coordination, it should be up to the Asian partners to create a possible Asian 
secretariat. An overarching ASEM secretariat could even potentially conflict with 
existing EU coordination procedures. Institutionalisation also runs counter to 
the EU’s standard approach to external relations, which usually strengthens 
relations with third countries or regions by upgrading their institutional basis 
through ‘third-generation’ or comprehensive cooperation agreements. Finally, 
institutionalisation would drastically alter ASEM’s unique character and in effect 
transform it into an international organisation.
Perhaps most importantly, the long-standing call for a secretariat has blurred 
the real issues and may have prevented discussion on more substantive issues for 
cooperation between Asia and Europe. Julie Gilson, for example, has argued that 
ASEM’s difficulties are not rooted in intercultural or inter-subjective barriers, but 
in the ‘constant focus upon the need to expand the formal institutional parameters 
(such as a secretariat) of the forum’.17 This results in cognitive misconceptions at 
the functional level, keeping issues such as human rights and future membership 
from being brought up for discussion. ‘ASEM, therefore, needs greater cognitive 
institutionalization, rather than being overly concerned about its structural 
façade’.
It is clear, however, that ASEM would benefit from better coordination, 
especially among its Asian partners. At the same time, ASEM suffers from lack 
of continuity as the European Commission functions as ASEM’s only constant 
coordinator and is regarded as its institutional memory. The soon to be established 
ASEM Virtual Secretariat (AVS) will aim to remedy these shortcomings. The 
AVS will function as a virtual office, enabling real-time exchange of information 
through an intranet, thereby facilitating the coordinators’ duties. The online 
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archive will function as ASEM’s institutional memory while allowing the process 
to remain true to its character. 
The AVS may even contribute to regional identity-building in the East Asian 
region, as it will provide Asian partners with the necessary means to improve 
interaction and exchange information. Signs of integration in East Asia are 
undeniable: market-led ‘new regionalism’ is evident in the growing importance of 
intraregional trade and investment and the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements. 
The ratio of intraregional trade to total trade in East Asia has risen dramatically 
over the past two decades. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) now include the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (agreed in 1992 and scheduled to be completed by 2012), the 
ASEAN-China FTA (2004), and bilateral FTAs between Japan and Singapore 
(2002), the Philippines (2004), Malaysia (2005) and Thailand (2005). 
The main catalyst for increased regionalism has been the Asian economic 
and financial crisis. Awareness of the need for cross-regional cooperation led 
to ASEAN inviting China, Japan and South Korea to the 1997 summit that 
marked the beginning of the ASEAN+3 (APT) process. It is widely accepted 
that Europe’s treatment of the East Asian region as a separate dialogue 
partner within ASEM required the Asian ASEM partners to consult internally, 
coordinate on diverse and occasionally sensitive issues, and build consensus 
ahead of meetings with their European counterparts. The formation of the 
APT in 1997 can at least partially be seen as a result of this. One reason 
why the EU has regarded ASEM’s function as primarily that of consensus-
builder and complementary to existing fora – and has preferred to focus actual 
cooperation on bilateral relations – is that the EU has considered ASEM a 
cross-cultural exercise between a closely integrated Europe and a much more 
diverse Asian side. In 1999 for example, a European Parliamentary Committee 
emphasised that the participants on the Asian side are much more diverse 
than the European Union, while ASEM bringing these countries together (in 
particular in the form of ASEAN +3) can be seen as an achievement in itself.18 
The EU thus sees itself as an institutional model and framework that can be 
exported, an ‘external federator’ in the words of Rüland, shaping regionalism 
through inter-regional contacts and contributing to local identity-building in a 
heterogeneous group of Asian countries.19 
ASEM needs to be seen as a tool that can promote integration in East Asia and 
dialogue among nations. The APT includes the only sustained regional grouping 
and building bloc for further regionalism (ASEAN), the initial driving force of 
regionalisation in East Asia (Japan), and a global power in the making (China). This 
makes the APT an important player on the global level. However, when compared 
to the EU, the epitome of regional integration, Asian regionalism appears shallow; 
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economic interconnectedness in the APT group and emerging community 
consciousness has yet to translate into political and institutional integration. 
Functionalists and neo-functionalists would argue that Asian regionalism has 
progressed to a lesser extent than in Europe because of a more limited supporting 
societal base and less developed supranational institutions. Constructivists would 
emphasise the importance of ideas, values, norms and identities, and point to 
the absence of a shared regional identity in East Asia. Realists would argue that 
nationalism in East Asia and the emphasis on sovereignty in newly independent 
East Asian countries form the main impediment to institutional integration.20 
More than anything, however, it may be the involvement of the US in the 
region and the tense relationship between China and Japan that prevent deeper 
institutional integration in East Asia in general, and the institutionalisation of 
ASEAN+3 integration (visible in ASEM) in particular.
Conclusion
The ASEM process can only be upgraded into a full-fledged inter-regional dialogue 
and cooperative project if integration among the Asian ASEM partners further 
develops in institutional form. Since this is not likely in the short term, ASEM 
should attempt to make a difference with means at its disposal. Awareness of the 
value of dialogue in an open and informal setting in a limited number of priority 
areas followed by concrete initiatives that complement activities and programmes 
in other fora can contribute significantly to further strengthening links between 
Asia and Europe. 
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Ten Years of ASEM – Changes and 
Challenges1
Yeo Lay Hwee
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was conceived in Singapore as an informal 
meeting between Asian and European leaders to enable the EU to engage dynamic 
Asian economies in a wide-ranging dialogue. The early 1990s saw the unilateral 
liberalization of various Southeast Asian economies and the opening up of the 
Chinese market. At the same time, the European Union was integrating further 
with the 1986 Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. There were 
therefore strong economic reasons for the two regions to strengthen dialogue. 
The EU wanted to partake in the benefits of the strong growth in Asia, and not to 
lose out to the Americans and Japanese. The Asians were worried about ‘fortress 
Europe’ with the creation of the Single Market, its focus on Central and Eastern 
Europe and the internal debates on the Maastricht Treaty. They wanted to be 
sure that they would not be shut out of Europe. Engaging Europe was also a 
way of diversifying their economic and foreign policy dependence away from the 
Americans.
The strategic reason behind ASEM was the concept of closing the triangle 
– balancing the relations and creating strong links between the three engines 
of growth – America, Europe and East Asia. The argument was that strong 
transatlantic ties exist between Europe and the US and transpacific ties were 
also increasingly dense because of APEC and other bilateral relations that exist 
between the US and its various Asian partners. But ties between Europe and 
Asia were weak and lacking, and hence there was a need to have a forum under 
which linkages could be built and strengthened. The further argument is that 
only close links among the three key economic players would forestall the spectre 
of closed, competing blocs, and ensure the continued openness of the global 
economic order powered by the three engines. This would in turn contribute to 
global stability and prosperity. 
142
Of course, each member state or regional grouping brings with them their 
own calculation of strategic and concrete interests. For example, for ASEAN, 
another strategic rationale would be to engage China in as many multilateral fora 
as possible, and to bring the bigger Northeast Asian economies of ‘plus three’ to 
bear in their relations with Europe. At a more concrete, tangible level, there is of 
course the hope that the ASEM process will facilitate and result in more trade and 
investments between the two regions.
The overall strategic rationale of completing the triangle was the accepted 
raison d’être of ASEM. But underlying this broad strategic rationale were slightly 
different interest calculations and perceptions. Hence, when the inaugural 
ASEM summit took place in 1996, the objective for ASEM was couched in the 
broadest terms; this was reflected in the Chairman’s Statement that the ‘Meeting 
recognized the need to strive for a common goal of maintaining and enhancing 
peace and stability, as well as creating conditions conducive for economic and 
social development. To this end, the Meeting forged a new comprehensive Asia-
Europe partnership for Greater Growth. This partnership aims at strengthening 
links between Asia and Europe thereby contributing to peace, global stability 
and prosperity (Chairman’s Statement of the inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting, 
Bangkok, 2 March 1996).
This broad objective – to create a forum for dialogue – underlined the 
perception that ties between Asia and Europe were weak, and to be able to get 
together to dialogue and exchange views on different issues would in itself be 
an achievement. One should therefore take a long view of ASEM and see it as a 
long-term project from building mutual understanding and trust to cooperating 
on useful projects. The positive side of framing ASEM in such broad terms is 
to accept that ASEM is about building relationships and cannot be measured in 
quantitative terms. It is qualitative in nature and it would be wrong to look for 
concrete outcomes from every single event. The downside, however, is that this 
very broad objective leaves room for all sorts of interpretation and has created 
different expectations, pulling the process in different directions. This in turn has 
created the sense that ASEM is unfocused, inefficient and ineffective. It is also 
generally felt that this kind of vast undertaking cannot be sustainable. In a world 
of constant flux whereby attention and resources are needed to tackle all sorts of 
challenges, there is need to be more focused and to deliver concrete results that 
can in turn help sustain the process.
This is particularly so as the external environment during which ASEM was 
conceived and launched is vastly different to the present environment. What 
are some of these significant changes in the external environment and how did 
ASEM’s agenda respond to these changes?
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The Asian Financial Crisis – the First Crisis of Globalization?
The Asian financial crisis (AFC) that began with currency attacks on the Thai 
baht in July 1997 was to spread and engulf almost the whole East Asian region by 
1998. It is now well-known that a combination of factors was responsible for the 
outbreak of the AFC. Though the affected countries are primarily to be blamed for 
the policy mistakes they had made, the AFC was also a broader reflection of the 
potential negative effects of globalization. Therefore it was not surprising that the 
AFC produced a crisis of the concept of globalization which in turn contributed to 
the wave of anti-globalisation movements that hit the streets of Seattle and were 
partly responsible for the failure of the WTO talks in 1999.
The Asian financial crisis also brought the first tint of doubts about the ASEM 
process. Asians were frustrated with Europe’s initial response to the financial 
crisis (seen as indifferent and unhelpful). Warnings by some Asian leaders such 
as Lee Kuan Yew on why ‘Europe should have a direct interest in containing the 
crisis of confidence in Asia, in view of the substantial losses that European banks 
faced’2 and enlightened self-interest of key European players saved the day. 
The 2nd ASEM Summit was held in London in April 1998 to signal that 
Europeans were not fair-weather friends. At the height of the crisis, with the 
gloom and doom, it was important that the meeting did take place, and with a 
good turnout by the ASEM leaders. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment 
to the ASEM process and more concretely, an ASEM Trust Fund was proposed 
to help crisis-affected Asian countries. The ASEM Trust Fund in some way 
vindicated the Europeans and supporters of ASEM hailed this as a significant 
outcome of the ASEM process. Yet critics would also note that the fact that the 
Europeans anchored the ASEM Trust Fund in the World Bank rather than in 
the Asian Development Bank, or having it managed under the ASEM process, 
perhaps reflected a continuing lack of trust. This, however, might not be fair, 
as at the time of the crisis, ASEM was only 2 years old, and much older fora 
such as APEC and regional organizations like ASEAN had also failed to respond 
adequately to the problems in the immediate aftermath of the AFC. 
East Asian Regionalism Gathered Pace
There is no doubt about the havoc and hardships that the AFC created for several 
Asian societies and their peoples. But there was also a silver lining: the crisis 
created an impetus for change, and more importantly, in a strange and paradoxical 
way, the AFC had the salutary effect of stimulating new thinking on the part of 
East Asians with regards to regionalism. 
The development of East Asian regionalism needs to be a slow process to 
accommodate the complex diversities, differences and historical antagonisms. 
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What is therefore remarkable is that despite these vast differences, regional 
cooperation and integration is taking root in East Asia. The first phase of regional 
cooperation and integration is driven by a mix of spontaneous market forces 
(economic regionalization) and political forces in reaction to what is happening 
in other regions, particularly in Europe, and with the formation of NAFTA in 
America. 
The AFC clearly demonstrated the interdependencies in the region due 
to economic regionalization, and the vulnerabilities of the region to external 
forces. This prompted the region to re-examine existing regional cooperative 
arrangements and take steps to create new mechanisms and institutionalize some 
of the older arrangements in response to the increasing interdependence. East 
Asians’ frustration with the lack of help from the US in the advent of the crisis 
and increasing dissatisfaction with the market fundamentalism of the IMF led 
to more concerted efforts to enhance regional policy coordination. It was during 
the crisis that several initiatives such as the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund, 
proposed by Japan, surfaced. 
Despite its essentially reactive nature, progress has been made in developing 
East Asian regionalism in recent years. At the political and policy level, the 
ASEAN + 3 process that begun in earnest after the AFC has achieved a certain 
momentum. Various concrete initiatives, particularly in the financial arena, have 
been launched. 
The ASEM process had been credited for indirectly helping to drive East Asian 
regionalism. A number of scholars have argued that the ASEM process has helped 
Asia to define itself. By having to deal with such a well-defined region such as the 
EU, Asian ASEM members have to get their act together. The preparations for 
ASEM set off a process of consultation and coordination among the Asian ASEM 
members who also happen to constitute the ‘ASEAN + 3’. By its willingness to 
deal with the ASEAN + 3 as an entity, the EU bestowed an aura of legitimacy on 
East Asian regionalism.
While ASEM may not be directly credited for being the impetus behind an 
emergent East Asian identity, constructivist scholars would argue that the various 
trans-regional or inter-regional fora such as ASEM, APEC and FEALAC (Forum 
for East Asian and Latin American Cooperation) can help lead to the development 
of discourse of East Asianness. This process is helped by epistemic communities 
of think tanks and intellectuals who in their discourse and activities have helped 
generate the consensus on the need of building an East Asian community.
A common feeling is therefore to be seen emerging among some political, 
business and intellectual leaders in East Asia that they all share a common interest 
and joint responsibility for the creation of a more stable regional order and that 
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they are on the threshold of building an East Asian community. Yet, the reality is 
that there is still no clear overarching vision of East Asian regionalism and a lack 
of specific blueprint for East Asia to further integrate. East Asian region-building 
is a work in progress. How far and how fast East Asian regionalism will develop 
will in turn impact the development of the ASEM process. There is no doubt that 
an integrated East Asia with a unified voice would strengthen the ASEM process 
and have a profound impact on the functioning of ASEM. An empowered East 
Asian region and a unified Europe truly engaged with one another could play a 
useful role in enhancing multilateralism and strengthening global governance 
which is much needed when the global situation is in such flux in the aftermath 
of September 11.
The September 11 Attacks and Its Aftermath – the Crisis of 
Multilateralism
September 11 was a watershed in the 21st century. It heralded the rise of an 
extremist, destructive ideology that rejects modernity but yet utilizes the very tools 
of global connectivity and globalised networks to indiscriminately inflict terrifying 
damage. The impact of the collapse of the World Trade Center on the psyche 
of the Americans and the excuse it gave for the Bush administration to pursue 
policies relying primarily on hard power and squandering the soft power built 
by Americans over the years was unfortunate. It led the US to war on Iraq, a war 
launched despite many dissenting voices within the international community.
The reality of course is that even before September 11, the US under the Bush 
administration had been increasingly unilateralist and had displayed disregard for 
multilateral institutions and agreement painstakingly built up by the international 
community. The decision to renege on the Kyoto Protocol on Carbon Emissions, 
its abrogation of the 1972 ballistic missile treaty, the rejection of the International 
Criminal Court, are just some examples. The decision to go ahead with the war on 
Iraq despite widespread apprehension and unease was to accentuate the problems 
of international terrorism. An increasingly complex international environment 
was to bring stress to many of the multilateral norms, regimes and institutions 
built up painstakingly after the Second World War.
After a series of high profile terrorist attacks in Europe and Asia following 
September 11, Asia and Europe acknowledged the seriousness of tackling 
terrorism. However, there is also more recognition than in the US that the 
problems cannot be solved by military force alone and there is a need for a more 
comprehensive approach targeting the root cause of terrorism. The 4th ASEM 
Summit in Copenhagen issued a Declaration on Cooperation against Terrorism 
and announced a series of initiatives and activities to enhance ASEM cooperation 
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on international terrorism. The initiatives ranged from Dialogue on Cultures 
and Civilisations, and regular seminars on anti-terrorism, to more specific 
calls for ASEM members to accede to and implement all existing international 
conventions and protocols on terrorism and trans-national organised crime, and 
targeting specific areas such as symposia on anti-money laundering to thwart the 
financing of terrorist activities. 
ASEM has also consistently called for the need to reaffirm the principles of 
multilateralism in dealing with global problems. In all key ASEM meetings, 
ministers and leaders reiterate the multilateral principles, and the 6th ASEM 
Foreign Ministers Meeting specifically issued an ASEM Declaration on 
Multilateralism. Yet the reality is that ASEM’s record so far has shown that it is 
strong in rhetoric but weak in substance. 
An Enlarged and Fragmented Europe?
It was the concern about a ‘fortress Europe’ in the early 1990s that provided 
one of the underlying rationale to have ASEM to engage Europe. The fear of a 
self-absorbed Europe has again surfaced in the wake of the enlargement process 
and the debates surrounding institutional reforms with the rejection of the 
Constitution Treaty by the Netherlands and France.
The EU has tried to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy as a first 
step towards defining the EU’s relations with the outside world. However, in the 
run-up to the Iraq war, the EU displayed its inability to speak with one voice on 
security and strategic issues. The expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 would only 
add to the differences and make it difficult for the EU to have a concerted policy. 
Therefore Asians are inclined to believe that an enlarged EU would set back its 
capacity to act. With further enlargement envisaged (Romania and Bulgaria) and 
as EU begins its accession talks with Croatia and Turkey, some scholars wondered 
if Europe would again become self-absorbed.
Compounding the problem is of course the constitutional and budget 
crisis that created uncertainty as to where the EU is heading. The crisis is a 
reflection of the much more fundamental problems facing European societies. 
European societies are under huge pressure to restructure their economies and 
tweak their welfare systems in the face of aging populations and worldwide 
economic competition. EU member states’ ability to manage diversities within 
their own societies as seen in debates on immigration and integration and 
tensions with ethnic and religious minorities are also having an impact on 
citizens’ senses of well being and security. As Europeans confront their own 
insecurity, the internal wrangling and uncertainty may further limit the EU’s 
capacity to engage Asia. 
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Proliferation of Initiatives
ASEM is now at a cross-roads. Much has changed since ASEM was first launched 
in 1996. What all the above major trends point to is an increasingly complex 
environment that challenges us to rethink the usefulness of dialogue forum such 
as ASEM.
ASEM has essentially responded to the above global and regional changes 
in a piecemeal manner by adding more and more initiatives. The proliferation 
of initiatives has been an issue of concern as critics noted a lack of focus and 
direction. The impact of many of the one-off initiatives and the effectiveness of 
other initiatives has been questioned.
It is difficult to gauge how much of an impact these initiatives have on the 
Asia-Europe relationship. Are these the most cost-effective and efficient ways 
of building trust and confidence, increasing knowledge and understanding and 
building support for the ASEM process? To what degree do these initiatives 
translate into concrete projects that would ultimately benefit ASEM governments 
and peoples? Is there too much wasteful duplication? These are just some of the 
questions often raised.
Such mushrooming of activities and initiatives is a reflection of a much more 
fundamental problem with regards to the specifics of ASEM. That is, while 
ASEM’s broad objective of strengthening Asia-Europe cooperation is clear, the 
reality is that the specifics of this objective and how to achieve it are still evolving. 
Thus far, ASEM’s objectives have been couched in the broadest terms as reflected 
in the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework 2000. Differences in perspectives 
and priorities hamper ability to prioritise and to deepen dialogue to concrete 
policy cooperation. This in turn has contributed to the proliferation of initiatives. 
Hence, what one sees is many movements but little progress.
While acknowledging that ASEM should be viewed in a long-term perspective, 
and that dialogues in various areas from the official summits and ministerial 
meetings to all the different conferences, meetings and workshops are building 
blocks towards greater partnership, it is also feared that interest in ASEM could 
wane (and has indeed waned) as meeting or ‘forum’ fatigue begins to set in. 
Without delivering on what would be deemed as visible benefits that could be 
profiled in the media and made known to the public, the support and interest in 
ASEM would fade into oblivion. 
Identity Crisis
Closely related to the problems of proliferation of initiatives is the issue of ASEM’s 
identity. It has been difficult to capture ASEM’s identity, distinct from that of 
other multilateral institutions, regional organisations and bilateral frameworks. 
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Is ASEM just a ‘Meeting’ or ‘Process’ or is it a ‘Framework’ or an ‘Institution’? 
Should ASEM be viewed as an inter-regional meeting/process/framework/
institution or an inter-governmental one?
How does ASEM add value to Asia-Europe relations within the myriad of EU-
ASEAN, EU-China, EU-Japan and EU-South Korea frameworks? Since the launch 
of ASEM, other bilateral dialogues between EU and its Asian partners have also 
been strengthened. The EU-Japan dialogue that actually began before ASEM in 
1991 was revitalized during the 10th Summit in 2001 with an Action Plan for 
reinforced cooperation. The EU-China Summit was launched in 1998 and has 
grown from strength-to-strength. The newest EU-Korea Summit, which began on 
the sideline of ASEM 4 meeting in Copenhagen in 2002, held its second summit 
in Hanoi in 2004. 
With all these competing frameworks, the question about ASEM’s role and 
identity is indeed pertinent. Is ASEM supposed to be THE overarching framework 
in which all other above bilateral and inter-regional fora should be subsumed? 
Or should ASEM remain just one of the many frameworks? If the latter, then 
the next question would be what is ASEM’s unique comparative advantage, and 
what special added-value can ASEM bring compared to the other frameworks 
and fora?
The lack of a clear identity is also closely linked to the issue that had been 
raised by many ASEM observers and commentators – the lack of visibility and 
public profile. Hence, even after 10 years of ASEM, in a survey of third level 
students in Beijing, 68.6% of respondents ‘do not know ASEM’. Asian media 
coverage of events suggested that ASEM is mostly the concern of officials and 
leaders, and not so much the concern of the average citizens.
Institutional Challenges
The only visible institution created out of the ASEM process is the Asia-Europe 
Foundation (ASEF). The mission of ASEF, as enshrined in the Chairman’s 
Statement from the 1st ASEM Summit, is to enhance better mutual understanding 
between Asia and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and people-to-
people exchanges. ASEF has therefore been instrumental in helping organize 
various dialogues under the socio-cultural and intellectual pillar of the ASEM 
process. 
ASEF’s role in bringing about closer understanding between Asia and Europe 
has been recognised, especially through its various activities targeted at young 
people such as ASEF University and the Young Leaders Symposium. However, 
it also suffers the same problem as the official ASEM process – a proliferation of 
activities and yet a lack of public profile and visibility. 
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The question has long been raised of whether ASEM needs a Secretariat. 
One of the key concerns expressed is that with a proliferation of activities, 
a Secretariat is essential to help coordinate all these activities to provide 
continuity and focus. Contrary to the popular perception that Asians prefer 
a loose framework, in a research commissioned by JCIE, most of the Asian 
papers actually called for the institutionalization of the ASEM process with 
the creation of a small but professional Secretariat to replace the current 
mechanism of four coordinators. Particularly with the enlarged membership, 
the feeling is that it is essential to have a Secretariat to manage the ASEM 
process. An ASEM Secretariat can also be a clearing house for information 
about its activities and help to raise the profile of ASEM with more concerted 
efforts. 
There is an asymmetry in ASEM in the sense that Europe is a well-defined 
and integrated entity with the European Commission and European Council 
to coordinate the EU’s position, while Asia is loosely defined and there is no 
counterpart in Asia equivalent to the Commission or Council that could help 
to coordinate Asia’s position. The existing coordinating mechanism was in part 
designed in response to such realities. But such asymmetry itself is also one of 
the reasons for calling for an ASEM Secretariat. 
The truth, however, is that establishing a Secretariat can mitigate the 
practical problems of coordination and can help in raising the profile of ASEM, 
but it would not help resolve the more fundamental problem of differences 
in perspectives and priorities amongst the member states. What do member 
states want out of ASEM? Can they muster the political will to make ASEM 
a relevant forum? Can they agree on a few areas where they believe that Asia 
and Europe can add value and produce tangible results so as to revitalize the 
ASEM process? And are there enough champions and leaders within the 39 
ASEM member states and societies that would be willing to work tirelessly to 
help drive the ASEM process? All these questions need to be seriously thought 
through if the ASEM process is to be revitalized and given a new impetus.
The Myanmar Issue and the Enlargement of ASEM
The issue of Myanmar membership in ASEM has also impacted on the ASEM 
process. The tussle over whether to admit Myanmar together with the other 
two new ASEAN member states – Laos and Cambodia, into the ASEM process 
as EU enlarged from 15 to 25, has resulted in the cancellation of two important 
Ministerial meetings. The 6th ASEM Economic Ministers’ Meeting and Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting to be held in the Netherlands were cancelled. The issue was 
supposed to be resolved when the Europeans finally agreed to the accession of 
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Myanmar, under the condition that Myanmar would be represented at a lower 
level than that of Head of State or Government. 
ASEM membership was therefore enlarged at the 5th ASEM Summit in 
Hanoi in October 2004 expanding from 26 to 39 members, including all the 10 
new EU Member States and the 3 new ASEAN Member States. But this would 
not be the end of the problems. At the same time that Myanmar joined ASEM, 
the European Council announced the decision to tighten existing sanctions 
against Myanmar, including the expansion of the visa ban and banning new 
investments in state-owned Burmese enterprises. The lack of internal reforms 
within Myanmar, and the secrecy of the military junta, would continue to pose 
challenges for Asia and Europe. The European political realities make it difficult 
for the European leaders to participate in meetings involving the Myanmar 
junta. At the same time, the Asian ASEM members cannot compromise on 
the principles of equality and non-interference in domestic affairs. The issue 
of Myanmar’s participation in meetings, particularly those involving the senior 
leaders would be a perennial problem.
Beyond the question of Myanmar, the enlarged ASEM in itself would also 
compound the problems enunciated above. Enlarging without significant 
deepening would further complicate the identity and institutional challenges, 
and impact on even the quality of the informal dialogue that ASEM is supposed 
to treasure.
The Future of ASEM – Problems and Prospects
ASEM is now at a cross-road. With the various internal challenges and external 
changes, there is a need to rethink the ASEM process. Some progress has been made 
in improving dialogue between Asia and Europe on a whole range of issues; however, 
while the dialogue has been broad, it has not been deep. The dialogue process has 
also stayed at the information-sharing level and has not moved onto a substantive 
cooperation level (here cooperation is defined more specifically using the concept 
defined by Robert Keohane3).
While there were high hopes and a sense of optimism during the first two years 
of ASEM, the subsequent development of the relationship has been seen by many 
as leaving much to be desired; ASEM was lagging behind in concrete achievements. 
Though one would not dismiss the value of dialogue in itself, international cooperation 
cannot be sustained in the long run without visible or tangible benefits. 
Whether ASEM could move beyond the dialogue stage would hinge on political 
will, and willingness to review the whole process and make significant changes 
to the current modus	operandi. What are some of these changes that need to be 
considered?
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The Chairman’s Statement of the 7th Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kyoto noted 
that cooperation among the ASEM partners which now represent about 40% of 
the earth’s population, 50% of global GDP and 60% of world trade is becoming 
increasingly important in addressing key global issues that the international 
community is facing. 
Indeed with such figures, Asia-Europe relations need to be thought of globally 
and not narrowly. Constructive thinking is needed when the global order is under 
stress, and internationalism is under threat from terrorists, anti-globalisation 
movements and unilateralist behaviour. New imperatives exist for Asia and 
Europe to work together, purposefully in a global setting, but also for each other 
regionally. No one questions this need for Asia and Europe to come together to 
support global governance and to work for the mutual benefit of the peoples of 
Asia and Europe. Yet, is ASEM in its present form the best forum to address all the 
challenges that face us? Solutions to 21st century problems will often by definition 
be global; should they best be handled in global institutions such as the UN and 
the WTO? ASEM should not attempt to be a mini-UN; or should it? How does 
ASEM complement and add value to other global and regional multilateral fora? 
In considering the future of ASEM, one should perhaps start by posing a 
few fundamental questions to the political leaders and bureaucrats of the ASEM 
member states and to those engaged in Asia-Europe affairs: 
Are they prepared to commit time and resources to deepen the relationship 
and cooperation between Asia and Europe through the ASEM process? Is the 
ASEM process just a loose overarching framework to stimulate other specific 
areas of cooperation among wider or narrower groupings of European and Asian 
countries? Or is it seen as a useful framework for inter-regional cooperation in 
itself as well as a facilitator of cooperation between states or groups of states in 
the two regions? What do we hope to realistically achieve or accomplish from the 
ASEM process? In short we need to make concrete ASEM’s goals and objectives. 
Only by clearly articulating ASEM’s objectives and goals can we then go to the 
next step of considering how to improve on its management, how to profile it, 
and to substantially consider what specific areas to focus on and how to really 
benchmark its usefulness or otherwise. 
The other fundamental question that needs to be addressed is the degree of 
trust and confidence between East Asia and Europe? Without a certain level of 
trust and confidence, very few common endeavours can get off the ground. 
Unfortunately, there is no one position or single answer to these fundamental 
questions reflecting the presence of divergent views yet to be fully reconciled. 
Some ASEM members see ASEM more as a loose overarching framework to 
complement the other bilateral, regional and global frameworks. It is not the 
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framework to be complemented by other fora. ASEM thus is used for dialogue to 
explore and understand each other’s position and viewpoints but not for concrete 
cooperation – as this will take place either in the global institutions such as the 
WTO or regional or sub-regional institutions or bilaterally. However, there are 
also some members who feel that ASEM is a useful framework for inter-regional 
cooperation, and cooperation should take place at this level for the mutual benefit 
of Asia and Europe, for instance in the area of trade and investments. In short, 
they feel that there are issues that can be usefully and exclusively addressed at 
this level. For the former, they do not look for concrete outcomes from every 
single ASEM event. For the latter, they want to see more action-oriented plans 
and deliverables at the ASEM level.
On the question of trust and confidence, there is a general consensus that 
after 10 years of talking, a certain comfort level has been achieved, and hence 
Asia and Europe should be ready to move beyond mere exchanges of views to 
functional cooperation and closer coordination of positions in larger multilateral 
fora such as the UN and the WTO. 
An Idealist Vision of ASEM’s Future
ASEM at this juncture is primarily a loose overarching framework for dialogue 
to be complemented by specific cooperation at other different levels. The analogy 
is that of a country club. There is often a myriad of reasons for people joining a 
country club – some join to network, others join for the different facilities offered. 
Some join because the entrance fee is low compared to other clubs, and others 
join because of proximity to work or home.
However, the vision is for ASEM to move towards an effective inter-regional 
dialogue and cooperation framework. The analogy is then that of an Association or 
a Society of people with some common interests. In short, ASEM must therefore 
move from being a social club to a serious Association or professional Society in 
pursuit of common interests of mutual benefits not only to its members but also 
to the wider global community. ASEM in this case will become more achievement 
oriented. As a forum linking two regions that account for two-thirds of world trade 
and international output, it will become a significant player in the international 
arena. It will in fact become one of the most important building blocks for global 
governance. And there are good reasons for doing so:
First, it is not too far-fetched to assume that most if not all of the ASEM 
members want to maintain peace and stability, and look towards more sustainable 
economic prosperity.
Second, Asia and Europe are growing in importance as they each increasingly 
acquire a sense of regional identity. No doubt the European identity is in a much 
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more advanced stage than the East Asian identity, and East Asian regionalism is 
not a stage comparable to the European Union. Nevertheless, the economies of 
East Asia have become increasingly integrated and inter-connected. Intraregional 
trade as share of East Asia’s trade rose from 35% in 1980 to 54% in 2003. This is 
comparable with the 66% in the European Union. Deeper economic integration 
will require a stronger institutional structure, which will in turn lead to a stronger 
sense of joint destiny and regional identity.
Third, even though an enlarged EU has appeared hesitant and divided at 
times, Europe will remain as one of the largest and influential regions in the 
world. Similarly, an increasingly integrated and economically dynamic East Asia 
will want to consider how to translate this growing economic weight into global 
influence.
Fourth, both Asia and Europe feel the weight of the American superpower. 
The main question they face today is how to strengthen their own cooperation 
without being seen as ganging up on the US, but at the same time, helping to 
keep US unilateralism or potential isolationism in check. 
Fifth, Asia and Europe are becoming increasingly interdependent. They face 
a similar set of challenges, trans-national in nature – environmental degradation, 
infectious diseases, terrorism, etc. – in which they have to work together to 
address with urgency and tenacity.
For the vision of ASEM as an effective inter-regional dialogue and cooperation 
framework to build peace and stability and sustainable economic prosperity, one 
of the most crucial issues for ASEM is how to help East Asia integrate.
The US was the external federator that contributed in some ways to the 
construction of the European community. In the case of East Asia, US attitude 
is ambivalent if not slightly suspicious and worried about the potential of an 
East Asian community that could fall under the influence of China. In contrast, 
the EU through ASEM has indirectly helped the smaller Asian countries in 
accommodating the rise of China. ASEM has opened the door for China to 
discover the virtue and perhaps also the pitfalls of multilateralism. Therefore the 
potential for the EU to be the external federator in the East Asian community 
project is not far-fetched. In fact Asians, while maintaining that the European 
integration model cannot be copied, have in recent years acknowledged that 
much could still be learnt from European experience.
The next important issue is for ASEM to identify the common interests that 
bind the two regions. What should be the common agenda for ASEM? It would 
be difficult to mobilize energy and enthusiasm from members without a clear 
identification and definition of a set of issues of common interest. ASEM should not 
attempt to over-stretch itself by discussing any issue under the sun and straining 
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its credibility. It must bring focus to its cooperation agenda, institutionalize the 
ASEM process further and provide benchmarks for measuring the progress and 
benefits of ASEM for its societies and peoples. Broadly, the guidelines for what 
issues ASEM should focus on should be:
What Europe can offer Asia is essentially considered as ‘soft power’ or civilian 
power. Asia-Europe cooperation should therefore focus on soft issues (non-
traditional or human security issues) and economic interests.
The issues must resonate within Asian and European societies. Issues such as 
balancing the pursuit of economic growth with good environmental governance 
that directly impact the quality of life are gaining prominence and urgency.
Furthermore, they should build on the success of some of the Asian-European 
initiatives or joint actions taken in other contexts, such as, the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission led by representatives of the EU and with involvement by several ASEAN 
countries. 
A Pragmatist Way Forward
The idealist vision faces various obstacles and constraints – the most fundamental 
being the different interests calculations of the ASEM partners. To get all 39 
ASEM partners to subscribe to this grand common vision is a Herculean task. 
Lack of leadership, the fact that both the EU and East Asians have not begun to 
see each other as ‘strategic’ partners and are still focused on the US, and that it 
will be a long time before the East Asian community becomes a reality, means 
that it is a long, difficult road ahead to realize the full potential of the Asia-Europe 
partnership within the ASEM framework. 
Recognising this fact does not mean ‘writing off’ the ASEM process. There 
is a more pragmatic way forward to improve the ASEM dialogue in response to 
the current criticisms. ASEM can continue to be an informal dialogue forum to 
create collegiality amongst Asian and European leaders, but at the same time, 
work towards a more efficient management of the process and create projects that 
will bring about mutual benefits for the ASEM partners.
A few things for ASEM to bear in mind in moving ASEM onto a pragmatic, 
step-by-step approach to strengthening Asia-Europe partnership for mutual 
benefit are:
First, ASEM should avoid ad	hoc programmes and one-off projects or initiatives. 
What needs to be done is to identify a few key concrete areas within the plethora 
of initiatives that have been started where ASEM can make an impact. Ongoing 
initiatives and dialogue in areas that have already received some sort of affirmation 
and positive feedback should be further developed. Moving from mere dialogue 
and conferences, specific projects in these areas can then be developed with a 
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clear roadmap and benchmarks to track the progress of the projects. Tangible 
results are indispensable if international cooperation is to survive in the long 
run. Though it may not be possible to show ‘tangible results’ for every event, 
there must be benchmarks for progress in any long-term cooperation agenda. 
In the short term, ASEM must strike a balance between visionary projects that 
have long-term gestation periods and down to earth initiatives such as increased 
scholarships for students, information and help for SMEs from Asia and Europe 
wanting to invest in these two regions. 
Second, since ASEM is a forum of equal partners and decision-making is 
by consensus, to circumvent the problem of inertia from lack of agreement, 
the principle of ‘variable leadership’ and ‘coalition of the willing’ can be applied 
particularly in functional projects and cluster of issues. Clusters of countries 
can take the lead in clusters of issues in which they have particular interest and 
expertise, and are willing to commit time and resources to drive concrete projects 
that will produce tangible benefits for all.
Third, raising ASEM’s profile is seen as one of the biggest challenges. To 
this end, efforts must be taken to enhance ASEM’s profile by tapping into the 
resources and expertise of the institutions and networks linked to ASEM such as 
ASEF, the AEBF and ASEFUAN. There is need to strengthen the density of ties 
among these ASEM-linked institutions and network and to examine concrete 
ways of coordinating their work and profiling ASEM. Links with civil society 
should also be strengthened; the involvement of non-state actors in the ASEM 
process will enhance its legitimacy. Ultimately, for the ASEM process to really 
take off, it needs to build a strong constituency of actors who believe in ASEM. 
Fourth, some sort of institutionalization is deemed essential for the smooth 
functioning and greater efficiency of the ASEM process. The argument for a 
Secretariat is based on the fact that the enlargement of the ASEM process will make 
the ASEM process more complex and hence the need for greater coordination. 
The Secretariat can also provide focus and continuity and ensure momentum. 
More importantly, the Secretariat can help profile and raise the visibility of ASEM 
activities and achievements. Currently, the preferred official position is to have 
a virtual Secretariat. Much thought would need to be put into how to make this 
work. Also, while the European side has a permanent institution, the European 
Commission, involved in the coordination of ASEM activities, the Asian side is 
relying on rotating mechanisms which may not be as effective. Hence, the idea of 
an Asian ASEM Secretariat situated perhaps within an existing Asian institution 
such as the ASEAN Secretariat should be considered.
Fifth, the Leaders’ Summit should be kept informal and interactive to capitalize 
on what was initially seen as one of the ‘strengths’ of ASEM. The summit should 
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continue to be held biennially with ample time for frank exchange of views on 
regional and global development and with opportunities for bilateral and sub-
regional meetings at the sideline.
Conclusion
A decade is a short period for an institution, but may be considered long in politics 
with the vagaries of shifting interests, shifting alliances and changes in domestic and 
external environment. ASEM@10 is at a crossroads; it is facing both fading political 
interest and a need for rethinking its institutional design which was conceived ten 
years ago in an environment that had undergone tremendous changes. 
To continue to play a role in strengthening Asia-Europe relations, ASEM needs 
to take cognizance of the external changes and internal challenges and respond to 
the growing expectations and criticisms. 
As a 10-year old soft institution, ASEM has provided a platform for confidence 
building between EU and East Asia, but has not made any significant impact in 
the global arena in terms of tangible benefits. Tangible benefits are indispensable 
if international cooperation is to survive in the long run as nation states are 
unwilling to put resources into meetings and fora without at some stage reaping 
some of the benefits. The time therefore has come for the people involved in the 
ASEM process to seriously reconsider the design, the format, and the specific 
objectives of ASEM, and take steps to improve on the management of the process 
if interest and any progress in the ASEM process are to be maintained.
Notes
1 This chapter is drawn largely from the Report on ASEM by the Asian Research Team, led by Mr 
Tadashi Yamamoto of JCIE and Dr Yeo Lay Hwee from SIIA.
2 Robles, Alfredo, Jr. ‘ASEM and Asia-Europe Relations: Between Investment Promotion and the 
Financial Crisis’, (http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/catala/obs/working%20Papers/wp092001.html), 
accessed 01.03.2006.
3 In Keohane’s concept of cooperation discussed in his book ‘After Hegemony’, cooperation does 
not equal harmony or absence of conflict. Instead cooperation refers to a situation in which actors 
coordinate their behaviour through a process of negotiation in order to arrive at an outcome that is 
acceptable to all. In short cooperation requires active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of 
others. The mere fact that two parties share common interests does not necessarily mean cooperation 
will naturally follow. A formal definition offered by Keohane that ‘inter-governmental cooperation takes 
place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating 
realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination’. 
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The Perception of ASEM in China
Zhu Liqun
The purpose of the ASEM process is to help build a new partnership based on 
equality between Asia and Europe, to promote the democratization of international 
relations and to accelerate the development of multilateralism. China has been 
involved in the process from the very beginning, and has played an active role 
in it. It is therefore very important to analyze the Chinese public’s, elites’ and 
policy-maker’s views of the ASEM process. To some extent, it is their attitude 
and perception that influence the future development of the overall process. The 
research, supported by the Japan Centre for International Exchanges (JCIE), is 
conducted by the ASEM research team headed by Prof. Zhu Liqun, Assistant 
President and Director of European Studies Centre of China Foreign Affairs 
University. The team consists of Zhu Jiejin, Hui Gengtian, Lin Minwang and 
Sun Junhua. Thanks are extended to the departments concerned at the Xinhua	
News Agency for their help with the research project.
The Public’s Perception of the ASEM process
We handed out 1000 questionnaires and took random samples in four universities, 
namely, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Renmin University of China and 
China Foreign Affairs University. This survey, meant to find out what students 
know about ASEM, includes questions that relate to two aspects: perception of 
facts and attitudes as well as comments. The sample size was 1000, with the 
validity rate being 97%. The sample distribution conforms to the principle 
that the sample size is in proportion to the total number of students studying 
at the university: Accordingly 300 questionnaires were handed out at Tsinghua 
University, 300 at Peking University, 300 at Renmin University of China and 
100 at China Foreign Affairs University. After retrieving the questionnaires, the 
research group organized their examination, and the de-selection of invalid ones. 
Epidata software was used for data input to ensure the quality of the statistics. 
Afterwards, the data was checked and sorted by statistical software. The statistical 
158
analysis of the data was conducted using SPSS 11.5. The whole process was under 
the effective management and quality control of the research team.
Among the valid samples, 602 were male, accounting for 62.13% of the total, 
and 367 were female, accounting for 37.87%. The following table shows the 
distribution of the samples’ education background, majors and age.
Table 1: Basic information on the survey
Basic information Content Valid sample  Percent %
Gender Male 602 62.06
 Female 367 37.84
Education  Undergraduate 795 81.96
Background Graduate 146 15.05
 Others 27 2.78
Major Science 386 39.79
 Art 355 36.60
 IR 88 9.07
 Others 138 14.23
Age 19 - 22 664 68.45
 23 - 30 268 27.63
 Above 30 35 3.61
Based on the survey, we could make the following conclusions about the samples’ 
cognitive knowledge about the Asia-Europe Meeting.
1)	Students	have	limited	knowledge	of	ASEM.	
The survey suggests that students know little about ASEM and have a poor 
knowledge about the basic facts of ASEM. When asked, ‘Do you know ASEM?’, 
68.6% of the respondents answered, ‘Heard of it, but do not know it well;’ While 
only 7.64% of the respondents said, ‘Know it well,’ and 1.34% said, ‘Know it very 
well.’
We designed six questions about the basic facts of ASEM in the questionnaire 
to investigate the respondents’ knowledge about the ASEM process. The survey 
shows that on average each respondent answered only 1.3 questions correctly. The 
following table shows the six questions asked:
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Table 2: The six questions asked to test the respondents’ knowledge
Q 1 The first ASEM Summit was held in____(place).
Q 2 ASEM Summits have been held for___ times.
Q 3 There are__ states participating in the ASEM today.
Q 4 Last ASEM Summit was held ____(time).
Q 5 Asia in ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’ refers to____.
Q 6 Europe in ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’ refers to____.
From Table 3 the conclusion can be drawn that students in China know little 
about ASEM. Moreover, only 4 students – 0.4% of the total respondents – could 
correctly answer the question on the basic facts of ASEM.
Table 3: The Distribution of Correct Answers about the Basic Facts of ASEM
Number of correct answers Valid sample Valid (%)
0 351 36.2
1 232 23.9
2 212 21.9
3 115 11.9
4 49 5.1
5 7 0.7
6 4 0.4
total 970 100
When asked the questions ‘Do you know about the Asia-Europe Foundation 
(ASEF)?’ and ‘Do you know about the ASEM Trust Fund’, most respondents 
answered ‘No’. Furthermore, the percentage of students who know about ASEF 
and the ASEM Trust Fund is very low (see Chart 1).
%
80
60
40
20
0
have a good
knowledge
familiar heard of, but 
unfamiliar
unknown
Do you know ASEM?
Chart 1
1.34
7.64
68.60
22.42
The Perception of ASEM in China
160
2)	Students	have	generally	a	positive	view	towards	the	role	of	the	ASEM	process.	
The survey shows that 46.2% of the respondents think ASEM is important or very 
important. Only 4.3% think it is unimportant (see Chart 2).
Chart 2
When asked about the role of ASEM in promoting the democratization of 
international relations, 31.57% of the respondents said it was very important or 
important, and only 5.28 % thought it was not important. This result shows that 
students are quite positive about ASEM (see Chart 3).
When asked whether ASEM was strategically important to China, 66.94% of the 
respondents answered, ‘Yes.’ When asked to assess China’s role in the ASEM 
process, 44.56% of the respondents answered that it was, ‘Very important’, or 
‘Important’. 4.25% answered ‘Not important’ (see Chart 4).
Don’t know 
28%
Not important 
4.3%
Important 
21%
Fairly important 
34%
Very important 
13%
Is ASEM important?
The Role of ASEM
Chart 3
Very
important
Relatively
Important
Important Not
Important
Don’t
know
%
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Zhu Liqun
161
When asked whether the role of ASEM has been strengthened or weakened in 
recent years, 8.07% of the respondents answered ‘Greatly strengthened’, 34.64% 
said ‘Slightly strengthened,’ and 4.24% of the respondents thought ‘Weakened’ 
(see Table 4).
Table 4: The role of ASEM in recent years
Attitudes of respondents Valid sample Valid (%)
Greatly strengthened 78.00 8.07
Slightly strengthened 335.00 34.64
Not strengthened 101.00 10.44
Weakened 41.00 4.24
Don’t know 412.00 42.61
In total 967.00 100.00
There are three questions in the questionnaire, which ask for the respondents’ 
view on the role of ASEM in promoting economic cooperation, political dialogue 
as well as social and cultural exchanges. The survey shows that the respondents 
hold the view that ASEM has played the most important role in the area of social 
and cultural exchanges. According to the findings the least important role has 
been in economic cooperation (see Chart 5).
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The survey shows 53.74% of the respondents suggested that ASEM should 
give priority to economic cooperation in the future, including energy security 
cooperation, and scientific and technological cooperation, and that political 
dialogue and cultural exchange should come later (see Chart 6).
In general, students have very limited knowledge about ASEM, which is clearly 
demonstrated by their low scores for the six questions about ASEM’s basics. In 
sharp contrast with the low level of awareness, students have a positive view about 
the role of ASEM and its influence. Meanwhile the statistics show that most of the 
respondents tend to think China has played an active role in the ASEM process. 
These three points are the major conclusions of the survey.
In Chinese society students are the group most capable of receiving and 
interpreting information. If they know little about ASEM, then it is safe to deduce 
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that the general public in China knows even less about the ASEM process than 
students do.
How can this knowledge pattern be explained? An analysis of the data provided by 
the questionnaires indicates that those students who know about ASEM are those 
who major in International Relations. This is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Correlation between majors and ASEM knowledge
Do you know about ASEM?
Types of 
major
Know it 
very well
Know it 
well
Dont’t know 
it well
Don’t 
know Total
technology Count
% within Types of major
2
0.5%
15
3.9%
262
68.1%
106
27.7%
385
100%
arts Count
% within Types of major
5
1.4%
35
9.9%
249
70.3%
65
18.4%
354
100%
internation  
al studies
Count
% within Types of major
4
4.5%
14
15.9%
56
63.6%
14
15.9%
88
100%
others Count
% within Types of major
2
1.4%
9
6.5%
96
69.6%
31
22.5%
138
100%
Total Count
% within Types of major
13
1.3%
73
7.6%
663
68.7%
216
22.4%
965
100%
(χ2 = 35.605_P=0.001)
From Table 5 we can see that the percentages of respondents who know ASEM 
very well or well are high if they major in International Relations studies. 
Therefore, the distribution of knowledge about ASEM is a function of the major 
or subject that a given student has taken. This indicates that only the students 
of international studies know about the ASEM process and outsiders know little 
about it.
Yet, this gives rise to the question: why do students think highly of ASEM despite 
their scant knowledge of it? The only reason for this illogical phenomenon 
might be that young students have a generally positive perception about Europe 
and consider better Asia-Europe relations to be desirable. Students wish to see 
further development of cooperation between Asia and Europe, the advancement 
of multilateralism, the promotion of the democratization of international 
relations and China’s importance within the ASEM process. Based on this survey 
a satisfactory explanation to this question cannot be given. The analysis of the 
media coverage of ASEM shall offer further explanations.
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Media Coverage, Elites’ and Policy-maker’s Perceptions
Media	Coverage
In order to analyse the media coverage, the Xinhua News Agency’s news coverage 
and commentary about the ASEM process since 1996 has been examined. 
Furthermore, the same was done for the APEC process. This approach allows for 
a comparison and an assessment of the frequency and density of ASEM-related 
media coverage. 
After searching all published Chinese news scripts that mention ASEM-
related words or phrases within the time period from the beginning of 1996 to 
July 2005, in total 778 documents were identified. Among these 355 used words 
like ‘ASEM’ or ‘Cooperation between Asia and Europe’ in their headlines. Out of 
those 333 are factual reports and 22 are commentaries. Most commentaries have 
a positive view of ASEM, as is shown in their respective headlines (see table 6).
Table 6
Publishing time Headlines of commentaries
28/02/1996 Commentary: Creating a New Situation of Asia-Europe Cooperation
02/03/1996 News Report: Initiating New Epoch of Asia-Europe Relations
03/03/1996 People’s Daily Editorial: New Starting Point of Asia-Europe Relations
18/03/1996 ASEM, a Historic Meeting
16/10/1996 Summary Report: New Steps in Asia-Europe Cooperation
16/02/1997 Summary Report: Positive Results Achieved at ASEM Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting
31/03/1998 Summary Report: An Important Topic for ASEM
02/04/1998 Summary Report: Asia-Europe Cooperation towards the 21st Century
03/04/1998 Feature Article: Asia and Europe Joining hands in Creating the Future
05/04/1998 Summary Report: A New Chapter of Asia-Europe Cooperation
19/10/2000 Summary Report: Strengthening Cooperation between Asian and European 
Countries for Common Development
21/10/2000 Summary Report: Asia and Europe Entering the New Century Hand in Hand
26/05/2001 Summary Report: Strengthening Asia-Europe Cooperation in the New Century
25/09/2002 Summary Report: Asia-Europe Cooperation Gets on a New Stage
22/07/2003 Summary Report: Asia and Europe Attach Importance to Economic Cooperation 
for Common Development
23/07/2003 Summary Report: The 5th ASEM Economic Ministers’ Meeting Highlighted
24/07/2003 Summary Report: China Playing an Important Role in Asia-Europe Cooperation 
24/07/2003 Commentary: An Important Dialogue between Asia and Europe
25/07/2003 Summary Report: ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Prompting Consultation 
and Cooperation
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06/10/2004 International Watch: Asia-Europe Cooperation Maturing 
09/10/2004 Commentary: A New Chapter in Asia-Europe Dialog and Cooperation
09/06/2005 Asian and European Countries Seeking for Universality among Cultural 
Diversities
In the same period 2690 documents used the acronym ‘APEC’, amongst which 
945 documents have ‘APEC’ or ‘Asia-Pacific Cooperation’ in their headlines. 
And there are 26 commentaries among the 945 documents. The following table 
compares the quantities of news coverage about ASEM and APEC.
Table 7
Number of articles 
with relevant key 
phrases
Number of articles 
with relevant key 
phrases in the 
headlines
Number of 
commentaries 
about relevant 
topics
Orientation of 
comments
ASEM 778 333 22 positive
APEC 2690 945 26 generally positive
There are three times as many reports on APEC as there are on the ASEM 
process. Yet, APEC commentaries outnumber ASEM commentaries only by a 
small margin. That is to say, the news coverage about ASEM per year is only 
35.5 on average, while APEC’s is 269. One reason might be that the APEC 
economic leaders’ meetings take place annually while ASEM summits are held 
on a biannual basis.
Elites’	Perceptions
The findings on the elites’ perceptions reflect the discourse between experts in 
International Relations and Asia-Europe Affairs during the ‘Seminar of Evaluation 
of Asia-Europe Relations and the 10-Year Process of ASEM’, which was held by 
European Studies Centre of China Foreign Affairs University on September 15th, 
2005. Besides the conclusion reached at the seminar, the reference information 
also includes some articles and literature on the ASEM process1.
Although the news reports are positive on the whole, the scholars of 
international relations, especially Asia-Europe relations, take both positive as 
well as negative views on the ASEM process. On the one hand, they think ASEM 
has made impressive progress in the last decade. On the other hand, they also 
contend that the ASEM process faces many challenges. 
On the positive side, the scholars think ASEM has made achievements 
in the following three aspects. First, ASEM serves as a platform and channel 
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through which the consultation and cooperation between Asia and Europe in 
international affairs are enhanced. The ASEM Summit and Foreign Ministers’ 
Meetings have held dialogues on major international and regional issues of 
common concern, including global issues, Asian and European politics, security 
situations, hot regional issues etc. Therefore, ASEM has played a role in building 
mutual trust and promoting political dialogues among Asian and European 
countries. The ASEM Declaration on Multilateralism, released by the 6th Asia-
Europe Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in April 2004, reflects the consensus that 
Asia and Europe share with respect to broad areas of international order, like 
politics, security, development, dialogues of civilizations etc. Asia and Europe 
thus expand their influence in each other’s region through ASEM. This process is 
conducive to the democratization of international relations and the development 
of multilateralism.
Second, it has made efforts to promote dialogues on sustainable development 
of the two continents and the world economy. Talks on macro economic and fiscal 
policy coordination are carried out through programs such as TFAP and IPAP 
in order to advance the bidirectional investment flows. Furthermore, ASEM also 
contributes to the financial stability of Asia through the setting up of the ASEM 
Trust Fund.
Third, under the framework of ASEM, active cooperation has been conducted 
and progress has been made in the areas of education, science and technology, 
environment, social security, health care, immigration and the fight against 
trans-national crime. Such cooperation also initiated a process of building a new 
concept of Asia-Europe relations, which is characterized by equal partnership and 
multilateral cooperation. The common goal of Asia and Europe is to accelerate 
the building of a world of peace, cooperation and harmony without hegemony.
In spite of the positive points, most of the scholars also see the problems 
and challenges which the ASEM process is facing. They can be summed up as 
follows:
First, ASEM is not the priority concern of either party’s foreign policy. European 
countries’ priority list includes the eastward expansion of the EU, issues of the 
greater neighbouring areas and the Middle East etc. East Asian issues are just one 
of its many policy concerns. Even though the EU puts emphasis on participating 
in Asian affairs, ASEM is only one of the channels for its participation. The EU 
pays greater attention to the bilateral mechanisms with ASEAN, China and Japan 
than to the multilateral mechanism of ASEM. Europe would like ASEM to be a 
tool that facilitates the convergence of Asian and European policies, since the EU 
underscores the political dialogues and the direction of the future development 
of political cooperation with Asia.
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As for East Asia, the countries in the region have never become an integrated 
whole when dealing with the EU in the ASEM process. They share neither a clear 
overall objective nor the same degree of attention to ASEM. Most East Asian 
countries are more interested in economic and technological cooperation with 
Europe than in other issue areas. Under such circumstances, the major challenge 
ASEM faces is how to change the function of ‘a forum’ and make practical 
progress.
Second, the fact that ASEM is not institutionalized has resulted in loose 
cooperation and slow development. ASEM holds that all countries, large or 
small, are equal, and adopts the principle of consensus. Although it has set up a 
regular meeting mechanism, it has neither official treaties nor institutionalized 
arrangements, and the papers signed during the meetings put no binding power 
on its members whatsoever. This un-institutional and unbinding arrangement 
may help to build up a flexible and comfortable cooperation environment and 
enhance mutual trust and cooperative will. But it also blocks information exchange, 
wastes resources and causes inefficiency. Decision-making by consensus has 
resulted in the fact that many valuable proposals cannot be adopted because of 
individual countries’ opposition. This has seriously paralyzed the function of 
ASEM. In addition, documents adopted by ASEM have no legal power. In this 
case, ASEM could become a chatting place wasting both time and resources for 
the expressions of the wills of parties.
Some scholars argue that the lack of formalization and institutionalization 
is exactly a major feature of ASEM, and a feature that should be kept during 
the current stage of the development of the process. These scholars do not 
emphasize formal institutions or binding force, but shared norms. Due to the 
asymmetric power distribution, differences in culture, tradition, values, and 
interests between Asia and Europe, and variety of internal interests of both sides, 
‘the institutionalization of ASEM, if it were to be realized in the future, should be 
flexible and suitable for the diversity of actors in regional cooperation’2.
Third, there has been inequality in the process of Asia-Europe cooperation, 
although ASEM seeks to set up equal partnership. Differing from the United 
States in the ways of imposing policy pressures on Asian countries for issues 
such as human rights and democracy, European countries admit the diversity 
of civilizations in Asia-Europe cooperation and hope to solve human rights 
problems through political dialogues. But actually they sometimes also adopt 
‘double standards’. ‘European centrism’ and a ‘European superiority complex’ 
has convinced European countries that anything that benefits them will of course 
benefit the rest of the world. Consequently, European countries have hoped 
that Asian countries would develop in accordance with the European mode, 
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and completely accept Western values such as democracy, freedom and human 
rights.
Fourth, the ‘American factor’ is an important aspect which affects Asia-
Europe cooperation. Both Europe and Asia attach great importance to relations 
with America, since the United States enjoys an obviously advantageous position 
in the handling of Asian affairs, especially with regard to security issues. The 
expansion of European influence in Asia through ASEM has aroused the concern 
of the United States. Further Asia-Europe cooperation will shake US dominance 
in Asia and provoke reactions. China-Europe negotiations on the lifting of the 
EU arms embargo on China have felt pressure from America. Since both Asia 
and Europe place their relations with the US as the No. 1 issue in diplomacy, the 
process of Asia-Europe cooperation is of course influenced and restrained by 
American policies and goals.
Perceptions	of	Policy-makers
In order to analyse the perceptions of policy-makers that are involved in 
ASEM affairs, interviews were conducted with officials from the International 
Department, the Policy Research Department and the European Department of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. The interviews were conducted in the 
autumn of 2005.
Driving forces for the development of ASEM
The ASEM process has been initiated and developed against the background of 
economic globalization and political multi-polarization. Guided by its foreign 
strategy with effective multilateralism at its core, the EU seeks to exert an active 
influence on the world. At the same time, the influence of East Asian countries 
continues to grow owing to their rapid economic development. But the linkage 
between Asia and Europe at present is much weaker than that of America and 
East Asia or that of America and Europe. Thus, it is a strategic necessity to develop 
close cooperative relations between the two continents, who have a lot in common 
in promoting multilateralism and safeguarding global security and prosperity.
Economic globalization is another driving force for closer Asia-Europe 
cooperation. To build a cooperative structure and a win-win situation is in the 
economic interests of both parties. Currently, the total population of ASEM 
members amounts to 2.4 billion, which is 40% of the world’s total; the total 
amount of ASEM members’ GDP reaches 2 billion dollars, which adds up to 
half of the world’s GDP; the trade volume among its members approximates 
1.33 billion dollars, 60% of the world’s total. These numbers indicate that Asia-
Europe cooperation will have great impact on the global pattern and economic 
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development. China’s promotion of ASEM is also driven by China’s domestic 
demands for economic development and a harmonious society. Conducting 
economic and technological cooperation with Europe and learning from its 
governing experience are of great significance for China’s strive to become a 
harmonious and well-off society.
Content and Features of the ASEM process
The cooperation conducted under the framework of ASEM covers political 
dialogues, economic and trade cooperation and cultural exchanges. The ASEM 
process is currently characterized by dialogues with weak cooperation. The 
dialogues often focus on policies and strategies, emphasizing understanding 
and coordination of each other’s positions. The institutionalized cooperation in 
the economic and trade area is rather weak with few significant achievements. 
Besides, the development of cooperation is unbalanced in areas of politics, trade 
and economy and culture. There are many high-level political dialogues, but 
inadequate policy cooperation in economy and trade. Yet, the dialogues among 
cultures and civilizations appear to be very active.
The issues discussed in ASEM, which are closely related to the latest 
developments in international affairs, feature the flexibility of the dialogue 
mechanism and the diversity of its topics. Unlike APEC whose focus is mainly 
on economy and trade, as well as science and technology, a great variety of 
issues are discussed in ASEM. Political dialogues and cultural exchanges have 
helped demonstrate the soft power of member states. Despite the immature 
institutionalization of ASEM, Chairman’s Statements deal with hot issues like 
global political security and convey very powerful political messages and express 
the political wills of Asian and European actors.
Problems and Prospects of ASEM
We should not make negative assessments about ASEM simply because it has 
made few significant achievements. Instead, we should evaluate it from a long-
term and strategic perspective. Though cooperation has been inadequate and few 
substantive results have been achieved up to now, dialogues, the main content 
of ASEM, after all help facilitate mutual understanding and lay foundations for 
further coordination. Therefore, dialogues are conducive to the development 
of cooperation. With the deepening of mutual understanding, cooperation 
will be a natural result. It takes time to go from dialogues to cooperation since 
such a step has to bridge the gap between the two regions in terms of cultures, 
traditions and values. Therefore, the accumulative role of ASEM should not be 
underestimated.
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However, the problems of ASEM should not be overlooked either. European 
and East Asian countries do have different political appeals in the process of 
ASEM. The former countries emphasize more the un-institutionalization of the 
meetings as well as the role of the political and human rights dialogues, while the 
latter are greatly concerned with actual cooperation in economy and trade and, 
in this area, intend to turn dialogues into cooperation. Thus, Asian countries 
have greater enthusiasm towards ASEM than their European counterparts. In 
sum, different political appeals have restrained the cooperation and prevented 
the process from reaching its full potential. Because of different historical 
backgrounds and cultural values, there are also some in-depth problems that 
add difficulties to the realization of equal partnership between EU and Asia. The 
ASEM Economic Ministers’ and Finance Ministers’ Meetings were postponed in 
2004 because of the Burma issue. Though the approach of the EU differs from 
the one of the US in how to deal with the idea of human rights, the EU and the 
US have a lot more in common in terms of ideologies and values.
There are outstanding technical problems as well. Ten Central and Eastern 
European countries acceded to the EU in 2004 and thus became ASEM members. 
This enlargement of ASEM caused many practical problems in the management 
of ASEM and the effective dialogue and cooperation among member countries. 
Big differences among Asian countries also add to the difficulty in the policy 
coordination within the ASEM process. Therefore Asian countries are often in 
disadvantage since they cannot coordinate and unify their positions.
China and ASEM
The Chinese government pays great attention to the multilateral diplomatic 
mechanism of ASEM. It holds the view that the process is both in the interests of 
Asia and Europe and that its results are of great importance to the development 
of mutual cooperation. This is even more important when assessed from a long-
term and strategic perspective.
The importance that the Chinese government has attached to ASEM is 
not merely rhetorical. Among all the members, China has made the most 
proposals for the convening of ministers’ meetings. China has taken actions 
to actively promote the ASEM process. Besides, China enjoys close and good 
cooperative relations with the member states of the EU. The EU countries 
have paid great attention to China’s role in ASEM. Furthermore, the Chinese 
government reckons that the ASEM process has set up a good platform for 
dialogue among leaders from the EU and East Asia. The multilateral mechanism 
of ASEM complements the bilateral mechanism between the EU and China 
well.
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Conclusions and Suggestions
From the perspective of perception, the Research Team has analyzed and studied 
the achievements made and challenges faced by the Asia-Europe Meeting over 
the past ten years. The general conclusions and suggestions are as follows:
General conclusions: First, college students have rather poor knowledge about 
the Asia-Europe Meeting, but think positively of its influence and role. The level 
of awareness of the general public can be deduced from the students’ perception 
of the ASEM process. It can thus be stated that the general public knows even 
less about the process. Yet, its evaluation and attitudes tend to be positive. Poor 
knowledge about the ASEM process correlates with the slight coverage by the 
media, while the positive evaluation and attitudes are consistent with the positive 
news reports and official perception. This reflects the public support of the 
Chinese government’s policy towards the process.
Second, the elites have relatively complex perceptions, and their evaluation, 
though both positive and negative, is mainly critical. For this part of the survey, 
the samples are experts and scholars who do research on ASEM. They have a 
comprehensive and systematic understanding of the process and are capable 
of a comparative and analytical approach. Accordingly they have more complex 
perception than the general public. While making a positive appraisal of ASEM, 
they all expressed their disappointment. Their evaluation of the status, role and 
influence of ASEM is far more negative than that of the general public and the 
policy-makers.
Third, the Chinese government has a developmental and far-sighted 
perspective on the ASEM process. It places more emphasis on its potentials, 
the role of dialogues and communications, and shows more patience with its 
gradual process of development. From the official perception, we find that China 
attaches great importance to Asia-Europe cooperation and the development of 
China-Europe relations, not only to meet the challenges in economy and in the 
process of globalization, but also to meet the demands of its own development. 
It is not intended to counterbalance the United States.
The rapid development of globalization and the profound changes of the 
international situation have posed new challenges to both Asia and Europe. Europe 
is confronted with huge pressures imposed by profound economic restructuring, 
while Asia, witnessing the deepening of regional cooperation needs to learn from 
European experience. Europe’s development needs Asia and Asian development is 
indispensable from the cooperation and support of Europe. Besides, there are still 
some misunderstandings in the bilateral relations between Asian and European 
countries, which call for efforts to enhance confidence, remove mistrust and 
reinforce mutual communication. Therefore, it is essential to further strengthen 
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Asia-European cooperation by fostering substantive results from the Asia-Europe 
Meeting. To this end, we put forward the following suggestions:
Firstly, ASEM should be institutionalized. A small standing body such as a 
secretariat should be set up to replace the mechanism of four coordinators so as 
to ensure effective coordination and communication and avoid waste of human 
and material resources. In order to make substantive achievements efforts should 
also be made to follow up and implement ASEM initiatives once they have been 
adopted by the leaders.
Secondly, new subjects and cutting-in points should be explored for the further 
development of ASEM, such as cooperation in the areas of energy, finance, 
science and technology and education. These new subjects should be concrete 
and practical, reflecting the common concerns of both Asia and Europe and 
serving common interests. The cooperation in functional fields promises more 
tangible results by avoiding politically and ideologically sensitive issues.
Thirdly, extensive people-to-people exchanges should be enhanced. Various 
ways of communication can be adopted to strengthen the ties, promote cultural 
understanding and deepen friendship. We should also set up a mechanism for 
regular exchange of visits of young people and regular contact and cooperation 
mechanisms between institutions of higher learning. New ways of thinking 
should be cultivated through people-to-people exchanges and identity nurtured 
between the two regions by adopting a positive and constructive attitude towards 
the Asia-European political dialogue. Identity is going to be an important factor 
in directing the future development of Asia-Europe relations.
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Abbreviations 
ACP  African, Carribbean and the Pacific
ADB Asian Development Dank
AEBF  Asia-Europe Business Forum
AECF Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework 
AEVG Asia-Europe Vision Group
AFC Asian Financial Crisis 
AIBC ASEAN-India Business Council 
AMF  Asian Monetary Fund
AMIS II African Union Mission to Sudan II 
AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 
APMF Asian Pacific Monetary Fund 
APT ASEAN+3 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEF Asia-Europe Foundation 
ASEFUAN Asia-Europe Foundation Alumni Network
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
AVS ASEM Virtual Secretariat 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BIMSTEC Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic 
Cooperation
BJP  Bharatiya Janata Party 
BOBCOM Bay of Bengal Community
CAEC  Council for Asia Europe Cooperation
CAR Central Asia Republics 
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 
CECA Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMI Crisis Management Initiative 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
COSA Commission on Security Arrangements 
CPM  Communist Party of India
CSP Country Strategy Papers 
CURD Compania Vale do Rio Doce 
DDA Doha Development Agenda
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus 
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EAS East Asian Summit
ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
EIAS European Institute for Asian Studies 
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
EMBRAER Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica 
EMS  European Monetary System
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EOM Election Observation Mission 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union 
EUPM European Union Police Mission 
FAC Foreign Affairs Canada
FEALAC  Forum for East Asian and Latin American Cooperation
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GAM Free Aceh Movement 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HLM  High-level Meeting
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 
ICAS International Convention of Asian Scholars
ICC International Criminal Court 
IFI international financial institution
IIAS International Institute for Asian Studies 
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMP Initial Monitoring Presence 
IORARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IPAP  Investment Promotion Action Plan
JCIE Japan Centre for International Exchanges 
LoC Line of Control 
Mercosur Mercado Comun de Sul
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
Minmetals Minerals and Metals Corporation 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
NSC New Security Concept 
abbreviations
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OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPLAN Operational Plan 
PDVSA  Petroleos de Venezuela SA
PULO Pattani United Liberation Organisation
R&D Research and Development
READI Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument 
RII Rabobank International Indonesia 
RO Regional Organisations
ROSCs Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
SAFTA SAARC Free Trade Area 
SAPTA SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation 
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TFIP  Trade Facilitation and Investment Promotion 
TFAP  Trade Facilitation Action Plan
TREATI Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative 
UN United Nations
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO  World Trade Organization
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
abbreviations
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